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Abstract
There are many methods for modelling the reliability of systems based on component failure
data. This task becomes more complex as systems increase in size, or undertake missions
that comprise multiple discrete modes of operation, or phases. Existing techniques require
certain levels of expertise in the model generation and calculation processes, meaning that
risk and reliability assessments of systems can often be expensive and time-consuming.
This is exacerbated as system complexity increases.
This thesis presents a novel method which generates reliability models for phased-
mission systems, based on Petri nets, from simple input files. The process has been
automated with a piece of software designed for engineers with little or no experience
in the field of risk and reliability. The software can generate models for both repairable
and non-repairable systems, allowing redundant components and maintenance cycles to be
included in the model.
Further, the software includes a simulator for the generated models. This allows a user
with simple input files to perform automatic model generation and simulation with a single
piece of software, yielding detailed failure data on components, phases, missions and the
overall system. A system can also be simulated across multiple consecutive missions. To
assess performance, the software is compared with an analytical approach and found to
match within ±5% in both the repairable and non-repairable cases.
The software documented in this thesis could serve as an aid to engineers designing
new systems to validate the reliability of the system. This would not require specialist
consultants or additional software, ensuring that the analysis provides results in a timely
and cost-effective manner.
Keywords: Phased-Mission Systems, Automated, Model Generation, Simulation, Petri
nets, Non-Repairable, Repairable, Operational Mode Tables and Decision Tables.
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1.1 Background
Risk and reliability has played a significant role in the design of major systems in a range
of industries in recent decades. Assessing the reliability of systems has aided in improving
the safety over the years. Major disasters such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
1986 illustrate the necessity of robust risk and reliability analysis. System assessments
applied at the design phase can reduce the chance of undesirable incidents occurring when
a system is in operation. This can be achieved by identifying components or combinations
of components within a system that could lead to an undesirable event; this information
can then show design engineers the weaknesses in a design. The reliability of the design
can then be enhanced, typically by introducing maintenance cycles or redundancy within
the system.
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Many methods have advanced since the Second World War to assess the probability
(or frequency) of an undesirable, or hazardous, event occurring. The risk, R, or expected
loss can be defined as the product of the consequence, C, and the probability, P , of the
undesirable event occurring. This is represented in equation 1.1.1.
R = C · P (1.1.1)
If the risk is too high then the system is not suited to handle the undesirable event. By
reducing one or both of the values that evaluate to the expected loss, an acceptable level
of risk may be found. Consequence, for example, could be reduced by finding a way to
reduce the number of people that work with the system. To reduce the probability of the
undesirable event occurring, the system itself would need to change. This could be achieved
through either a significant overhaul of the design or the introduction of redundancies and
fail-safes. The reduction of this probability is the main focus of the work presented in this
thesis; it introduces a more efficient means of acquiring the probability of the undesirable
event occurring.
System reliability models are a way of representing the undesirable events and from
them calculating the system reliability. They have been used over the years to determine
whether a system is reliable to use for its intended purpose. These models can be used
within the design phase to aid the designer in investigating implementation options.
A reliability assessment of the design is generally required to prove it can perform to
applicable standards. Usually a specialist team is required to complete this assessment,
as the designers to do not have the necessary skills to complete this task. It can take a
significant amount of time to generate the reliability models for the system; this can limit
the scope for the analysis to influence the design.
1.2 Research Objectives
The work presented in this thesis provides a method by which to assess a system at the
design phase allowing the reliability analysis of the system to influence the design in a timely
fashion. The method uses information about the system and the mission the system is to
undertake. This information is translated into a reliability model to assess the mission
success/failure. The system information can be entered by a member of the design team
rather than requiring specialist knowledge. The program then builds the model and gives
the user the relevant data about the mission. This information can then be used to improve
the system reliability.
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1.3 Basic Definitions
This section gives a description of some of the commonly used terms in the thesis. The
following information is based on Andrews and Moss (2002) which also contains further
reading on these topics.
1.3.1 Hazard Rate
The hazard rate, or conditional failure rate, is a measure of the rate at which a component
or system fails. By plotting the hazard rate against time, the curve of the graph usually
follows that of the bath-tub curve. Figure 1.1 shows a generalised view of the bath-tub
curve.
Figure 1.1 shows three distinct phases of a component or system’s life-cycle. The first,
burn-in, shows a decreasing hazard rate as component manufacturing defects are most
likely to present themselves early in the component’s life-cycle. The second phase, useful
life, shows a constant failure rate as a result of random failures. The final phase, wearout,
shows an increasing failure rate as the component/system deteriorates with age.
1.3.2 Reliability and Unreliability
The reliability, R(t), of a component or system is the probability that an item (component,
equipment, or system) will operate without failure for a stated period of time under
specified conditions. This is a measure that the item under consideration is successful
over a given period of time. Equation 1.3.1 represents the reliability of a system with a
constant hazard rate, λ. Constant hazard rate is also referred to as the failure rate.
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R(t) = e−λt (1.3.1)
The unreliability, F (t), of a component or system is the probability that a com-
ponent/system fails to work continuously over a specified time period, under specified
conditions. The relationship between reliability and unreliability is given as follows:
F (t) = 1−R(t) (1.3.2)
1.3.3 Availability and Unavailability
The availability, A(t), of a component or system is defined as the probability that the
component or system is working at a particular instant. Alternatively, it is the fraction
of the total time the component or system is able to undertake its required function. The
availability of a system is an important measure of the performance of the system. This
value is calculated when a system failure can be tolerated and repair can be initiated.
Equation 1.3.3 represents the availability of a system.
A =
MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
(1.3.3)
Where the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is defined as the reciprocal of the failure rate
1
λ
Ł
and the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is defined as the average time taken from the
failure of a system to its start-up, τ . The MTTR is also defined as the reciprocal of the
repair rate

1
ν
Ł
.
The unavailability, Q(t), of a component or system is the counterpart to availability
and is the probability that a component or system does not perform its required function
for time t. Unavailability has the following relationship:
Q(t) = 1−A(t) (1.3.4)
1.3.4 Maintenance Policies
There are three types of maintenance policies for systems or components: no repair,
scheduled maintenance and unscheduled maintenance. Each of these is given in detail
below.
1.3.4.1 No Repair
For this type of policy there is no maintenance once a system fails. If a system is said to
be working at a given time t, then the system must have been working continuously up
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to time t. Therefore the reliability and availability are equal. Equation 1.3.1 would be
applicable for analysing a system with this policy.
1.3.4.2 Scheduled Maintenance
Faults in systems do not always become apparent the moment they have failed. This can
occur when a system is dormant and can only be detected when there is a demand on the
system, or is discovered during a scheduled maintenance. This can be quantified by finding
the probability of the system being in a failed state at any time by equation 1.3.5.
QAV = λ

θ
2
+ τ

(1.3.5)
Where λ is the unrevealed failure rate of the system and θ is the test interval.
Equation 1.3.5 can be approximated to equation 1.3.6 when the mean repair time, τ ,
is much shorter than the test interval, θ.
QAV =
λθ
2
(1.3.6)
For the scheduled maintenance policy an inspection is carried out after a fixed time
interval. When a failure is discovered during this inspection, repair is initiated. As this
maintenance is based on the time between inspections, θ, the unavailability is a function
of this time. Therefore, equation 1.3.5 is used for the average unavailability of the system.
Another form of the average unavailability can be found from integrating between the
interval times as shown below. This is more accurate than the simplified equation given
in equation 1.3.6. Equation 1.3.7 shows the integral between t = 0 and t = θ, the first
inspection period. This equation represents the unavailability of a system (or component).
Between these inspection intervals the system (or component) is non-repairable.
QAV =
1
θ
Z θ
0
1− e−λtdt (1.3.7)
By integrating, equation 1.3.7 this gives equation 1.3.8.
QAV = 1− 1
λθ

1− e−λθ
Ł
(1.3.8)
1.3.4.3 Unscheduled Maintenance
This policy initiates any repairs when a failure occurs. For this type of maintenance policy
the analysis is only dependent on the failure and repair rate of the system (or component),
as the fault is known as soon as it occurs; therefore there is no detection time. By the use
of Laplace transforms it can be shown that the unavailability of a system (or component)
is given by equation 1.3.9.
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Q(t) =
λ
λ+ ν

1− e−(λ+ν)t

(1.3.9)
For components that have settled down into their steady state, taking t → ∞ in
equation 1.3.9 gives the steady state equation, equation 1.3.10.
Q =
λ
λ+ ν
(1.3.10)
This can be simplified further, given that the MTTF will be significantly larger than
the MTTR, therefore reducing equation 1.3.10 to equation 1.3.11.
Q = λτ (1.3.11)
1.3.5 Cut Sets and Minimal Cut Sets
A failure mode, or system failure mode, is the failure of a system that can occur through the
failure of a single component or a combination of components in that system. These failure
modes can be defined by cut sets. Cut sets are a list of basic components or combinations
of basic components that, should they fail, would cause a system failure event. Minimal
cut sets are an extension of this concept that expresses the minimal set of components
that is sufficient to cause each failure event.
1.3.6 Implicants and Prime Implicants
Implicants and Prime Implicants are similar to cut sets and minimal cut sets, in that they
show what components, or combination of components, cause a system failure event. The
difference is that implicants are combinations of working and failed components that cause
a system failure event. Prime implicants are the minimal, but sufficient combinations of
working and failed components required to cause a failure event.
1.4 Reliability Techniques
As the work focuses on the automatic building of a reliability model, the chosen modelling
technique should cater for all types of systems and missions. The following section discusses
the different modelling techniques available.
1.4.1 Combinatorial
The following techniques look at the combinations of failure, usually of components, and
the effects they have on the overall system state.
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1.4.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis
H. A. Watson of Bell Laboratories in 1961 whilst connected to the US Air Force contract to
study the Minuteman Launch control system first conceived the idea of Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA). D. Haasl of Boeing Company saw the merits and the value of this technique, and
with a team, used this method for the whole Minuteman study. From this point onwards
the Boeing Company used FTA for the design of commercial aircraft. Boeing Company in
conjunction with the University of Washington in 1965 sponsored the first System Safety
Conference where FTA papers were first presented. The interest of FTA soon spread
beyond the Aerospace industry, with particular interest shown in the Nuclear industry
(Ericson II 1999).
Fault tree analysis is a method of graphically displaying how an undesirable event could
occur. This is accomplished using different symbols to demonstrate how components are
linked to other components in the event of an undesirable event. From this structure the
probability of system failure can be calculated.
When constructing a fault tree, the top event must first be described. The top event is
the resulting failure of a system or process, i.e. a specific system failure mode. For example
a top event could be “Landing gear failure”. From the top event branches are constructed
which are used to show how such an event could occur. To construct the branches of the
fault tree a number of gates and events are used to link them. These are listed in Table
1.1 and Table 1.2 respectively. For the full list of gate and event symbols see Andrews and
Moss (2002), which also provides background information on this section.
Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative analysis of a fault tree is used to identify the failure modes of a system. These
failure modes are used to quantify the potential failure of a system. These failure modes
are defined as cut sets. These are discussed in Section 1.3.5.
To find the cut sets of a fault tree, there are two main approaches that can be taken.
The top-down and the bottom-up approach. Logic expressions are used in conjunction
with three laws in order to obtain the cut sets. In these expressions; ‘AND’ is represented
by ‘.’ and ‘OR’ by ‘+’. The following are the three laws used in the process;
1. Distributive Law: This is used to expand out any brackets, e.g. (A+B)(C+D) =
A.C +A.D +B.C +B.D
2. Idempotent Law: This is used to remove repeated cut sets, e.g. A+ A = A, and
is used to remove repeated failure events, e.g. A.A = A
3. Absorption Law: This is used to remove unnecessary non-minimal combinations,
e.g. A+A.C = A
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Table 1.1: Gate symbols (Andrews & Moss 2002)
Symbol Name Description
AND gate Output event occurs if all input events occursimultaneously.
OR gate Output event occurs if at least one of the input
events occur.
k-of-n
k n1
k-out-of-n gate Output event occurs if at least k events out ofn events occur. E.g. 2-out-of-3.
NOT gate Output event occurs if the input events DO
NOT occur.
To demonstrate each of these methods an example of a fault tree was constructed for
a system with six basic events A, B, C, D and E which is given in Figure 1.2.
The top-down approach begins with the top event and is expanded in terms of the next
level gate. In the case of the fault tree in Figure 1.2 this would be the AND gate. The first
expansion would therefore be the inputs into this gate, G1 ·G2. From there the next level
gate would be considered for both G1 and G2, continuously expanding the next level gate
until the top event is presented in terms of only the basic events. Equation 1.4.1 shows
the top event for the fault tree in Figure 1.2.
T = A.C.D +A.C.E +A.B.C.F +B.D +B.D.E +B.D.F +D.E + E +B.E.F (1.4.1)
Hence the minimal cut sets are:
T = A.C.D +A.B.C.F +B.D + E (1.4.2)
The bottom-up approach is similar to the top-down approach, but instead of starting
from the top event, this approach moves from the basic events up through the fault tree. By
using the three laws given above, the top event in terms of the minimal cuts are obtained.
This leads to the same expression as equation 1.4.2.
Any of these methods can be used to obtain the top event; the choice of which one to
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Table 1.2: Event symbols (Andrews & Moss 2002)
Symbol Name Description
Top or intermediate event
Describes the event occurring such as the
top event or the intermediate steps after
the top event. These are connected to logic
gates.
Basic event
These are found at the end of the branches
of a fault tree. These usually represent the
basic components of a system.
Transfer symbol Represents a part of the fault tree that isrepeated elsewhere.
use is entirely up to the individual as each method provides the same result. Once the
minimal cut sets are obtained the fault tree can then be analysed quantitatively.
Quantitative Analysis
Quantitative analysis of fault trees can determine the performance of the overall system, as
it can be used to determine the probability, or frequency, of the particular system failure
mode under consideration. Two aspects are discussed here: the top event probability and
importance measures.
Top Event Failure Probability
The top event failure probability is dependent on what the top event is and is calculated by
combining the failure probability of each minimal cut set. This can be achieved using the
inclusion-exclusion principle. The probability of a minimal cut set occurring is the product
of the probability of each component in the cut set occurring. The top event occurs if any
one of the minimal cut sets occurs, so the unavailability of the system can be represented
by equation 1.4.3.
QE =
NCX
i=1
P (Ci)−
NCX
i=2
i−1X
j=1
P (Ci ∩ Cj) · · · · · ·+ (−1)NC+1P (C1 ∩ C2 · · · ∩ CNC ) (1.4.3)
Where QE is the exact probability of the top event, NC is the total number of cut sets
and Ci and Cj are the ith and the jth minimal cut set.
For large systems, many minimal cut sets will exist that could cause a top event failure,
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Top Event
Gate 1
EGate 3
Gate 2
Gate 4 Gate 5
A C B D
D
Gate 6E
B F
Figure 1.2: Example fault tree
hence using the inclusion-exclusion principle can be time consuming and computationally
expensive. Approximations are therefore considered to quantify the top event probability.
The first of the approximations is the rare event approximation or upper bound. This
approximation takes only the first term of the inclusion-exclusion equation, as shown in
equation 1.4.4.
QUB =
NCX
i=1
P (Ci) (1.4.4)
The next approximation is the lower bound, which takes the first and second term of
equation 1.4.3 as shown in equation 1.4.5.
QLB =
NCX
i=1
P (Ci)−
NCX
i=2
i−1X
j=1
P (Ci ∩ Cj) (1.4.5)
The final approximation considered here is the Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound
(MCSUB), which is described using equation 1.4.6.
QMCSUB = 1−
NCY
i=1
(1− P (Ci)) (1.4.6)
The relationship between these approximations is given in equation 1.4.7.
QLB ≤ QE ≤ QMCSUB ≤ QUB (1.4.7)
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Importance Measures
In system reliability analysis, importance measures can be calculated for each component
or minimal cut set and are used to identify weak areas of a system that could lead to,
or be a contributing factor leading to, a top event. The measures assign a numerical
value to each basic event or minimal cut set which allows them to be ranked in order
of their contribution to the occurrence to the top event. There are many importance
measures available for system reliability (see Andrews and Moss ((2002))). Two of the most
common are Birnbaum’s measure of importance and the criticality measure of importance
(Birnbaum (1969)). These measures are both based on a critical system state. The critical
system state of component i is the case in which a failure in component i causes a failure of
the entire system. Birnbaum’s measure of importance, Gi is defined as the probability that
the system is in a critical state for component i. Equation 1.4.8 is Birnbaum’s measure of
importance.
Gi(t) =
∂QSY S(t)
∂qi(t)
(1.4.8)
Where qi(t) is the probability of failure of component i and QSY S(t) is the probability
of failure of the system.
Birnbaum’s importance measure was built on to include the contribution from
component i to the system failure; this is the criticality measure of importance. Equation
1.4.9 gives the criticality measure as the proportion that component i failures could cause
the system to fail.
ICRi =
Gi(t)qi(t)
QSY S(t)
(1.4.9)
1.4.1.2 Reliability Block Diagram
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) or Reliability Networks are a method of determining
system reliability using block diagrams to show system structure. Unlike fault trees, RBDs
are success orientated and so the dependencies between the components represent how the
system will function. (Andrews & Moss 2002).
RBDs consist of the following five features; a start node, an end node, a set of nodes, V ,
a set of edges, E, and an incidence function, φ. The incidence function is used to associate
each edge with a set of ordered nodes. The edges are used to represent the components
within a given system. The nodes are used to show the structure of the system, in that
they are the points at which components are joined. An example RBD is given in Figure
1.3 constructed from four components, with four links between them. Each of the features
given above can be defined as following for the example system:
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B
C
A
1 2 3
D
4
Figure 1.3: Example reliability block diagram
E = {A,B,C,D} (1.4.10)
V = {1, 2, 3, 4} (1.4.11)
φ = A→ (1, 2)
B → (2, 3)
C → (2, 3)
D → (3, 4) (1.4.12)
To show that a component is working in the system the edges X → (i, j) represent that
there is a path from node i to node j if component X is working normally. The path is
broken if component X fails. Using the RBD in Figure 1.3 there are two paths that can be
taken from the start node, 1 to the end node 4. If a path exists between these two nodes
then the system is in a working state.
Series Reliability Block Diagrams
When a system is non-redundant i.e. it will not tolerate failures, then the components are
placed in series, dictating that if any component in the system fails then the system fails.
The general solution for n components for the unreliability and reliability of a series RBD
are given in equations 1.4.13 and 1.4.14, respectively. When evaluating the reliability of a
system, the greater the number of components, the less reliable the system is.
QSY S = 1−
nY
i=1
(1− qi) (1.4.13)
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RSY S =
nY
i=1
ri (1.4.14)
Parallel Reliability Block Diagrams
In comparison to series block diagrams where all components must be working for a system
to work, parallel RBDs require only one path from the start node to the end node to exist
for the system to work. The general form for n components for the unreliability and
reliability of a system with parallel components are given in equations 1.4.15 and 1.4.16,
respectively. The greater the number of components the lower the probability of failure.
QSY S =
nY
i=1
qi (1.4.15)
RSY S = 1−
nY
i=1
(1− ri) (1.4.16)
RBDs can also be made from both series and parallel connections, such as Figure 1.3.
If within a branch of a parallel section exists a series of components, then the series of
components are assessed first using equations 1.4.13 and 1.4.14. These series components
can then be considered as a single component, as the parallel components are assessed
using equations 1.4.15 and 1.4.16. If there were two sets of parallel components in series,
then each set of parallel components would be assessed first and each set treated as a single
component and then these two single components would be assessed in series.
Voting Systems in Reliability Block Diagrams
Voting systems are used when a system requires a combination of k-out-of-n components to
be in a working state, where n represents the number of components in the voting system,
of which k must work for the system to function. Sometimes the components within a
voting system are identical and therefore are used in a redundant capacity. For analysis
purposes to begin with, this will be assumed. The value of k and n are given at the side
of the voting system in the form of a fraction, for example, where k is 2 and n is 3, the
voting system would be represented by 2/3 at the side of the parallel RBD. The general
form for the calculation of the reliability for each combination of working components is
given in equation 1.4.17.
P (k components work) = nCkr
kqn−k (1.4.17)
The unreliability of the voting system can also be calculated in a similar way with r
and q reversed in equation 1.4.17. Using the example of 2-out-of-3 must work for the voting
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system to be successful, equation 1.4.18 shows the unreliability of the voting system. This
shows the number of components that, should they fail, would cause the system to fail.
QSY S = P (Two components fail) + P (Three components fail)
= 3q2r + q3 (1.4.18)
When a voting system has non-identical components, then the analysis reflects this by
producing each combination of working and failed components required to fail the system.
So in the case of 2-out-of-3, there would be 3 combinations which consisted of 2 components
failed and 1 working and 1 combination where all 3 components have failed.
Combined series, parallel and voting Reliability Block Diagrams
There are many ways in which series, parallel and voting systems can be incorporated into
a RBD. To analyse such systems the RBD would be broken down into stages. Voting
systems would first be assessed and this would then be followed by any components in
series and then in parallel. For example the RBD given in Figure 1.4, the voting system
would be analysed first. In this system the components within the voting system are
identical components, therefore the reliability and unreliability of each component is r and
q, respectively. The analysis of the voting system can be seen in equations 1.4.19 and
1.4.20.
q1 = 3q
2r + q3 (1.4.19)
r1 = 3r
2q + r3 (1.4.20)
With the analysis of the voting system complete, this can become a single component
within the RBD as seen in Figure 1.5a denoted 1. With no other voting systems present,
the analysis of the system moves on to the two components in series, A and B. The analysis
of the series components is given in equations 1.4.21 and 1.4.22.
q2 = 1− (1− qA)(1− qB) (1.4.21)
r2 = rArB (1.4.22)
The series components, A and B, are now represented by component 2, as seen in
Figure 1.5b. The parallel components, C and 2 can now be analysed. The analysis of the
parallel components can be seen in equations 1.4.23 and 1.4.24.
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Figure 1.4: Reliability block diagram including series, parallel and voting systems
A
C
B
1
(a) Voting system components represented
by block component 1
2
C
1
(b) Series components, A and B, repre-
sented by block component 2
3 1
(c) Parallel components, 1 and C, repre-
sented by block component 3
SYS
(d) Series components, 1 and 3, represented
by block component SY S
Figure 1.5: Reliability block diagram analysis steps
q3 = q2qC (1.4.23)
r3 = 1− (1− r2)(1− rC) (1.4.24)
The parallel components are now represented by component 3, as seen in Figure 1.5c.
With the system now consisting of two components in series, components 3 and 1, these
can be analysed to find the reliability and unreliability of the system. The result of which
can be seen in equation 1.4.25 and 1.4.26.
QSY S = q3 + q1 − q3q1 (1.4.25)
RSY S = r3r1 (1.4.26)
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Root node 
Non-Terminal Terminal node 
Branch 
Terminal node 
Figure 1.6: Example binary decision diagram
1.4.1.3 Binary Decision Diagrams
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) were first introduced within the field of reliability by
Rauzy (1993). The method was introduced to aid in industrial scale fault tree analysis. The
task of generating the minimal cut sets can be computationally heavy when handling large
industrial systems. The algorithm proposed in this paper was to increase the efficiency of
handling the minimal cut sets. This will be discussed in detail later in this section. First,
this section covers the basic structure of a BDD.
A BDD has root, terminal and non-terminal nodes (also known as vertices) that are
connected by branches. These Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) only follow one direction
and therefore do not loop back at any point. A root node is the start of the BDD and
represents a basic event of a fault tree, it always has two branches connected underneath
it. The left branch is the failure or occurrence of the basic event, denoted ‘1’. The right
branch is the success of the basic event, component working, and denoted ‘0’. Each of
these branches either becomes a terminal node or is connected to another basic event.
The terminal nodes of a BDD represent the final state of the system, denoted by a ‘0’
representing a working system state and a ‘1’ representing a failed system state. The non-
terminal nodes represent the basic events, these too always have two branches connected
underneath it. An example of a BDD is given in Figure 1.6. The terminal and non-
terminal nodes are labelled on the diagram. The BDD size is expressed as the number of
non-terminal terms.
The paths of the BDD always begin with the root node. Each path moves through
non-terminal nodes, until a terminal node is found. If a ‘1’ terminal node is found then
this signifies a cut set. For example taking the BDD in Figure 1.6, this has two ‘1’ terminal
node paths; A and A¯, B,C. Ignoring the success of basic event A in the second path, the
cut sets are found as {A}, {B,C}.
As the ordering is very important in a BDD, the basic events need to be considered in
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X1
f1 f2
01
Figure 1.7: Binary decision diagram illustrating ite(X1, f1, f2)
an order so that the system BDD can be constructed in an efficient manner; otherwise the
BDD would become very large and computationally inefficient.
If-Then-Else Structure
Rauzy (1993) describes a method in which to form a BDD from a fault tree using a
technique referred to as If-Then-Else (ite). The idea was to represent the gates of a fault
tree using ite. Taking the top event to be expressed as the Boolean function, f(X) and
pivoting about Boolean variable X1, Shannon’s expansion is expressed as equation 1.4.27.
In equation 1.4.27 f1 and f2 are functions f(X) with X1 = 1 and X1 = 0, respectively.
f(x) = X1 · f1 +X1 · f2 (1.4.27)
ite(X1, f1, f2) represents the structure given in equation 1.4.27. This states that if
X1 fails, then consider f1, else consider f2. The BDD for this is shown in Figure 1.7.
To construct a BDD from a fault tree each basic event x is given the structure
ite(x, 1, 0), this forms the basis of the full BDD. The tree is then considered from the
bottom up and rules that are applied to connect basic and intermediate events are given
below (where X and Y are variables):
If X < Y (i.e. X is considered before Y )
J ⊕H = ite(X, f1⊕H, f2⊕H) (1.4.28)
If X = Y
J ⊕H = ite(X, f1⊕ g1, f2⊕ g2) (1.4.29)
Where equations 1.4.30 and 1.4.31 are the gate inputs.
J = ite(X, f1, f2) (1.4.30)
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Top Event 
Failure
A
CB
Figure 1.8: Simple fault tree structure for conversion to a binary decision diagram
H = ite(Y, g1, g2) (1.4.31)
Using this ite technique the repetition of nodes is avoided. An example of this technique
in use is shown for the fault tree given in Figure 1.8.
With the ordering A < B < C;
G1 = B.C
= ite(B, 1, 0).ite(C, 1, 0)
= ite(B, 1.ite(C, 1, 0), 0.ite(C, 1, 0))
= ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0) (1.4.32)
T = A+B.C
= ite(A, 1, 0) + ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0)
= ite(A, 1 + ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0), 0 + ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0))
= ite(A, 1, ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0)) (1.4.33)
This produces the BDD shown in Figure 1.6.
Rauzy (1993) also describes an algorithm for fault tree analysis which uses BDDs for
the purpose of fault tree management. The purpose of the algorithm was to increase the
efficiency at which the fault tree minimal cut sets and probability of failures could be found.
The idea was to obtain one BDD from a fault tree and then apply a minimisation process
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to it to obtain a minimal BDD which represents the minimal cut sets of the fault tree. The
minimal cut sets are found using the paths of the minimal BDD. The probability of the
root event is found using Shannon’s decomposition and the terminal events of the BDD.
Reay and Andrews (2002) describe an efficient method to convert fault trees to BDDs.
To simplify the fault tree before conversion, the FAUNET reduction (discussed later in
section 2.2.1.2) covers the techniques of contraction, factorisation and extraction. Once
these techniques have been employed, common structures (i.e. arrangements of gates and
branches) are identified as modules within the fault tree. These modules contain no basic
events that occur elsewhere in the fault tree. This makes analysing the whole fault tree
easier by analysing each of the modules first and then substituting these into the higher-
level fault tree. Once all the modules are identified these can be converted into BDDs.
As the modules all have different properties, a different ordering system is chosen for each
module, in order to take into account each modules’ individual properties.
Quantification of Binary Decision Diagrams
As each path of a BDD to a terminal node ‘1’ is disjoint, the top event probability, Q is
given in equation 1.4.34.
Q =
nX
i=1
p(ri) (1.4.34)
Where p(ri) is the probability of the ith disjoint path to a terminal 1 node.
1.4.2 State-Space
1.4.2.1 Markov Analysis
The first published work on Markov chains was by Andrei A. Markov in 1906, this was the
start of much study of stochastic processes with many applications (Ching & Ng 2006).
Markov models are used when dependencies exist between basic events and when failure
rates do not vary with time. Fault trees cannot be used in this case as they cannot model
statistical dependencies between components, i.e. the failure of one component cannot
affect the failure of another.
There are two different types of Markov models to consider; the first is Discrete Markov
chains and the second is Continuous Markov processes. These can both be defined in terms
of time and space. Discrete systems move from one state to another at set points in time,
whereas continuous systems move from one state to another at any point in time. Discrete
systems have a set of non-overlapping exhaustive states identified, where the system must
be in one of these at any given time. Continuous system states can degrade continuously
between working and failed.
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Figure 1.9: Markov model depicting a working, failed state system
Markov models consist of two basic components; states and transitions. States are
representative of the state in which the component resides, for example, working, failed or
standby. Transitions show either a failure or a repair event between the states. Figure 1.9
gives an example of a simple working, failed state system.
• States:
– State 1: Working
– State 2: Failed
• Transitions:
– P(Failure Transition): from state 1 to state 2 denoted λ dt
– P(Repair Transition): from state 2 to state 1 denoted ν dt
Where λ and ν are the failure rate and the repair rate, respectively.
Using these models the probability of being in any of the states of a system can be
calculated. These calculations will be given in detail later.
The events that are considered dependent in reliability modelling can include standby
redundancy, common-cause and failure/repair processes. Standby redundancy incorporates
a standby component that is brought into effect should the primary component fail, or
be under-repair. Depending on the type of standby component the failure rate of the
component can change when it is brought into operation. A common-cause event can
cause more than one component failure in the system, meaning that component failure is
not independent. For example, failure/repair processes can become dependent when there
is a single maintenance engineer employed to handle the maintenance of many components
of a system. This can result in a queue of components in need of repairs.
Discrete Markov Chains
Transition Probability Matrix
The Transition Probability Matrix (TPM) is used to determine the probability of being in
a particular state after a certain number of time intervals. The matrix has elements Pij ,
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which denotes the probability of making a transition to state j after a given time interval
from state i at the beginning of the interval. The TPM for the two-state system shown in
Figure 1.9 is given in equation 1.4.35. The size of the matrix is N × N , where N is the
total number of states.
[P ] =
2
4 P11 P12
P21 P22
3
5 (1.4.35)
When evaluating time dependent systems, the TPM is multiplied by itself n times,
where n is the number of time intervals. The elements of [P ]n are Pnij , the probability of
being in state j after n time intervals given that it began in state i. This form is given in
equation 1.4.36.
P (n) = P (0) · [P ]n (1.4.36)
Where P (0) is the initial probability vector and is a row vector containing the
probability of starting in each state.
When considering steady-state probabilities, P (∞) these would not change with further
multiplication, therefore equation 1.4.37 would be used for these types of systems.
P (∞)[P ] = P (∞) (1.4.37)
Continuous Markov Processes
When considering systems that are discrete in space and continuous in time, these can
be modelled using continuous Markov processes. For the approach to be valid the system
must be stationary, the process must lack memory and the states of the systems must be
identifiable.
State Equations
There are two ways in which the state equations can be acquired; one way is by using the
state diagrams. Taking the state diagram in Figure 1.9, the state equations are found by
the following method:
dPstate
dt
= (rate of entering state)− (rate of leaving state) (1.4.38)
Where PSTATE is the probability of being in a state.
From this statement equation 1.4.39 and 1.4.40 are formed.
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dPw(t)
dt
= −λPw(t) + νPf (t) (1.4.39)
dPf (t)
dt
= λPw(t)− νPf (t) (1.4.40)
Where Pw(t) and Pf (t) are the probability that the component is working or failed at
time t, respectively.
In matrix form equations 1.4.39 and 1.4.40 become:
[P˙w(t), P˙f (t)] = [Pw(t), Pf (t)]
2
4 −λ λ
ν −ν
3
5 (1.4.41)
Generalised, this equation becomes:
[P˙] = [P][A] (1.4.42)
Where [A] is the transition rate matrix.
[A] =
8><>:
aij Transition rate from i→ j
aii −
pX
j=1, j 6=i
aij
(1.4.43)
Where p is the maximum number of states.
The transition rate matrix has certain properties that make it easy to develop:
• The number of states in the diagram equals the number of rows and columns in the
matrix.
• The sum of each row of the matrix equals zero.
• Every non-diagonal elements in row i and column j represents the transition from
state i to state j
• Diagonal elements i, i is the transition rate out of state i. This is always negative.
The sum of any system state probabilities, at any time, must be equal to one, as shown
in equation 1.4.44.
NsX
i=1
Pi(t) = 1 (1.4.44)
Where Ns is the total number of states.
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Another method for finding the state equations is by denoting the state of the
component at time t by:
x(t) =
8<: 1 Failed0 Working (1.4.45)
Finding the probability that a component is in a failed state after dt, requires knowledge
of only the state of the component at the present time. Equation 1.4.46 defines that for
P [x(t+ dt) = 1] that, either the component was working at time t and failed in time dt or
that the component had failed in time t and remained so during time dt.
P [x(t+ dt) = 1] = P [x(t) = 0]λ dt+ P [x(t) = 1](1− ν dt) (1.4.46)
Equation 1.4.46 can be written as
Pf (t+ dt) = Pw(t)λ dt+ Pf (t)(1− ν dt) (1.4.47)
Rearranging the above gives equation 1.4.48.
Pf (t+ dt)− Pf (t)
dt
= Pw(t)λ− Pf (t)ν (1.4.48)
As t→ 0, equation 1.4.48 becomes equation 1.4.40. Using the statement Pw(t)+Pf (t) =
1 and using the initial conditions Pf (0) = 0, equation 1.4.49 gives the unavailability.
Pf (t) =
λ
λ+ ν
(1− e−(λ+ν)t) (1.4.49)
Using the same process, but starting with P [x(t + dt) = 0] leads to equation 1.4.39
which can be solved to give the availability of a component.
Pw(t) =
λ
λ+ ν
+
λe−(λ+ν)t
λ+ ν
(1.4.50)
In general equation 1.4.42 gives a set of NS first order differential equations to solve. In
some cases it may be possible to solve these using Laplace Transforms but in most situations
numerical methods are adopted. Equation 1.4.42 can be expanded to give equation 1.4.51.
h
P˙1 P˙2 · · · P˙Ns
i
=
h
P1 P2 · · · PNs
i
[A] (1.4.51)
Approximating
P˙i(t) =
Pi(t+ dt)− Pi(t)
dt
(1.4.52)
Equation 1.4.51 can be written as equation 1.4.53.
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h
P1(t+ dt) P2(t+ dt) · · · PNs(t+ dt)
i
=
h
P1(t) P2(t) · · · PNs(t)
i
[I + [A]dt]
(1.4.53)
This can be written generally as equation 1.4.54.
[P(t+ dt)] = [P(t)][K] (1.4.54)
Where [K]=[I+[A]dt].
1.4.3 Simulation
1.4.3.1 Monte Carlo
Monte Carlo methods can be used when methods such as Markov and fault tree analysis
are not applicable. For example, if the components or sub systems are dependent then
fault trees cannot be used and if components do not have constant failure and repair rates,
then Markov methods cannot be used. The use of Monte Carlo simulation requires no
assumptions to be made regarding system behaviour. The following information is based
on Andrews and Moss (2002) which also contains further reading on this topic.
Uniform Random Numbers
The Monte Carlo simulation method is dependent on the generation of random numbers
which form a uniform distribution. A number of methods can be used to generate these
numbers. One method by Von Neumann, the mid-square method, takes a random number,
squares the value and then takes the middle numbers. These middle numbers form the
new random number. For example squaring a starting number of 7989 gives 63,824,121.
Taking the four middle numbers, the new value is 8241. A disadvantage of this method
is that if zero is encountered then the sequence ends. Another disadvantage is that these
values are not truly random, but pseudo-random; although they are uniform, the sequence
is not random. Another method is random number tables. These tables are a sequence of
random digits where entry can be from any point in the table and any subsequent values
can be obtained by reading across or down the table.
Real engineering simulations require the generation of large quantities of random
numbers and the only way to achieve this is to use a computer. Computers can generate
pseudo-random number sequences.
The recursion formulae most commonly used are linear congruential generators. These
have the form:
xn+1 = (axn + b)(mod m) (1.4.55)
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A
B
Figure 1.10: Two-component system
Where a, b and m are positive integers.
Following an arbitrary number of iterations, i, of equation 1.4.55, the resulting random
number is found as follows:
Ri =
xi
m
(1.4.56)
Where Ri is the random number produced in the range [0, 1], xi is the ith number
produced and x0 is the seed.
The seed is a number that is specified initially to generate a sequence of pseudo-random
numbers. As the same seed would produce the same sequence if repeated, a, b and m are
chosen so that a large sequence of numbers are produced before the sequence produces the
seed value again and it is repeated.
Direct Simulation
This method of modelling uses direct statistical simulation. For this type of system
reliability simulation, two inputs are required: first is the statistical distributions for time to
failure and time to repair for each component. The second input is the system logic, which
includes how the components are connected and what the effects each component failure
has on the system performance. The system is simulated by using random samples from
the statistical distributions and tracking how the system functions when the component
states change.
This method can be demonstrated by considering the two-component system given in
Figure 1.10. Components A and B both have a probability of failure of 0.15. For there to
be system failure both components A and B are required to fail.
The simulation is carried out by generating for each component in the system a random
number that will be used to say if the component is working or failed. If the random
number is less than the probability of failure, then the component is assumed to be failed.
If the random number is larger than the probability of failure, then the component remains
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Random 
No.
Component 
Failure
0 0.15 1.0
(a) Component failure when random number falls
between 0 and 0.1
Random 
No.
Component 
Works
0 0.15 1.0
(b) Component working when random number falls
between 0.1 and 1
Figure 1.11: Representation of direct sampling
working. This can be seen in Figure 1.11. The state of the system can then be determined.
Distributions for generating event times
Exponential distribution
The exponential distribution is the first of three distributions considered here. This
distribution uses the density function presented in equation 1.4.57.
f(t) =
1
µ
e−t/µ (1.4.57)
Where µ is the mean.
To obtain the random samples, a number of steps are followed: the first is to integrate
the density function to obtain the cumulative failure distribution, F (t), as seen in equation
1.4.58.
F (t) =
Z t
0
f(u)du
= 1− e−t/µ (1.4.58)
As the cumulative failure distribution has the same range and properties as the random
number distributions, the next step is to generate random numbers, X, and equate to F (t)
(0 ≤ F (t) ≤ 1) giving equation 1.4.59.
X = 1− e−t/µ (1.4.59)
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To find the distribution to represent time to failure, the equation is rearranged for t.
t = −µ ln(1−X) (1.4.60)
If X is assumed uniform over [0, 1] then 1−X must also be. This simplifies equation
1.4.60 to equation 1.4.61.
t = −µ lnX (1.4.61)
Weibull distribution
Like the exponential distribution, the Weibull distribution can also obtain the random
samples directly. The density function that represents this distribution can be seen in
equation 1.4.62.
f(t) = β
tβ−1
ηβ
e−(t/η)
β
(1.4.62)
Where η is the Weibull scale parameter or characteristic life and β is the Weibull shape
parameter. Where β < 1 represents a reducing hazard rate, β = 1 is constant hazard rate
and β > 1 is increasing hazard rate.
As with the exponential distribution, the density function is integrated to give the
cumulative distribution, F (t), as seen in equation 1.4.63.
F (t) = 1− e−(t/η)β (1.4.63)
Once again the cumulative distribution has the same range and properties as the
random number distribution and so from the generated random numbers, X, equation
1.4.64 is used.
X = 1− e−(t/η)β (1.4.64)
By rearranging the equation above for time, t, to represent the time to failure (or
repair), equation 1.4.65 is obtained.
t = η[− ln(X)]1/β (1.4.65)
Normal distribution
The normal distribution is the only distribution considered here for which the density
function cannot be integrated to obtain the cumulative distribution. This is due to the
density function as seen in equation 1.4.66.
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f(t) =
1
σ
√
(2pi)
e−
1
2
[(t−µ)/σ]2 (1.4.66)
Where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean.
Instead, a method using the central limit theorem is introduced. The central limit
theorem states that if X1, X2, ..., Xn are n independent random variables which are
identically distributed and have mean, µ and variance, σ2 and then Sn is the sum of all
these variables then the random variable (Sn − nµ)/(σ√n) is asymptotically normally
distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Sn can use random numbers
U(0, 1) to represent it as these are identically distributed, however it should be noted that
Sn will only ever be approximately normal for a finite value of n. Therefore to find this
value of n, values are tested to see what kind of distribution is obtained. Starting with
n = 2, the distribution is a triangular distribution which is unsuitable. For n = 3, a
bell-shaped distribution is obtained. This is closer to what is required, therefore n ≥ 3
is suitable. A number that is mathematically suitable is n = 12, as Xi has µ = 0.5 and
σ2 = 1/12, therefore Sn is N(6, 1). Therefore to obtain a random sample from the normal
distribution, twelve random numbers are required. X is the summation of these numbers,
as given in equation 1.4.67.
X =
12X
i=1
Xi (1.4.67)
The central limit theorem states X is normally distributed with mean 6 and standard
deviation 1. Hence t, given by applying this equation 1.4.68, is normally distributed with
mean µ and standard deviation σ.
t = (X − 6)σ + µ (1.4.68)
1.4.3.2 Petri Nets
Carl Adam Petri, in his 1962 Ph.D. Thesis entitled Kommunikation mit Automaten
(Communication with automata), presented a new graphical representation of systems.
The idea presented in the thesis was to show the theory of communication between non-
simultaneous components of a computer system. Petri focused on the description of the
relationships between events. Anatol Holt et al (1968) produced the translation to Petri’s
dissertation and added to the work considerably; this was given in the final report of the
Information System Theory Project. Holt and Commoner (1970) wrote a paper entitled
Events and Conditions. This paper was concerned with the part-by-part performance of
a system, and was chiefly concerned by concurrent operations. This paper was also an
important part of the early research of Petri nets.
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Petri nets are useful when simulating large systems when the computational time to
analyse a system becomes too significant to ignore. They are incredibly versatile in terms
of the system features that they are capable of modelling. This section discusses the basic
definitions of Petri nets, and with given examples, how Petri nets are applicable to this
work.
There are four basic components that constitute a Petri net; places, transitions, arcs
(also referred to as edges) and tokens. A graphical representation of each is given in
Table 1.3. Places can represent states of a system, such as the Petri net in Figure 1.12 that
shows a system in one of two states; working (P1) or failed (P2). This is one of the simplest
examples of a Petri net, but these can be expanded considerably to include other system
states such as under repair, system down, repaired and system standby. Places are not
limited to just representing states; they can also represent components within a system, or
a member of the workforce carrying out maintenance. This makes Petri nets very versatile
and so can accommodate the needs of many different problems.
Table 1.3: Key to Petri nets
Symbol Name
Place
ti
Transitions (delayed and instant)
Arc
Token
tFP1 P2
Figure 1.12: Working and failed state system
Tokens, represented as a small dot, are located inside places and used as locators. For
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T1P1 P2
5
Figure 1.13: Petri net with multiple transitions and multiple tokens in one place
example, in Figure 1.12 a token can be seen inside place, P1. This indicates that the system
is in a working state. If there were a token in place P2, this would indicate that the system
is in a failed state. As tokens can be treated as a finite resource, they can also be used
to signify the number of components available or the number of maintenance engineers
available to repair a system. It should also be noted that places can hold more than one
token.
Arcs, sometimes referred to as edges, are used to show the link between places and
transitions. If there is more than one arc connecting a place to a transition then this is
represented on a Petri net as a slash through the arc with a number by it indicating the
number of arcs. An example of this can be seen in Figure 1.13.
Transitions dictate at which “time” a system “moves” from one state to another. In
Figure 1.12, the transition tF would represent the ‘time to failure’ of the system. The rules
that govern when a transition can fire and tokens are moved, are described in detail later.
Formal definition of a Petri net
The formal definition for a Petri net is given in Schneeweiss (1999):
GPN = (Vp, Vt, E;M(0), D,W ) (1.4.69)
Where GPN is the Petri net graph, Vp is the set of places, Vt is the set of transitions,
M(0) is the initial marking vector, D is the vector of switching delays (transition times)
and W is the vector of weights of edges i.e. the number of arcs making a given connection,
E is the set of edges (ordered pairs of nodes), where E ⊆ (Vp × Vt) × (Vt × Vp). The
initial marking vector, M(0), lists the number of tokens in each place when the system is
initialised.
For example, for the Petri net shown in Figure 1.14:
GPN = (Vp, Vt, E;M(0), D,W )
Vp = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Vt = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
E = {(p1, t1), (p1, t2), (t1, p3), (t2, p2), (p2, t3), (t3, p4), (p4, t4), (t4, p3), (p5, t5),
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(t5, p4), (p3, t6), (p4, t6), (t6, p6)}
M(0) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
D = (D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6)
W = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
P2
D1
D2 D4
D6
D3
D5
P1 P3
P4
P5
P6
Figure 1.14: Petri net
The Rules of Execution
The movement of tokens between places within a Petri net represents its dynamic
behaviour. In reliability modelling the position of tokens in the Petri net at a given instant
in time, known as its marking, represents a particular system state.
A set of rules for the movement of tokens are given as follows:
• A Petri net executes by firing transitions.
• A transition fires by removing tokens from its input places and creating new tokens
which are distributed to its output places.
• A transition may fire if it is enabled.
– A transition is enabled if each of its input places has at least as many tokens
in it as arcs from the place to the transition.
– Transitions can have a time delay associated within them; such transitions are
known as timed transitions. The time for the delay only passes while tokens are
present, as described above.
• A transition fires by removing enabling tokens from its input places. One token is
removed from each input place for each arc connecting the place to the transition.
32 Chapter 1. Introduction
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(a) Initial Petri net
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(b) Transition t1 enabled and fired
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(c) Transitions t2 and t3 enabled, t2 fired, as t2 < t3
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(d) Transitions t3, t4 and t5 enabled, t5 fired as
t5 < t4 < t3
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(e) Transitions t3 and t4 enabled, t4 fired, as t4 < t3
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(f) Transition t3 enabled and fired
P1
P2
P3
t1 t2
P4
t4
t3
P6
t5 P5
t6 P7
(g) Transition t6 enabled and fired
Figure 1.15: Petri net transition process
• After a transition has fired, tokens are deposited into all places connected as outputs
from the transition. One token is deposited for each arc connecting the transition and
the output place. Note that output arcs can be connected to input places, meaning
that tokens are deposited back into the input place.
In the example Petri net shown in Figure 1.15a, ti terms denote the times at which the
transitions fire. The transition sequence can be expressed in the following form, showing
the order in which these transitions fire: t1 → t2 → t5 → t4 → t3 → t6. The movement of
the tokens in the system as each transition fires can be seen in Figure 1.15. Another way
in which this sequence can be written would be as follows: t1 < t2 < t5 < t4 < t3 < t6.
This expresses, using an inequality, the relative time values used in the transitions.
Fault Trees to Petri Nets
Fault tree gates can be represented by Petri nets such as those shown in Table 1.4 (For a
full list see Liu and Chiou (1997)), hence enabling fault trees to be converted into Petri
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Table 1.4: Fault tree symbols and Petri net equivalent
Gate name Fault tree symbol Petri net equivalent
AND gate
P1 P2
P3
T1
OR gate
P1 P2
P3
T2T1
nets. Other aspects of the system can be incorporated into Petri nets, such as maintenance
policies for each component. The dependencies within the system can also be shown by
changing a fault tree to a Petri net.
Table 1.4 gives an example of two of the main gates that are commonly converted from
fault trees to Petri nets, the AND gate and the OR gate. The AND gate requires that
both P1 and P2 have a token to enable the immediate transition labelled T1 so it can fire.
The OR gate requires either place P1 or P2 to have a token to enable transition T1.
Minimal Cut Sets and Path Sets
Minimal cut sets and path sets are usually associated with fault trees, but can be applied
in the same way with Petri nets. Path sets are the opposite of cut sets in that they show
the minimal, but sufficient components in order for the system to be successful. There are
multiple methods by which this can be achieved. Liu and Chiou (1997) show that minimal
cut sets and path sets can be determined by the following procedure:
1. If a place representing a basic event is connected via arcs and transitions to the
place representing the top event, where the only input place to the transitions is
this basic event, then this basic event is a minimal cut set.
2. If a path between a basic event and the top event places includes transitions that
involve further places, then identify these further places.
3. If the places identified in the previous step do not represent basic events, then apply
steps 1 and 2 again to each place to identify the basic events.
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P1 P2
P4
T2T1
P3
P5
T3
P6
P7
T4
(a) Example Petri net
P1 P2
P4
T5T4
P3
P5
T1
P6
P7
T3T2
(b) Dual Petri net
Figure 1.16: Petri net example and dual of the Petri net
4. Further basic events identified in step 3 form cut sets. Transitions which involve
more than one basic event give rise to cuts sets of multiple basic events. Once a full
list of cut sets is obtained these can be reduced to minimal cut sets by removing
any cut sets which comprise solely of smaller cut sets.
The procedure for obtaining the minimal cut sets and path sets for a fault tree have a
total of eight steps, as opposed to the four given above. This makes Petri nets much more
efficient.
Dual Petri Nets
To find the path sets of a Petri net, the above procedure would be used, but on a dual
Petri net. The dual Petri net switches the transitions with multiple inputs to a single input
and vice versa. The equivalent fault tree is changing AND to OR gates and vice versa. As
an example Figure 1.16b shows a representation of the dual Petri net presented in Figure
1.16a.
Matrix Method
Another way to obtain minimal cut sets and path sets is by use of a matrix method. This
matrix method begins with the place that represents the top event and moves down to the
basic events. Liu and Chiou (1997) describe the procedure:
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1. If there are multiple arcs connected to an output place from multiple transitions
then write the input place identifiers in a horizontal list.
2. If a single arc is connected to an output place then write the input place identifiers
in a vertical list.
3. Once all lists are represented as basic events then the matrix is established. If there
is common basic event located between rows or columns, it is the basic event shared
for each row or column. The column vectors of the matrix represent cut sets while
row vectors path sets.
4. Taking the full list of cut sets and path sets these can be reduced to minimal cut
sets and path sets by removing any cut sets or path sets which comprise solely of
smaller cut sets or path sets.
This is an efficient method of identifying the minimal cut sets and the path sets without
needing to change the Petri net to the dual Petri net.
Absorption
Absorption can occur in Petri nets when the firing time is not required, i.e. when there is no
time between input and output. Absorption removes any non-required intermediate steps.
Examples of this can be seen in Figure 1.17a and Figure 1.17b. Figure 1.17a shows that
the input can go directly to the output. As soon as the transitions are enabled they fire the
tokens from the current place to the recipient of the transition. The figure shows that there
is a chain of one place followed by one transition followed by a place and so on. As there is
no delay time associated with the transitions the token would move instantaneously from
the first place to the last. As there are no other places connected to the transitions, it
means that there is only one outcome from such a situation: the token would always go
from P1 to P3, therefore it can be shown as a single place.
Figure 1.17b shows a Petri net with hierarchical transitions which consists of multiple
inputs can be combined to one transition. This Petri net shows that the places P1 and P2
require a token in order to enable the transition that would place a token in P4. Then,
should there be a token in P5, transition 2 would fire to deposit a token into P5. To obtain
a token in P5, the minimal number of tokens in other places that have no transitions to
them is 3. One token would be required in P1, P2 and P3; P4 is an intermediate place and
would not require a token. Therefore P4 can be absorbed.
Marking Transformation
Another way to represent a Petri net is by using marking, as explained in Liu and Chiou
(1997). Marking is a way to represent a Petri net as a vector, M , representing the number
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T1
P1
P2
P3
T2
P3
(a) Absorption for Petri
nets with input to output
places
P5
P1 P2
P4
T1
P3
T2
P5
P2P3
T2
P1
(b) Absorption for Petri nets showing hierarchical
transitions
Figure 1.17: Petri nets illustrating absorption
of tokens in each place. The vector therefore describes completely the state of the Petri net
at a given time. When transitions in the Petri net fire, this vector is transformed using the
incidence matrix, AT . Rows of AT are associated with places in the Petri net (in the same
order as they appear in M), while columns represent the transitions. Each column of AT
shows the net change to the number of tokens in each place when a given transition fires.
Equation 1.4.70 shows the relationship between the incidence matrix and the next state,
given that it is in the kth state. S represents the firing times, Ti, of the ith transition.
Mk+1 = Mk +A
TS (1.4.70)
To combine all the marking transformations to the final marking Mn to the initial
marking, M(0), equation 1.4.70 is rewritten to give equation 1.4.71.
Mn = M0 +A
T
X
(1.4.71)
Rearranging the above gives:
AT
X
= ∆M = Mn −M0 (1.4.72)
Where
P
denotes the firing counter. This is a vector with an element for each transition
in the Petri net; transitions which are enabled are denoted by 1. This vector, therefore,
selects which transitions from matrix AT are fired during the transformation of matrix M .
To demonstrate this, the Petri net in Figure 1.16a was used. The incidence matrix for
this Petri net is given in equation 1.4.73. With an initial marking of equation 1.4.74, and a
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transition sequence of t1, t3, t4, i.e. the firing counter given in equation 1.4.75, Mn would
be as that given in equation 1.4.76, through application of equation 1.4.71. Different firing
counters will produce different final markings, Mn.
AT =
2666666666666664
T1 T2 T3 T4
P1 −1 0 0 0
P2 0 −1 0 0
P3 0 0 −1 0
P4 1 1 −1 0
P5 0 0 1 −1
P6 0 0 0 −1
P7 0 0 0 1
3777777777777775
(1.4.73)
M(0) =
h
1 1 1 0 0 1 0
iT
(1.4.74)
X
1
=
h
1 0 1 1
iT
(1.4.75)
Mn =
h
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
iT
(1.4.76)
Reachability Graphs
Reachability graphs are used when multiple transitions in a Petri net can fire simultane-
ously. In such situations it is not possible to determine which transition fires first; if two
transitions rely on the same input tokens then only one can fire. Reachability graphs show
the current state of the Petri net and branch out to different possible states when such
situations arise. In Figure 1.18a an example of a simple Petri net is given, and in Figure
1.18b is the equivalent reachability graph.
Figure 1.17a shows a simple Petri net with transition T1 enabled. As seen in Figure
1.17b, the starting point at the top of the graph is the initial markings of the Petri net,
and below this is an arrow to represent the transition firing, leading to the next marking
data. This marking data shows that there are now three transitions enabled of which only
one can fire. This means that three branches are produced to signify the outcomes of each
of the three transitions firing. This process is continued down each of the branches until
there is no more transitions left enabled. The final reachability graph is given in Figure
1.17b.
Although for this example the process reached a finite set of markings, sometimes
this process can be infinite. This can be reduced to a more manageable size by using
the symbol ω, which can be taken as the symbol for infinity. This can also be used for
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T1P1 P2
T2
P3
P4
P5
T3
T4
(a) Initial Petri net
T1
(1,0,0,0,0)
(0,1,1,1,0)
(0,1,0,0,1)
T4
(0,1,0,2,0)
T3
(0,0,2,0,0)
T3
(0,0,1,1,0)
(0,0,0,0,1)
T4
T2
(0,0,1,1,0)
(0,0,0,2,0) (0,0,0,0,1)
T4T3
(b) Reachability Graph
Figure 1.18: Petri net and the equivalent reachability graph
any large number of tokens. This symbol is located in the marking(s), which create this
infinite process. More information on this and an algorithm that can automate this process
of creating a reachability graph is given by Peterson (1981).
1.5 Summary
This Chapter has introduced the possible reliability methods available that could be used
in the process considered here. From the research, only a few of the methods available
are suitable for a variety of systems. Although Fault Tree Analysis is the most widely
used method, this would be inappropriate for the work presented here as fault trees cannot
handle dependencies. From the research, Markov methods and Petri nets would be the
most suitable. However as Markov models, more so than Petri nets, are susceptible to
state explosion, this would make the work more inefficient. Petri nets are very powerful
and flexible and seem well suited to the application discussed in this thesis. However, before
a method can be chosen the methods presented in this chapter need to be considered for
their usability within the scope of Phased Mission Systems, which is discussed in the next
chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
There are many applications where missions are required, such as in the Aerospace and
Nuclear Industries. Missions consist of phases which can be considered as different tasks
that a system must undertake and accomplish for the mission to be successful. Within
these phases the system can have a different configuration as the success criteria for each
phase can be different. The components within that system can also have different failure
behaviours from phase-to-phase (Xing & Dugan 2002).
A good example of a phased-mission is an aircraft flight. The mission would be to take
passengers from one airport to another. This mission could consist of seven phases; taxiing
to the runway, take-off, climb, descent, landing and taxiing to the terminal. A graphical
representation of such a flight is given in Figure 2.1. Each phase of the mission requires a
different configuration of the aircraft and therefore the probability of system failure must
be calculated for each phase in order to obtain the mission failure probability. A model
therefore is required for each phase.
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Figure 2.1: Phased mission of an aircraft flight
2.1.1 Types of phased-mission systems
2.1.1.1 Static and Dynamic Phased-Mission Systems
A system is said to be static if the failure of the mission, in any phase, is dependent on
combinations of the component failure events, i.e. if the structure of the reliability model
in any phase is combinatorial. A system is said to be dynamic if the failure of the mission
in any phase is dependent on the combinations of component failure events and the order
in which input events occur, i.e. if the order in which component failure events occurs
affects the outcome (Xing & Amari 2008).
2.1.1.2 Repairable and non-repairable Phased-Mission Systems
In non-repairable Phased-Mission Systems (PMSs), once a component has failed in a phase,
it has failed for every other succeeding phase. For a repairable PMS there are two things
to consider; the failure characteristics of a component and the maintenance plan in place.
Meshkat (2000) investigated the following:
• Time-driven maintenance (Scheduled maintenance): Maintenance is initiated on
a predetermined schedule.
• Failure-driven maintenance (Unscheduled maintenance): Maintenance is initi-
ated when a component failure occurs.
• Condition-driven failure: Maintenance is initiated when a component fails, but
the system does not. However if the system fails there can be no repair on the system;
this is the difference between failure- and condition-driven maintenance.
2.1.1.3 Coherent and non-coherent Phased-Mission System
A PMS is coherent when each component of a system contributes to the state of said
system. For every component that fails the system state cannot improve, it can only
2.2. Non-Repairable Systems 41
worsen or remain the same (Andrews & Beeson 2003). A non-coherent PMS, however,
can worsen or improve with the functioning or failure of a component, respectively. Non-
coherent PMSs can be represented using non-coherent fault trees which are distinguished
by the use of inverse gates (a NOT gate) as well as the usual logic gates (e.g. AND gate).
2.1.2 Analytical Modelling Techniques
There are multiple ways in which a phased-mission system can be evaluated. There are two
areas into which these fall; analytical modelling and simulation. Simulation is often found
to cost more in terms of computational requirement, but does give a better generality in
system representation (Smotherman & Zemoudeh 1989). Analytical modelling provides a
direct solution, however it can be very difficult to generate analytical models of complex
systems. Analytical models can be broken down into three groups (Xing & Amari 2008):
• State-space orientated models: Examples of state-space approaches are Markov
chains and Petri nets. Each is flexible and can model complex dependencies in system
components. State space models can be used for both dynamic and static phases.
• Combinatorial models: These methods assume that all the components in a
system, in each phase, fail statistically(s)-independently, so should they fail it would
have no bearing on whether another component in the system fails or not. This
s-independence is dealt with across the phases for a given component. Examples
of combinatorial approaches are fault trees (mini-component systems and Boolean
algebraic method) and BDDs. Combinatorial models can only be used when phases
are static, as discussed above in section 2.1.1.1.
• Phase modular solution: This takes advantage of both of the above methods by
addressing their limitations. Combinatorial models are computationally efficient,
but can only be used when the phases are static. State-space models such as
Markov chains have to be used if any phase in a mission is dynamic. A problem
with Markov chains is that state explosion can occur, making the Markov approach
computationally intensive. Therefore the phase modular solution uses both BDD
and Markov chain solution when appropriate.
2.2 Non-Repairable Systems
2.2.1 Phase Fault Trees
2.2.1.1 Quantitative Analysis
A technique for an exact unreliability solution for a phased-mission system is given by
Esary and Ziehms (1975). The method is based around components that, once failed,
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cannot be repaired or replaced. Also the system can only be either functioning or failed.
The method given reduces a multi-phased system into a single equivalent phase system.
Each phase of a mission can be expressed as either a RBD or a fault tree, as it is assumed
that each phase configuration is coherent. Presented in Burdick et al. (1977) is Esary and
Ziehms technique given in five steps:
1. Mission cut-set cancellation: Any minimal cut set of a phase is removed if it contains
a minimal cut set for a later phase. An example of this is if there is a two phase
system as shown in Figure 2.2a, where the dotted OR gate represents the input into
a phased mission top event. The minimal cut sets for the fault tree are as follows:
• Phase one: {A.C} and {B.C}
• Phase two: {D}, {B.C} and {E}
From these there is a common minimal cut set between the two phases, {B.C}. From
the rule above {B.C} is removed from phase one as it occurs in the second phase.
Therefore phase two remains the same, however phase one can now be represented
as the fault tree in Figure 2.2b.
2. Basic-event transformation: For a j-phase mission, the series logic with basic events
Ck1, · · · , Ckj , which perform statistically independently with the failure probability
replace basic event Ck. Where Ck1 is the basic event k occurring in phase 1. Taking
the example from above, each side of the fault tree in Figure 2.2b can now be
represented as the fault tree in Figure 2.2c. In the first phase, a subscript of one
denotes that the basic event in that phase. In phase two an extra OR gate exists
for each basic event so that one branch represents the basic event in phase one and
another represents the basic event in phase two.
3. The configuration of the phases can now be considered as a new system with sub-
systems operating in series logic and can also be considered, as a single phase mission.
An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.2d.
4. As with any other fault tree, the minimal cut sets can now be found for the new
logic model. For the example considered, all cut sets are minimal.
5. Normal quantitative analysis techniques are used to find the unreliability for the
system.
Esary and Ziehms (1975) also presented new unreliability equations for phased mission
systems (reviewed in Burdick et al. (1977)). These particular approximations are designed
for non-repairable systems and can be used for larger systems as they reduce the cost of
calculating the exact unreliability.
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(d) Mission fault tree considered with sub-systems
Figure 2.2: Process for a two phase mission to find the exact solution
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1. IN-EX method: The IN-EX method first identifies the minimal cut sets for each
phase of a mission. These are then used to calculate the unreliability of phase i,
Qi, by using the inclusion-exclusion expansion given earlier in equation 1.4.3. Then
either equation 2.2.1 or equation 2.2.2 can be used to calculate the reliability of a
mission with m phases or the unreliability of the mission, respectively.
RIN−EX =
mY
i=1
Ri (2.2.1)
QIN−EX ≤
mX
i=1
Qi (2.2.2)
2. IN-EX-CC method: This is similar to the IN-EX method, the difference is with
the mission cut set cancellation. The cancellation, in step 1 from above, is done
before Qj is calculated for each phase. For this bound the value of Qj will be
generally less than the Qj found in the IN-EX method (fewer cut sets).
3. MCB method: This method requires four steps; the first is to obtain the minimal
cut sets for each phase, using the appropriate model. The second step is to calculate
qij for a minimal cut set i in phase j using equation 2.2.3
qij =
kijY
l=1
Pr{Cl} (2.2.3)
Where Cl, l = 1, · · · , kij are basic events in cut set i in phase j.
The third step is to estimate Rj using the minimal cut bound as given in equation
2.2.4.
Rj =
njY
i=1
rij (2.2.4)
The fourth and final step is to calculate ¯RMCB, which is the same as that given in
equation 2.2.1.
4. MCB-CC method: This method has the same steps as that given for the MCB
method, but with an additional step between the first and the second step that
carries out the mission cut-set cancellation as discussed earlier.
The relationship between these methods can be seen in equation 2.2.5.
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Q ≤ QIN−EX−CC ≤
8<: QMCB−CCQIN−EX
9=; ≤ QMCB (2.2.5)
Dazhi and Xiaozhong (1989) discuss a new set of Boolean algebra specifically for phased
mission systems, taking into account initial conditions at the start of the phase. This
method uses generalised intersection and union concepts in order to do this. Assuming
that the system contains non-repairable events, that the model is coherent, the basic events
are statistically independent in failure and that the transition time between two phases is
instantaneous, equation 2.2.6. If 1 ≤ k ≤ j, where j and k are phase numbers:
A(j) = A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪Aj
=
k[
i=1
Ai ∪
j[
i=k+1
Ai
= A(k) ∪
j[
i=k+1
Ai (2.2.6)
Where A(j) denotes that the basic event A exists in phase j, given that it occurred
between the first and j phase inclusive.
A(k) ∩A(j) = A(k) ∩

A(k) ∪
j[
i=k+1
Ai

= A(k) ∪
j[
i=k+1

A(k)Ai
Ł
= A(k) (2.2.7)
A(k) ∪A(j) = A(k) ∪

A(k) ∪
j[
i=k+1
Ai

= A(k) ∪
j[
i=k+1
Ai
= A(j) (2.2.8)
To calculate mission unreliability the following is true: it can be said that if there is
system failure in phase n, then the system has failed in phase n or in any of the previous
n− 1 phases. This can be demonstrated mathematically using equation 2.2.9.
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X(n) = X1 ∪X2 ∪X3 ∪ · · · ∪Xn (2.2.9)
Where X(n) represents system failure in phase n, Xi represents the first failure in phase
i.
From this the mission unreliability is found using equation 2.2.10.
QMISS = P

X(n)
Ł
= P
 
n[
i=1
Xi
!
= P
2
4 n[
i=1

mi[
j=1
C(i)j
3
5 (2.2.10)
Where,
Xi =
mi[
j=1
C(i)j (2.2.11)
Where, C(i)j represents a minimal cut set for Xi, mi represents the number of minimal
cut sets in phase i, n represents the number of phases.
La Band (2005) describes an analytical technique for the efficient representation and
solution of phased-mission systems. Methods for representing the phase unreliability and
the mission unreliability were considered for non-repairable systems.
The method introduced was to use fault trees to represent a failure event and in the
case of phased-mission systems, multiple fault trees were drawn to represent each phase
failure in a single mission. These fault trees show what components, or combination of
components could cause that phase failure, as this can be different for each phase of the
mission. La Band takes into account that a component can fail in any phase and although
it may not cause a phase failure in that phase, it could cause a later phase to fail. A new
way of using fault trees to show this was developed.
Each component in the fault tree is shown with a subscript of the phase that it resides
in, e.g. in the second phase a subscript of 1 or 2 would be seen to signify that the component
has failed in either phase 1 or phase 2, these would be connected through an OR gate. As
this is a non-repairable system the OR gate signifies that once that component has failed
in one phase it is failed for the rest of the mission.
To show the mission unavailability, the above representation was used for each of the i
phases of the mission. For every phase, any and all previous phases are taken into account
as the mission would fail if any of the phases failed. To take into account the success of the
previous phases, the phase failure fault trees are used with a NOT gate to show that the
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condition met 
during phase i
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Phase i fault tree with 
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with an OR combination 
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Figure 2.3: Generalised phase fault tree (La Band 2005)
previous phases did not fail. Each of these successful phases and the current phase failure
are all connected to an AND gate. A generalised phase failure fault tree is given in Figure
2.3.
2.2.1.2 Qualitative Analysis
To find the failure modes of a system, defined earlier, the same process as for single phase
fault trees is used. The NOT logic gate represents the non-coherence of the tree due to
the requirement of noting the success of the previous phases. An example of a three-phase
mission is given in Figure 2.4.
B
Failure in 
Phase 1
A DC
Failure in 
Phase 2
DB
Failure in 
Phase 3
Figure 2.4: Three phased-mission system
The phase failure fault tree for phase 1 remains unchanged for the analysis, as there
are no previous phases to account success for. The phase 2 failure fault tree incorporates
the success of the previous phase, and so the phase fault tree is represented by Figure
2.5. Finally phase 3 would incorporate the previous two phase successes to find the failure
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probability in phase 3. This is represented by Figure 2.6.
B1
Failure in 
Phase 1
A1 D2
Failure in 
Phase 2
C1
Failure in 
Phase 2
C2 D1
Figure 2.5: Phase fault tree construction of phase 2
Modularisation a useful technique to simplify the phase failure fault trees to decrease
computational time. The modularisation technique by Reay and Andrews (2002), referred
to as FAUNET reduction, is employed here. There are three mechanisms of modularisation
and these are described as follows:
• Contraction: Gates of the same type connected in subsequent fashion are contracted
to produce a single gate, so there is an alternating sequence of OR and AND gates
within the tree structure.
• Factorisation: Events that occur in pairs under the same gate type are recognised
and combined to form a single complex event. These complex events are given a
numerical label starting from 2000 with increments of 1. The NOT logic gate requires
De Morgans’ laws to be followed in that basic events occurring together in one gate
type, e.g. AND (OR), must have complements that occur in the opposite gate type,
e.g. OR (AND).
• Extraction: When there is a common basic event under a structure, like those shown
in Figure 2.7, this is isolated and the other basic events brought together under the
same gate.
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Figure 2.6: Phase fault tree construction of phase 3
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Figure 2.7: Extraction method for fault trees
These steps are designed to be repeated in order until no further changes to the structure
of the fault tree can be made. Such modules can be taken from the structure of the tree to
create a sub-tree. These become completely independent to the rest of the tree and analysed
separately to put the results into the higher-level fault tree (Reay & Andrews 2002).
For the example considered in Figure 2.4 the extraction method cannot be used. The
reason is that there are no common basic events in the same branch of the tree that
considers the failure of the individual phases. In Figure 2.6 there are no common basic
events in the each of the three phases’ failure branches. Although basic event D exists in
both phase 2 and phase 3 failure branches, these cannot be merged as they are individually
linked to each phase. In phase 2 failure, only phase 1 and phase 2 failure of basic event D is
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considered, whereas in phase 3 it is considered in all three phases. Also all previous phases
are considered in a working condition, and the current phase in a failed state. Functioning
and failed basic events cannot be merged.
2.2.1.3 Prime Implicants
Prime implicants are used to show the combination of basic events that lead to phase or
mission failure. The notation used for failure and success of component, A, in phase i is
given as:
1. Ai – Failure of component A in phase i
2. A¯i – Success of component A in phase i
To show the failure, or success, of a component between the beginning of phase i and
the end of phase j, component A would be expressed as:
1. Aij – Failure of component A between phase i and phase j
2. A¯ij – Success of component A from phase i through to the end of phase j
New algebra laws developed by La Band (2005) are shown in Table 2.1.
Using the three phase mission example given earlier in Figure 2.4, and the subsequent
individual phase failure fault trees in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, the prime implicants for
the three phases can be found as follows, where Ti is the top event for phase i:
Phase 1 Failure:
T1 = A1 ·B1 (2.2.12)
Prime implicants = {A1 ·B1}
Phase 2 Failure:
T2 = (A¯1 + B¯1) · ((C1 + C2) · (D1 +D2))
= A¯1 · C12 ·D12 + B¯1 · C12 ·D12 (2.2.13)
Prime implicants = {A¯1 · C12 ·D12}, {B¯1 · C12 ·D12}
Phase 3 Failure:
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Table 2.1: Algebraic law for phased-mission systems for i < j
Law Number Algebraic Law Description
1 Ai ·Ai = Ai Component A fails in phase i AND phase i. This is arepeated event.
2 Ai ·Aj = 0 Component A fails in phase i AND phase j. As theseare mutually exclusive events they cannot both occur.
3 Ai ·Aij = Ai
Component A fails in phase i AND between phase
i and phase j. As mutually exclusive events cannot
occur together, i.e. component A failure in phase i
AND any other phase between phase i+ 1 and phase
j, the common event, failure of component A in phase
i, is the result.
4 A¯i ·Ai = 0
Component A is functioning in phase i AND fails in
phase i. The event and its complement cannot occur
at the same time.
5 A¯i ·Aj = Aj
Component A is functioning in phase i AND fails
in phase j. Failure in phase j assumes that the
component is successful in any previous phase, in this
case phase i. Therefore the statement of component
A is working in phase i is not required.
6 A¯i ·Aij = Ai+1,j
Component A works in phase i AND fails between
phase i and phase j. The success and the failure of
A in phase i cannot be combined as given by law 4,
therefore the combination is the failure of component
A between phase i+ 1 and phase j.
7 A¯i · A¯i+1 · · · A¯j = A¯ij Component A works from phase i up to and inclusiveof phase j.
8 Ai ·Ai+1 · · ·Aj = Aij Component A has failed from phase i up to andinclusive of phase j.
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T3 = (A¯1 + B¯1) · (C¯1 · C¯2 + D¯1 · D¯2) · (B1 +B2 +B3) · (D1 +D2 +D3)
= A¯1 · C¯12 ·B1 ·D13 + A¯1 · C¯12 ·B23 ·D12 +B2 ·D3 +B3 ·D3 (2.2.14)
Prime implicants = {A¯1 · C¯12 ·B1 ·D13}, {A¯1 · C¯12 ·B23 ·D12}, {B2 ·D3}, {B3 ·D3}
With each phase failure prime implicants established, the probability of phase and
mission failure can now be quantified. The probability density function is given in equation
2.2.15 by the negative exponential distribution for a component, A, with a constant failure
rate in a non-repairable single phase mission.
f(t) = λAe
−λAt (2.2.15)
It is assumed that component A has a constant failure rate for all phases of a mission.
This is regardless of whether it is required for a certain phase or not. To model the
unreliability of component A, qA(t), over a duration [0, t) a cumulative probability function
FA(t) is used, as seen in equation 2.2.16.
qA(t) = FA(t)
=
Z t
0
fA(t)dt
= [−e−λAt]t0
= 1− e−λAt (2.2.16)
The unreliability of the component over a phase i is derived in a similar way as equation
2.2.16, as seen in equation 2.2.17. This equation calculates the probability density function
for the time of phase i’s, i.e. phase i duration is between t = ti−1 and t = ti.
qAi(t) =
Z ti
ti−1
fA(t)dt
= [−e−λAt]titi−1
= e−λAti−1 − e−λAti (2.2.17)
For each phase i, the unreliability, Qi, is found using the inclusion-exclusion expansion
for the existence of prime implicants, Kli , in phase i.
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Qi =
NpiiX
l=1
P (Kli)−
NpiiX
l=2
l−1X
n=1
P (Kli∩Kni) · · · · · ·+(−1)Npii−1P (K1i∩K2i · · ·∩KNpii ) (2.2.18)
Where Npii is the number of prime implicant sets in phase i.
Using the three-phase mission example in Figures 2.4-2.6, the inclusion-exclusion
expansion can be applied to each phase, yielding equations 2.2.19, 2.2.20 and 2.2.21 (phase
1, 2 and 3 respectively).
Q1 = qA1qB1 (2.2.19)
Q2 = (1− qA1)qC12qD12 + (1− qB1)qC12qD12 (2.2.20)
Q3 = (1− qA1)(1− qC12)qB1qD13 + (1− qA1)(1− qC12)qB23qD12 + qB2qD3 + qB3qD3 (2.2.21)
To calculate the mission unreliability, QMISS , equation 2.2.22 can be used as each
phase failure is mutually exclusive and therefore can be expressed as the sum of all the
individual phase failures.
QMISS =
mX
i=1
Qi (2.2.22)
Where, m is the total number of phases.
2.2.1.4 Importance Measures for Phased-Mission Systems
Andrews (2008) gives a detailed description of the importance measures of component
contribution to the failure of phased-missions. The first to consider is the in-phase
criticality function, which is an extension on the Birnbaum’s measure of importance, Gi.
Equation 2.2.23 gives this equivalent measure where Gij is the probability that the system
resides in a critical condition such that if component i fails during phase j, the system
would fail. Qi is the value that is calculated from the minimal cut sets using the method
discussed earlier by La Band. By using that method of obtaining the failure probability
of each phase, the success of previous phases is accounted for, i.e. successful transition to
the current phase.
Gij =
∂Qj
∂qij
(2.2.23)
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There are two criticality importance measures that need to be considered for phased-
mission systems; Phase Importance and Transition Importance. These can both lead to
phase failure and therefore mission failure. Each is given in detail below:
• Phase Importance: Within any phase, a system can be in a critical condition
for component i in phase j, and phase failure can occur due to component i failing.
Equation 2.2.24 is the fraction of phase failures that occur due to component i failing.
IPij =
Gijqij
Qj
(2.2.24)
• Transition Importance: If the failure conditions of phase j are met before entering
this phase, given that all previous phases are successful, phase failure will occur on
transition to phase j. Equation 2.2.25 is the proportion of the total phase failure
probability that component i contributes to cause the transition failure into phase j.
ITij =

j−1X
k=1
GTij,kqik

Qj
(2.2.25)
The total importance contribution of component i failure in phase j is found by
summing the contribution from transition importance and the phase importance as shown
in equation 2.2.26.
Iij = I
P
ij + I
T
ij (2.2.26)
The total contribution by component i to the mission failure can be calculated using
equation 2.2.27, which is the proportion of mission failures that triggers component i to
fail, given that the system was in a critical state for component i.
Ii =
X
allj
8<:

∂Qj
∂qij

qij +

j−1X
k=1
 
∂QTj
∂qik
!
qik
9=;
QMISS
(2.2.27)
2.2.2 Phase Modular Approach
The initial properties of modules and their use in fault trees are described in Chatterjee
(1975) and Birnbaum and Esary (1965). Chatterjee describes two properties of modules
in fault trees as the following:
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Figure 2.8: Modularised fault tree
1. All branches of the fault tree are independent.
2. The logic function associated with each gate, is one of the following:
• A prime. In this representation a prime function is any gate other than those
with a AND or OR function.
• An AND with no other inputs immediately below it that are also AND gates.
• An OR with no other inputs immediately below it that are also OR gates.
Birnbaum and Esary give a definition of a module in coherent systems. A module of
a system is a subset of basic components of the system which are then organised in to
their own substructure. When organised in to these substructures they can be treated as a
component of the system. Components only affect the system through the performance of
their substructure. These lead to Locks (1981) expanding this idea for non-coherent fault
trees and showed how it could be used to find the cut sets.
Meshkat et al. (2003) discuss a method for modularising fault trees to represent phased-
mission systems using combinatorial and Markov-chain based methods. Within each phase
there are interdependencies between the components, which are brought together. The
phase modular approach identifies modules within the fault trees of the phased mission
that remain independent throughout. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.8 where
the modules of the tree have been identified. These modules do not exist anywhere else in
the tree, therefore are independent.
The reliability of each of these modules is found and then these modules are combined
in a system level BDD. This is used to find the system reliability measures. The process
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involves finding independent modules within a fault tree and then solving each, depending
on whether the phase is static or dynamic and then integrating the two methods to obtain
the reliability of the system. This process is referred to as modularisation.
One type of combinatorial method for a phase modular approach is the Binary Decision
Diagram (BDD) approach, which is computationally efficient. However to use this, every
phase of the mission would be required to be a static phase. For any dynamic phases the
Markov chain models can take care of any dependencies between the components and the
order in which they can fail. Both methods discussed here do have a common limitation
in that they assume statistical independence among the failures of the components.
The phase modular approach starts by using fault trees to represent each of the phases
of the mission. Sub-trees are created to identify the independent components in the
phase. Each of these sub-tree is identified as either static or dynamic. The system-level
independent modules, are those that overlap in at least one component. For example one
module could contain {A,B,D,E}, another {A,B,D} and another {D,E}. The system-
level independent module would be {A,B,D,E}. The modules would then be stated as
either static or dynamic. Static modules would include all AND, OR and/or K-out-of-
n gates. Dynamic modules would include at least one of the following; priority AND
(PAND), cold spare (CSP), warm spare (WSP) or hot spare (HSP) gates. Once this has
been established each of the modules is identified as being bottom-level or upper-level.
Bottom-level means that the module has no child modules and the top-level means that
the module does have child modules. An example of a bottom-level module can be seen
in Figure 2.8 is module M1, and an example of a top level module is M3 as it has child
modules {A,B} and {B,E} which are each linked to a gate.
Once all bottom-level modules have been identified, the BDD approach is used to
find the joint phase module probabilities if the modules are static, and if the modules
have dynamic properties then the Markov approach is implemented. As the reliability
measures were found, each of the modules were treated as a basic event of a static fault
tree. Through the reliability measures found earlier, the system reliability equation can be
found by solving the BDD from that static fault tree.
An algorithm to detect modules within fault trees is described by Dutuit and Rauzy
(1996). The algorithm is based on Tarjan’s (1972) algorithm, which describes a method for
depth-first search and linear graphs. Dutuit and Rauzy describe an algorithm that finds
strongly related components of a graph. The algorithm presented was designed for large
fault trees with several hundred gates and events.
Another phase modular approach from Ou and Dugan (2004) is for dynamic multi-phase
systems. Two concepts were introduced; the first is the phase module and the second is
module joint probability. A module joint probability is defined by Ou and Dugan as ‘the
probability of a module with the specified statuses, either operational or failed, in different
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Table 2.2: Phase algebra used by Zang et al. (1999) (i < j)
Algebraic Law
A¯i · A¯j → A¯j
Ai ·Aj → Ai
Ai · A¯j → 0
Ai +Aj → Aj
A¯i + A¯j → A¯i
A¯i +Aj → 1
phases’. For example the module joint probability of P{M11M12}, where M1j is module
one in phase j, this is the probability that module M1 is operational in phase 1 and failed
in phase 2. From this method the reliability of the multi-phase system, i.e. that it is
operational throughout the mission, can be calculated by doing a special joint probability
of all the phases in the mission. There are two ways in which this is found; the first is based
on basic events only, i.e. the module has no child sub-modules. The second depends on
one or more Module Basic Event (MBE), i.e. the module is not at the bottom-level of the
system, and has child sub-modules. The only disadvantage in using the joint probability
method is that it can increase the computational time, and decrease efficiency.
2.2.3 Binary Decision Diagrams for Phased-Mission Systems
Zang et al. (1999) designed an algorithm that would use BDDs to analyse phased-mission
systems. Phase algebra is used to cover the dependencies across the phases, with a new
operation for a BDD to incorporate this phase algebra. The phase algebra used for this
technique can be seen in Table 2.2.
The failure function of a component in a specific phase is given by equation 2.2.28.
This takes care of the statistical-independencies across the phases. Equation 2.2.28 is the
failure function for component CA in phase j, with the time period, 0 ≤ t ≤ Tj .
FA,j(t) =
2
41− j−1Y
i=1
(1− pA,i(Ti))
3
5+
2
4j−1Y
i=1
(1− pA,i(Ti))
3
5 . pA,j(t) (2.2.28)
Where pA,i(ti) is the failure function of cAi . This has been defined below:
pA,i(ti) =
8<: Pr{A(t) = 0} i = 1Pr{A(t+ Ti−1) = 0|A(Ti−1 = 1))} 1 < i ≤ j; t ≤ Ti
Where, A(t) is the state indicator variable for CA and Ti is the duration of phase i.
The first term in equation 2.2.28 represents the probability that a component has failed
in the previous phase (1, 2, ..., j−1) and the second term represents the lifetime probability
distribution of the component in phase j.
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The BDD algorithm uses the phase algebra stated in Table 2.2 to create a new BDD
operation, Phased-Dependent Operation (PDO). PDOs come in two forms; forward and
backward PDO. This is due to the dependence of BDD structures on ordering.
• Forward PDO: The order of the variables is the same as the phase order,
A1, A2, . . . , An
• Backward PDO: The order of the variables is in reverse to the phase order,
An, An−1, . . . , A1
Where Ai is the state indicator variable of component A in phase i.
Using the ite structure technique, Ei and Ej , representing the failure combinations for
phase i and phase j respectively, can be represented as follows:
Ei = ite(Ai, G1, G2) (2.2.29)
Ej = ite(Aj , H1, H2) (2.2.30)
Where H1, H2, G1 and G2 are the ite structure off the branches.
For a forward PDO,
ite(Ai, G1, G2)⊕ ite(Aj , H1, H2) = ite(Ai, G1 ⊕H1, G2 ⊕ Ej) (2.2.31)
If A has failed in phase i then A must be in a failed state in phase j.
For a backward PDO,
ite(Ai, G1, G2)⊕ ite(Aj , H1, H2) = ite(Aj , Ei ⊕H1, G2 ⊕H2) (2.2.32)
If A is working in phase j then it must have been working in phase i.
The ordering strategy for ordering variables is based on a heuristic. Using this
information the components can be ordered. The heuristic is where each basic event of
the fault tree is given the value of weight 1, and therefore the weights of the gates can be
found by adding the weights of all inputs. When the whole tree has been assigned weights,
a depth-first traversal of the tree is made. At each level the sons of a gate are chosen
by order of increasing weight. During this process of traversal, as soon as variables are
encountered they are put in an ordered list.
Once ordered, each component indicator variable was then replaced with a set of
variables representing the component in each phase by using one of the above two PDOs
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(Forward or Backward), where each has its own ordering of the variables that belong with
the same component.
The process of the BDD algorithm using backward PDO can be seen below:
1. The failure function for each variable is calculated using equation 2.2.28.
2. The components and their corresponding variables are ordered using the heuristic
described earlier.
3. For each phase a BDD is generated using ordinary logical operations, as seen in
§1.4.1.3.
4. Using the phase algebra stated in Table 2.2 and the corresponding backward PDO
the final BDD can be found by combining these.
5. The unreliability of the PMS is calculated from the final BDD. This is accomplished
using an evaluation algorithm.
The results of the algorithm found that the backward PDO created a smaller BDD. The
reason for generating a smaller BDD was that the backward PDO provides the advantage
of cancelling common components automatically.
Xing and Dugan (2004) commented on the algorithm by Zang et al. (1999), and
provided areas of improvement to the algorithm. Two new rules were suggested by Xing and
Dugan to overcome an unstated restriction on the variable ordering. The PDO presented by
Zang et al. (1999) was used to combine single-phase BDDs to obtain the PMS BDD. When
the same component root node occurs in different phases, the PDO would be applied to
the combination rather than the usual BDD operation which would address the statistical-
dependency that exists between the variables of the same component in different phases
when combining them. The two rules state;
• Rule 1: Orderings adopted in the generation of each phase BDD are consistent or
the same for all the phases.
• Rule 2: Orderings of variables that belong to the same component, but to different
phases, stay together. This is achieved by replacing each component indicator
variable with a set of variables which represent this component in each phase after
the ordering of components is completed using the heuristic stated earlier.
If the rules are not followed correctly would lead to inaccurate single-phase BDDs that
are used to generate the final PMS BDD.
La Band and Andrews (2004) discuss a method of using BDDs to represent phase fault
trees. In Section 2.2.1 details of using just fault trees were given. This is extended to
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convert the fault trees into BDDs in order to increase the efficiency of the mathematical
manipulation. Although BDDs are very difficult to generate directly from a system
description, fault trees are not; but when a system is large it is more efficient to convert it.
Each phase of the mission is represented by a phase fault tree and then converted into
a BDD. Each component occurs in the BDD corresponding to the phase being evaluated.
These BDDs are evaluated in the usual way, by finding the paths to the ‘1’ terminal nodes.
To account for the phase dependencies, the laws given in Table 2.1 are used. This is a
simple and effective method of evaluating a phased-mission system. The advantage of using
BDDs over the fault tree method come when completing the mathematical analysis. It is
more advantageous to convert fault trees into BDD form, particularly for larger systems
as they can produce large and complex fault trees. This is also true for non-coherent fault
trees such as phase failure fault trees.
Dunnett and Andrews (2006) discuss a method that uses BDDs for non-repairable
phased-mission systems. As before, the phase fault trees are converted into their equivalent
BDD form which is expanded to include all components that appear in subsequent phases.
This method uses these BDDs to create the mission BDD. To minimise the size of the
mission BDD the following rules are used:
• Rule 1: Ai ·Aj = 0 Non-repairable component A cannot fail in phase i and j.
• Rule 2: Ai · A¯j = 0 for i < j, Component A cannot be repaired once failed.
• Rule 3: If C1 is a minimal cut set for phase j and that cut set occurs prior to
entering phase j, then the system will fail when it enters phase j.
These rules are applied to produce a reduced mission BDD. The phase and mission
failure probability can be calculated by first identifying the paths that lead to a phase
failure. Using phase algebra these paths can be minimised and evaluated. The phase failure
probability is found by summing the probabilities of all the paths. A general algorithm for
the construction of a mission BDD is given below:
1. Using the constructs for AND and OR gates to produce a BDD for each phase of the
mission from the phase fault trees. These are expanded to incorporate all possible
states of components required in later stages.
2. Considering the mission failure as an OR combination of the phase failures, the
mission BDD is constructed. Terminal mission BDD nodes represent the phase in
which the mission fails or succeeds. As there are more than two possible outcomes,
this BDD differs from conventional BDDs.
3. Each phase failure BDD is incorporated one at a time into the mission BDD to yield
a structure that is defined by the performance of each component in each phase.
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4. The mission BDD is minimised by removing paths which represent impossible
component conditions.
The general algorithm for mission BDD quantification is given below:
1. Failure modes for each phase of the mission are obtained by considering the
component conditions represented by each path of the BDD leading to the specified
phase failure.
2. Failure modes are simplified by using the phase algebra.
3. Component phase failure probabilities are evaluated.
4. Phase failure likelihoods are calculated using the disjoint phase failure modes and
the component failure probabilities.
5. Phase failure probabilities can be combined with the consequences of phase failure
in order to perform a mission risk analysis, or summed to find the mission failure
probability.
Prescott et al. (2009) discuss a method where BDDs can be used for phased-mission
planning. This work was based around phased-mission planning of autonomous systems,
which require quick analysis in order to enhance the capabilities of the autonomous system
decision-making. There are four stages to the methodology. The first is the phase failure
logic BDD construction denoted Fi. The phase failure for every possible phase during a
mission is represented by fault trees, which are then converted to BDDs. The BDDs are
independently structured to allow for an ordering scheme to be chosen, which will minimise
the size of the BDD. Once constructed the BDDs can be saved in a library for later use.
The second stage is the mission definition. The profile of the mission, the order of the
tasks and time taken for each phase are decided in this step. The appropriate BDDs are
then chosen from the library. These BDDs represent Fi which would be used to make up
the mission failure of every phase, denoted, Phi. In the third step of this technique, the
quantitative analysis begins. For the construction of the BDDs that represent Phi, a simple
connection process is used. This process does not require variable ordering and allows
efficient connection of the Fi BDDs. These have their own variable ordering. This helps to
minimise the size of the BDD. This process uses the success of the mission, which switches
the terminal nodes 0 and 1 of the BDD. This gives the dual BDD representing the success
of a phase. When the Phi BDDs are built, the AND connection of two BDDs is achieved
by connecting all terminal 1 nodes of one BDD to the root node of the other BDD to be
connected. As different BDDs might have identical components usually these would have
to follow a specific ordering scheme which would cover both BDDs. This method, however,
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Figure 2.9: System configuration for a three phase mission
does not have to as when the variables are connected they are treated independently, with
the times associated with the variables are used to take care of the dependencies between
them during quantification. By using this method the time to construct a mission phase
failure BDD is reduced. The fourth, and final step entails the quantification of the Phi
BDDs. The failure probabilities are calculated and then processed for their viability.
2.3 Repairable Systems
2.3.1 Markov applications in Phased-Mission Systems
For repairable systems the assumption of independence is no longer valid, in this case the
Markov approach is valid. There has been some work in using various Markov models
to represent phased-mission systems. Clarotti et al (1980) discusses a method that uses
the Markov approach to represent a repairable system undergoing a phased mission. This
method takes in a reliability model, such as a reliability block diagram and phase state
description. To demonstrate the method presented, an example system will be used. In
Figure 2.9, the RBDs for each phase are given, and in Table 2.3 the phase state description
is given. This table consists of all possible states the system can exist in, listing each
component as either in a functioning state (0) or failed state (1). The phase time periods
(start time, end time) are as follows:
• Phase 1: (0, t1)
• Phase 2: (t1, t2)
• Phase 3: (t2, t3)
Starting with phase 1, a probability vector, P (0), is used to state what the probability
is of the system existing in each of the eight states at time 0. It is assumed at the beginning
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Table 2.3: States of component combinations for the example system
State A B C
S1 0 0 0
S2 1 0 0
S3 0 1 0
S4 1 1 0
S5 0 0 1
S6 1 0 1
S7 0 1 1
S8 1 1 1
of the mission that all components are functioning, therefore the probability of the system
existing in state 1 at time 0 is 1, as shown in equation 2.3.1 .
P (0) =
h
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
iT
(2.3.1)
From the system configuration shown in Figure 2.9a, either A or B or C must be
functioning for phase 1 to be successful; therefore the system cannot exist in state S8. The
progression through phase 1 can be represented in matrix form as seen in equation 2.3.2,
which comes from the matrix equation 1.4.42.
2666666666666666664
p˙1(t)
p˙2(t)
p˙3(t)
p˙4(t)
p˙5(t)
p˙6(t)
p˙7(t)
p˙8(t)
3777777777777777775
=
2666666666666666664
−P1 νA νB 0 νC 0 0 0
λA −
P
2 0 νB 0 νC 0 0
λB 0 −
P
3 νA 0 0 νC 0
0 λB λA −
P
4 0 0 0 −
λC 0 0 0 −
P
5 νA νB 0
0 λC 0 0 λA −
P
6 0 −
0 0 λC 0 λB 0 −
P
7 −
0 0 0 λC 0 λB λA −
3777777777777777775
2666666666666666664
p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
p4(t)
p5(t)
p6(t)
p7(t)
p8(t)
3777777777777777775
(2.3.2)
Where,
P
i is the sum of the ith column, 0 represents impossible state transitions and
‘−’ represents absorbing states.
To move from phase 1 to phase 2 at time t1, the system must exist in states that allow
success for both phase 1 and phase 2. To be successful in phase 2, A must be functioning
with either B or C functioning. Therefore, the system can exist in S1, S3 or S5. The
probability that the system will exist in one of these states at time = t1 (moving from
phase 1 to phase 2) is the sum of the probability of being in each state as shown by
equation 2.3.3.
R(t1) = PS1(t1) + PS3(t1) + PS5(t1) (2.3.3)
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Where R(t1) denotes the reliability of the system at time t1.
For phase 2 (t1, t2), the system must start this phase in either S1, S3 or S5 as discussed
above. At this point all other states are said to be absorbing, as entering any of the other
states will cause mission failure. Therefore the initial probability vector is given as follows:
P (t1) =
h
PS1(t1) 0 PS3(t1) 0 PS5(t1) 0 0 0
iT
(2.3.4)
The matrix equations for phase 2 are given in equation 2.3.5.
2666666666666666664
p˙1(t)
p˙2(t)
p˙3(t)
p˙4(t)
p˙5(t)
p˙6(t)
p˙7(t)
p˙8(t)
3777777777777777775
=
2666666666666666664
−P1 − νB 0 νC 0 0 0
λA −
P
2 0 − 0 − 0 0
λB 0 −
P
3 − 0 0 − 0
0 λB λA −
P
4 0 0 0 −
λC 0 0 0 −
P
5 − − 0
0 λC 0 0 λA −
P
6 0 −
0 0 λC 0 λB 0 −
P
7 −
0 0 0 λC 0 λB λA −
3777777777777777775
2666666666666666664
p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
p4(t)
p5(t)
p6(t)
p7(t)
p8(t)
3777777777777777775
(2.3.5)
For phase 2 to be successful the system must exist in a state that is successful for both
phase 2 and 3. For success in phase 3 as shown in Figure 2.9c A, B and C must all be
working for success in phase 3. Therefore the system must exist in state, S1 at time t2.
The probability that phase 2 is successful is therefore given as equation 2.3.6.
R(t2) = PS1(t2) (2.3.6)
For the third and final phase of the mission, the system must be in state S1 at time
t3 in order for the phase to be successful. The probability vector at time t2 is given in
equation 2.3.7.
P (t2) =
h
PS1(t2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
iT
(2.3.7)
The matrix equation for phase 3 is given in equation 2.3.8.
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2666666666666666664
p˙1(t)
p˙2(t)
p˙3(t)
p˙4(t)
p˙5(t)
p˙6(t)
p˙7(t)
p˙8(t)
3777777777777777775
=
2666666666666666664
−P1 − − 0 − 0 0 0
λA −
P
2 0 − 0 − 0 0
λB 0 −
P
3 − 0 0 − 0
0 λB λA −
P
4 0 0 0 −
λC 0 0 0 −
P
5 − − 0
0 λC 0 0 λA −
P
6 0 −
0 0 λC 0 λB 0 −
P
7 −
0 0 0 λC 0 λB λA −
3777777777777777775
2666666666666666664
p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
p4(t)
p5(t)
p6(t)
p7(t)
p8(t)
3777777777777777775
(2.3.8)
The probability that phase 3, and therefore the mission is successful is the probability
that the system remains in state S1 until time t3, the end of the mission. This is given in
equation 2.3.9.
RMISSION = PS1(t3) (2.3.9)
This method moves from one phase to another accounting for the requirements to move
between phases. The phase reliabilities are based on what possible states the system can
exist in to make a phase successful, and the final phase provides the overall reliability of
the mission.
Alam and Al-Saggaf (1986) discuss the reliability of repairable phased-mission systems.
The analytic Markov model presented by Alam and Al-Saggaf solves for systems where the
Mission-Phase Change Times (MPCT) are deterministic, and further to stochastic (only
the deterministic MPCT method is covered here). There are two methods presented,
the difference between the two is in determining the sequence of initial conditions for
subsequent phases. This means that the phases would be assessed individually as soon as
the initial conditions are set by the previous phase. For random MPCTs, the marginal
distribution of the duration of each phase has to be determined as well, in order to find
the initial conditions for the next phase. Five assumptions were given that apply to this
work as follows:
1. A system has both good and bad elements. A mission (phase) requires several such
elements.
2. Failure and repair times are statistically independently exponentially distributed.
3. Repaired items are always returned to a state of as-good-as-new.
4. If the system fails during a particular phase the process ends.
5. Transition time is instantaneous between any consecutive phases in the mission.
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For deterministic MPCTs, each phase can be evaluated by identifying all possible states
the system can be in, e.g. for a system with components A, B, C, there are eight possible
states. Three components with two possible states each leads to 23 = 8 possible states.
This failed state would be an absorbing state. The state transition matrix [A], can be found
by the information given above. If a component fails then the repair on that component
starts immediately.
Using equation 1.4.42 with the initial condition that all components are working as
P(0), given in equation 2.3.1, The probability of being in each state at the end of the
phase is determined.
In each phase a number of components are required to be working for a phase to
be successful. This method considers the state of components in the current phase and
the subsequent phase. The reason it considers subsequent phases is that one (or more)
component(s) may need to be working in both the current and the subsequent phase in
order to move from the current phase to the subsequent phase. From the initial conditions
set in equation 2.3.1 and the state transition matrix discussed earlier, the reliability of the
system can be found. This is the probability of being in one of the states that has all the
required components in a working condition. For all subsequent phases after the first the
same approach is taken, but the initial conditions are set by the reliability equation. The
success of the mission is dependent on the reliability found at the end of the last phase.
This says what states must be occupied in order for the mission to be a success.
Smotherman and Zemoudeh (1989) use non-homogeneous Markov models for reliability
analysis of phased-mission systems. Three assumptions that hindered previous work, in
that they restrict the flexibility and applicability of the work, were considered:
• Phase changes and phase-change times do not depend upon individual states, but
rather only upon the current phase. It is therefore not possible to represent a
degraded system which requires longer completing a phase than a fully working
system.
• The number of phases of random duration must be restricted, or the time-in-phase of
each phase of random duration must obey an exponential or locally-time-dependent
distribution.
• Failure and repair rates must be constant within phases. Constant failure and repair
rates have been used to model the useful life period of components, which does not
take into account the burn-in phase of electric components and the wear-out effects
of mechanical components.
Smotherman and Zemoudeh (1989) took each of these and produced a model that
can have phase-change times that are dependent and phases that have random durations
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represented by globally-time-dependent distributions of phase-change times. The model
also states that the failure and repair rates are globally-time-dependent. This model
assumes that the system can be represented by a continuous-parameter finite-state Markov
model, with non-overlapping uniform distributions for phase-change times and failure and
repair rates globally-time dependent, where the repairs are modelled as “continuous wear”.
A set of sub-states represent each phase of a mission and the transitions are generalised to
handle phase changes. Also the transitions are given in terms of random variables which
satisfies the above hindrances. The only disadvantage to this technique is that the Markov
model generated can be very large. This is computationally inefficient, and can have an
effect on the type of systems that could be modelled.
Dugan (1991) gives a method to automate the analysis of phased-mission systems. The
method is based on Markov models created from fault trees that represent the phases of
a defined mission. In this model the phase change times are fixed; random phase changes
were not considered at this point. The model is similar to Smotherman and Zemoudeh in
that a single model is created to represent all the phases of the system.
Some of the methods for analysing phase-mission systems, including some of the above
are computationally inefficient. Somani et al. (1992) describes a technique to increase the
efficiency with which phased-mission systems can be analysed. This technique takes into
account systems with variable configurations, spares within the systems either for a single
component (dedicated spare), or for an array of components (pooled spare). These spares
can be brought into service to aid in balancing reliability and costs depending on the
requirements for the given phase. The technique incorporates redundancy management
in the system into the Markov model. This is done by generating a Markov model for
every phase, rather than a single Markov model. These Markov models are then solved
independently. Mean Time Between Critical Failures (MTBCF) is presented for a mission,
M , of time, T , seen in equation 2.3.10. The MTTF for a mission is given in equation
2.3.11.
M(T ) =
Z T
0
R(t)dt
1−R(T ) (2.3.10)
µ = M(∞) (2.3.11)
An equivalent probability of occupation for a virtual state S for a time t is given as
equation 2.3.12. The transitions are also virtual and the transition rate from all of the
operating states to this new state is 1.
S(T ) =
Z T
0
R(t) dt (2.3.12)
68 Chapter 2. Phased-Mission Systems
After some manipulation the MTBCF can be calculated using equation 2.3.13. At the
end of the mission both S¯(T ) and Q(T ) are known and S¯(T ) is calculated using the virtual
state.
MTBCF =
S¯(T )
1−Q(T ) (2.3.13)
Kim and Park (1994) describe a technique that uses Markov-based applications to
assess the reliability of a multi-phase mission systems where the configuration of the
system changes during consecutive time periods. This assumes that the failure and repair
rates of the components in a system are exponentially distributed, and that components
of a redundant nature are repairable, given that the system is operational. Kim and
Park discuss three cases in which to apply their Markov model; phase durations that are
deterministic, and random variables with either a set maximum mission time or no set
mission time. This technique uses system eigenvalues to solve the differential equations
created from the Markov model. These eigenvalues are found in the reduced TRM, [B]k,
for the kth phase. For each of the cases, the TRM with all input and outputs are stated
and from this the reduced TRM is given for each of the phases. The eigenvalues are then
calculated for each of the phases, which is used to find the mission reliability.
Alam et al. (2006) discuss an approach that uses both Markov discrete and continuous
models, by changing the phased-mission system into separate non-phased-mission systems.
The Markov model uses a standard Markov chain resulting in the union of 2n possible
states encountered during the mission. The Markov model can then be used to calculate
probability of mission success and the MTTF. Some of the advantages of this method is
that once the models are created any decisions made before or during a mission can be
done without having to re-calculate the models. Another advantage is that every phase
is calculated independently, which makes it quick and simple to input into a program. A
major advantage is that as all the phases are self-contained this allows the user to change
the number of phases and duration for a particular mission. Also, should the sub-mission
requirements change, the reliability of the mission can be calculated easily.
As there is an issue with state explosion with Markov models for real-world applications,
this method bypasses this problem by remembering that the overall state space of the
mission is the union of all the states encountered in all the phases. The procedure for this
technique is given as the following:
1. Calculate the reliability of the m phases from t0 to tf , covering all anticipated
durations for each phase.
2. The reliability for the phased-mission system is found by selecting one of the
applicable m phase durations. Initial and final probabilities for phase i for a specific
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duration are maintained at time ti−1 and tj , respectively.
3. The worst-case estimate (or conservative estimate) is calculated when the individual
reliability values for the m phases are multiplied together.
2.3.2 System and Phase Petri Nets
Mura and Bondavalli (2001) describe a method of modelling Phased-mission systems as
a combination of two separate models. These models are called System Net (SN) and
Phase Net (PhN). A System Net is used to represent an overview of all the components in
the system, taking into account their interactions and their failure and repair behaviour.
The Phase Net is used to describe the changes between phases throughout the mission.
Chew et al (2008) extends this method by using three different nets, as opposed to the
two proposed by Mura and Bondavalli. These three nets are; Phase Petri Net (PPN),
Component Petri Net (CPN) and Master Petri Net (MPN). The PPN describes the phase
failure of the system in terms of the components or basic event failures. The CPN describes
the failure/repair characteristics for each component. In this model the components can
be repaired at the end of each mission, which is made up of a number of phases. The
MPN controls the systems progress through the phases, whether it has failed in a phase
and hence cannot progress or it is allowed to progress through the phases. In this study by
Chew et al. it also controls the maintenance of the components. The Petri nets described
above interact through arcs and transitions. Together the PPN, CPN and MPN create one
large Petri net.
The Phase Petri net shows the system failure in terms of the basic components. It is a
Petri net representation of the phase fault tree.
The Component Petri net shows the basic event failure, this includes the time for
Maintenance. Each component is graphically represented by two places in the Petri net;
one to show it is in a working state, the other shows the failed state of the component. The
number of places are not limited to show just working and failed, there are other states
in which the component can reside. These are then linked to the Phase Petri net from
the failed state place and to the Master Petri net if enough of the components could cause
mission failure. Each of the components are also linked to an area of the CPN that denotes
the repair place for the components.
The Master Petri net consists of three main sections. The first is the area for control of
the sequence of phases, and the failure/success of the mission. In terms of the control of the
phases, this section of the Master Petri net indicates with a token which phase is currently
in operation. Should a Phase failure occur it would be indicated on the Phase Petri net
as the top event and indicated in the Master Petri net that it is a failed phase. If that
phase is also the current operational phase then the mission would fail. This type of phase
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modelling was adapted from the work by Volovoi (2004). The second is the ending of each
mission or maintenance free operating period (MFOP). Should a mission be accomplished,
then one of two actions occur next; another mission is initiated before any maintenance
occurs or the system enters a maintenance recovery period (MRP). This is where any
repairs needed are taken into account. The last is the section that takes into account the
abandonment of the mission should a component or system fail. This is indicated on the
Master Petri net with a place indicated as the Mission abandoned. Should a component
or system fail that causes a mission abandonment, all missions cease and the maintenance
free operating period is considered failed and the system enters a maintenance recovery
period.
Chew et al. (2008) developed simulation software to find the overall system reliability
of a system. As input the software takes the phase fault trees and component failure data
in a text-file format. The software then takes this information to produce the three Petri
nets; MPN, PPN and CPN. The output for this software is again in the format of a text-file
that can then be used for analysis. The simulation itself takes the component failure data
and phase lengths and uses these to give the transition times required. These times and
the component failure data and the phase lengths can all be sampled using distribution
types such as normal and exponential. The algorithm used for this simulation is given
below:
1. Randomly sample switching times for each newly enabled timed transition in each
net from the switching time distribution assigned to it.
2. Find the transition with the earliest switching time and fire it.
3. Search through each of the immediate transitions and if any are enabled, switch
them.
4. Repeat step 3 until no more immediate transitions are enabled.
5. Test for any of the following conditions and log them:
(a) If a system has failed, begin next simulation
(b) If system has been abandoned, begin next MFOP
(c) If a mission has completed begin next mission
(d) If MFOP has completed, begin MRP
(e) If MRP has completed, begin next MFOP
(f) If simulation has completed, begin next simulation
6. If simulation completed < ns, go to step 1, else end.
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2.4 Summary
The reliability modelling for Phase Mission Systems showed a variety of ways to model
with the methods discussed in Chapter 1. The methods discussed there were applied to
non-repairable and repairable systems. Ideally the method to be taken forward would have
to cater for both repairable and non-repairable systems, without the need of combining
with another method. From the research, the method from Chew et al. (2008) which
was the development of a piece of software to find system reliability using Petri nets as
the modelling method had the most potential. The method in which the Petri nets are
arranged provides the foundation of the work presented here.
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3.1 Introduction
The ability to automate a reliability method is not a new concept. Most effort has
been in the development of the automated construction of fault trees. Manual fault tree
construction is inefficient and prone to error. Although a specialist would be able to
complete this task themselves, there are two reasons that this is inefficient. The first
is the number of man hours required to complete such a task particularly if the system
is large. The second is fault tree construction can be subjective, meaning that different
specialists might adopt inconsistent approaches. To reduce the amount of time that is
needed to construct a fault tree and ensure that the tree is accurate, automated methods
were needed to complete the task. This is the same for any reliability model.
3.2 Methods for Automation of Reliability Models
3.2.1 Decision Table Methods
Decision tables are a method of defining the behaviour of a component within a system.
They can represent the different states, working or failed, of the component and how
the component behaves as a result of different inputs from other components within the
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Table 3.1: Complete decision table for component fuse
Row No. Input State Internal Mode Output State
1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 2 0
4 1 0 1
5 1 1 0
6 1 2 1
7 2 0 0
8 2 1 0
9 2 2 2
Input/Output states: 0 - No Signal, 1 - Normal, 2 - High/Overload
Internal mode: 0 - Good, 1 - Failed Open (without an overload input),
2 - Failed shorted (fails to open in the event of an overload)
Table 3.2: Reduced decision table for component fuse
Row No. Input State Internal Mode Output State
1 0 – 0
2 – 1 0
3 1 0 1
4 1 2 1
5 2 0 0
6 2 2 2
Input/Output states: 0 - No Signal, 1 - Normal, 2 - High/Overload
Internal mode: 0 - Good, 1 - Failed Open (without an overload input),
2 - Failed shorted (fails to open in the event of an overload)
system. They have been commonly used as a method of describing components for use in
constructing fault trees. This section describes decision tables in more detail and how they
have been applied.
Salem et al (1977) discussed a method using decision tables to model the system
behaviour. The decision tables represent the components in the system. For example
the decision table for the component fuse has been given in Table 3.1. Decision tables are
first created to account for every possible combination of inputs and state and showing
the output as a result of the combinations. In the example given in Table 3.1 the inputs,
outputs and the internal modes are represented by three values as described in the table.
From this full version of the decision table, modifications can be made in order to
reduce its size. This is done by identifying which rows have the same output based on
either inputs or states. This allows the rows to merge and therefore reduce the size of the
table. An example of this reduction can be seen in rows 1, 2 and 3 where regardless of the
internal mode of the fuse if the input state is 0 then the output is 0. By bringing these
rows together and introducing ‘–’, which refers to a‘don’t care’ entry, the table is reduced
to that seen in Table 3.2. It should be noted that only the input and internal states can
be reduced to a ‘don’t care’ state.
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A method of using decision tables to once again model components within a system is
demonstrated by Salem et al. (1977). This method discusses how decision tables have been
used in aiding the construction of fault trees. A piece of software, Computer Automated
Tree (CAT), was developed as a result. The software was designed for the analyst to use
as part of there work. The method discussed describes a way of producing an accurate
fault tree to describe a system’s behaviour. The software was designed to cater for multiple
fault trees at any one time, which could include the success of a system. The CAT allows
an analyst to edit the produced fault tree including the gates and events of the fault tree.
Another method for fault tree construction is presented by Han et al (1989) which
describes a different piece of software, Automated Fault Tree Construction (AFTC). The
AFTC code was designed as an improvement on the CAT software. This method combines
the use of decision tables and flow diagrams to ensure that the system and its components
can be modelled effectively. This method uses the concept of super component models,
which are similar to flow diagrams, together with decision tables and flow diagrams in order
to generate a fault tree. Common Cause Failures (CCFs) models, which show how a root
cause can create multiple component failures, are then merged into the fault tree. Then
the fault tree is modularised. The software holds within a library the decision tables and
the flow diagram is a required input from the user. The flow diagram would incorporate
the basic decision table of the components. The main feature of this software was the use
of these super components and the ability to use CCF modelling and modularising fault
trees.
A new method of describing a component’s behaviour was introduced by Majdara
and Wakabayashi (2009). They introduce a new table, the state transition table, which
describes the operational states of a component. An example of a component with
operational states is a switch. This has the operational states of open and closed. Together
with the function table is similar to the normal decision tables that have previously been
discussed. The function table describes the input-output relationships. An example of
both the functional and operational state tables can be seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Figure
3.1 shows the visual relationship of the tables. Majdara and Wakabayashi introduced a
new algorithm to generate a fault tree based on an occurrence of an undesirable event being
defined. The algorithm uses the input and output connections between the components
of a system in order to trace the cause of the undesirable event. The algorithm traces
back from the occurrence and identifying component states or outputs that could cause
the event. These would then be used to generate the fault tree.
When constructed the fault tree is checked for consistency. Where consistency means that
two mutually exclusive events cannot occur at the same time. The algorithm would then
remove these.
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Operator
Valve
Command input
Command output
Flow input Flow output
Figure 3.1: Operator-driven valve
Table 3.3: Operator-driven valve state transition table
First State Command Functionality Condition Next State
Open 2 OK Close
Open 2 Fail-to-close Open
Open 1 – Open
Close 1 OK Open
Close 1 Fail-to-open Close
Close 2 – Close
Open 0 – Open
Close 0 – Close
Table 3.4: Operator-driven valve function table
Flow input State Flow Output
0 – 0
– Close 0
1 Open 1
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3.2.2 Digraph Method
Another method for constructing fault trees is presented by Lapp and Powers (1977) by
using digraphs or directed graphs. This method details how taking a constructed digraph
can be transformed into a fault tree.
A digraph consists of two components; nodes and directed edges. These nodes are used to
represent process variables, and also some types of failures. Relationships between these
nodes are through edges that connect between them. If a deviation occurs in one variable
and has an effect on another variable in the system, then there is an edge connecting these
variables. These deviations can either be positive or negative; “+” and “-” respectively.
Depending on the severity of these deviations the values 0, 1 and 10 are used to represent
none, moderate and a very large deviation, respectively. For example in a system that
deals with mass flow rates, should there be a large decrease in that flow then there would
be a (-10) associated with that connection.
The digraph is used to detect control loops to identify ‘disturbances’ which could result
in the top event. By following the disturbances through the digraph the fault tree can be
constructed by allowing the disturbances to propagate.
3.2.3 Modified Decision Table method
A new method of combining both decision tables and digraphs to automatically construct
fault trees was introduced by Henry and Andrews (1997). Decision tables brought forward
the advantages of the ability to identify the normal state of a system and digraphs the
ability to detect and classify control loops.
This method is demonstrated in a program that uses AutoCAD schematic diagrams
and decision tables to model the system and its components. The AutoCAD diagram is
used as a method of showing how the components of a system link to one another. This
allows this sort of analysis to be completed during the design phase of a new or modified
system. The decision tables are used as a method of modelling the components and are
stored within a library of decision tables. These decision tables can be edited by the user
to suit their needs using a component editor. To generate the fault tree a top event is
entered as input from the user into the program. The program then traces the undesirable
event and generates a fault tree based on the trace. This program does not complete the
analysis of the fault tree, but does provide a file version of the fault tree that can be read
by commercial packages.
The method for automating the construction requires the system description, which is
given in the form of an AutoCAD schematic diagram. From the schematic diagram a file is
created that stores the topology information for the system. This information includes how
the components connect together in the system. A library of component decision tables
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Table 3.5: Original decision table format for component Contact (Henry & Andrews 1997)
IN1 IN2 STATE OUT1 OUT2
C EN W - C
C DE W - C
NC - - NC NC
- DE - NC -
- - F NC NC
- EN W - NC
Table 3.6: Modified decision table format for component Contact (Henry & Andrews 1997)
CONTACTS
NORMAL
2,2,1
+,+,+,+
IN1, IN2, STATE, OUT1, OUT2
C, EN, W, -, C
C, DE, W, -, C
NC, -, -, NC, NC
-, DE, -, NC, -
-, -, F, NC, NC
-, EN, W, -, NC
EXCLUSIVE
W, F
exists and these can be amended or new decision tables generated. This is accomplished
using a generic component editor. A top event is entered into the fault tree construction
program so that the causes of such an event can be traced. The program then generates
the fault tree structure for the top event. This fault tree structure is written to an output
file, which is capable of being read by other commercial analysis packages. These packages
can then be used to carry out the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the fault tree
and therefore obtain the top event probabilitys. As this method makes use of a Computer
Aided Design (CAD) interface, this can allow the reliability assessment of a system at the
design stage.
Henry and Andrews created a modified decision table method to overcome the main
weakness of decision tables: the inability to detect, classify and analyse control loops and
circuits. This was overcome by modifying the tables to incorporate a gain that is used to
show the connection between the inputs and the outputs of a component. An example of
a modified decision table is given in Table 3.6.
This new decision table element, to add gains, allows for the identification of circuits
within a system. By using the component decision tables and the system topology Henry
(1996) generates a digraph. The nodes of the digraphs represent the outputs of a component
and the edges link these nodes together. By defining a top event and using the digraph a
new item is created, a topology graph. The fault is traced and the nodes that are ‘passed’
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are identified. This process identifies any circuits within the system.
3.2.4 Cause-Consequence Diagrams
Cause-Consequence Diagrams (CCDs) are another method of showing the failure logic
of a system in a similar fashion to fault trees. However, CCDs identify a complete set,
rather than a sub-set, of consequences as a result of an initiating event. CCDs can become
very large particularly if applied to industrial scale systems and is a subjective process.
To remove human error from the construction of such diagrams Valaityte et al. (2010)
discusses a method of automatically constructing a CCDs based on a system description in
the form of a system topology diagram and decision tables describing component behaviour.
The construction algorithm detailed within Valaityte et al. (2010) is based on whether the
system contains electrical circuits. This changes the way in which the system is handled.
Circuits are identified in this method by locating loops using the system topology diagram.
This method uses the initiating event to follow/trace the path of the knock-on effects within
the system and identifying these within the CCD.
3.2.5 Mini fault trees
Taylor (1982) developed an algorithm for fault tree construction using mini fault trees. The
initial information given was the description of the system, which describes each component
and the set of connections between these components. Each component type stores in a
library a standard function and a failure model. These functions and models are made up
of mini fault trees. The mini fault trees consist of the following:
• Input event
• Set of component conditions
• Set of output and state change events
This is a method of describing the component’s behaviour in fault tree form rather
than decision tables as seen in previous methods. This method uses the undesirable event
as the starting point and identifies the event and the associated component. The method
then moves through the connections of the component to other components in the system
that also have the event listed. The process continues to follow associated components
and events and further following new events as a result of a previous event. Using the
associations the fault tree is constructed.
3.2.6 Faultfinder
The FAULTFINDER program was developed at Loughborough University in the Depart-
ment of Chemical Engineering and written in Fortran 77. The programme has been
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Figure 3.2: FAULTFINDER Structure (Hunt et al. 1993)
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described in detail in 4 papers by Kelly and Lees ((1986a) – (1986d)). These papers are
split into the following four categories; the modelling method (Kelly & Lees 1986a), the
fault tree synthesis method (Kelly & Lees 1986b), the interactive facility by implementing
these (Kelly & Lees 1986c) and illustrative examples (Kelly & Lees 1986d).
The third paper (Kelly & Lees 1986c) gives a detailed description of the main sub-
programs that comprise of the suite of programs within FAULTFINDER. These are listed
below:
1. Master Program (MASTER)
2. Unit Model and Event Model Programs (MODGEN and EVTGEN)
3. Fault Tree Generation Program (FLTGEN)
4. Fault Tree Analysis Program (FLTANL)
5. Fault Tree Display and Evaluation Program
An example of the structure of the FAULTFINDER programme is given in Figure 3.2.
The sub-programs of FAULTFINDER are described in detail below; the uses of each sub-
program and their relevance to the other sub-programs are considered.
3.2.6.1 Master Program
The master program or MASTER is the framework program which handles the data inputs
and outputs. In MASTER there are two options; the first is to call a fault tree synthesis
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program and the second is to transfer input data straight into a process control computer.
For the first option a top event is selected and a fault tree is generated using FLTGEN.
This creates a fault tree encoded as an array. Using other facilities within FAULTFINDER
the fault tree can be viewed, modified, plotted (using GINO graph plotting facility) and
analysed using FLTANL. The second option, at the time of the publication of the paper,
was not developed, but was available in principle. The structure of the control program
can be split into six parts:
• Input the configuration data.
• Input unit model data from MODLIB and EVTLIB.
• Attachment of FLTGEN: In this part the options for the fault tree generation and
drawing are selected. The top event data is also input here.
• Generation of the cut sets.
• Configuration editor for modifing the configuration.
• Input of the sequence abort conditions. The configuration is also modified at this
part for the next stage sequence.
3.2.6.2 Unit Model and Event Model Programs
A unit model contains the necessary data for a particular component within a system.
The collection of unit models should make up the system as a whole. These unit models
are created in MODGEN and then stored in the unit model library, MODLIB. The unit
model program, MODGEN, is an interactive program where the necessary data for each
unit model is entered.
The model data that is required for each has a specified format. The information first
given is the model name which can be an alphanumeric description and the model number
which lies between 1-100. The information required next is the engineering description
which defines the equipment and engineering assumptions (these relate primarily to the
propagation equations explained shortly). These are both given in plain text format. The
next group of information is the system information including propagation equations, event
statements, and decision tables if applicable to the system. This information provides the
initial behaviour of the unit, each is described below:
• Propagation Equations: Propagation equations describe how a fault moves
through units in the system by describing the relationship between an output variable
of a unit and the input and other output variables of the unit.
• Event Statements: There are three types of event statements that are considered;
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Table 3.7: Example Decision Table for system description
A B C D Output
T T – – Z
– – T T Z
– Initial event statements: These statements are used to represent the affect of a
fault initiating a sequence of disturbances or an operator action as an initiating
event. These statements are also used in place of a propagation equation when
variable deviation cannot be derived.
– Intermediate event statements: These statements are used to include logical
relations such as AND gates and can also be used to represent generic faults.
Intermediate events can have either faults or variable deviations as their causes.
– Terminal event statements: These statements are used to represent a variable
deviation that can cause a terminal fault. This approach is not always used
within a unit model as this can cause the size of the model to increase with a
full list of terminal events. Therefore these are usually given in a separate event
model.
• Decision Tables: Decision tables can be used instead of initial event statements
when the logical relations become complex. For example, equation 3.2.1 can be
represented as Table 3.7, where T represents True and – represents Don’t care.
Z = (A AND B) OR (C AND D) (3.2.1)
Information about the components normal, failure states/modes is also included in the
system information. The format for the output data is in the form of mini-trees; a list of
mini-tree top events and a list of the individual mini-trees.
Event statements and decision tables are the most flexible out of the three input data
and therefore widely used. However if decision tables are the primary model, then they
are generated manually. This takes time and storage on the system. Therefore the use of
decision tables was kept for complex models.
The method chosen for the output information was in the form of mini-fault trees.
These are well adapted for the automatic generation of models and fault trees. Mini-fault
trees can be created manually, but it is more desirable to automatically create them. A
unit model should only be created when there is a need for one. This ensures that the
model has been tested before it is stored to the library.
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Mini-fault trees are generated from the propagation equations and the event statements
or decision tables. The propagation equations can be converted into the mini-fault trees,
as top event, or output is variable deviation given on the left hand side of the equation,
with the basic events, or inputs to the tree are the variable deviations on the right hand
side of the equation. Mini-fault trees generated from these equations can be incomplete
and can require information from initial event statements and decision tables. If only a
propagation equation is required to form the mini fault tree then an OR gate is used, but
if an initial event statement or a decision table is required then an AND gate is required.
In some cases it is more useful to model as an event rather than a unit. The types of
events that this would be applicable to are:
1. Undesired events
2. Physical and phase changes
3. Materials
Undesired events are those events that are terminal events, as discussed earlier. These can
either be modelled with unit models, but are more often modelled with event models due
to the problems of the size of the model with unit models. Event models are generated
by inputting the data into the event model program, EVTGEN. The event model is then
automatically stored in the event model library, EVTLIB.
The input information for EVTGEN is similar to that for the input information for
MODLIB, the first piece of information to create an event model is the event type, such as
those mentioned above; undesirable event, phase or physical change, or materials failure.
Event name and number, where the name is an alphanumeric description and event number
that is in the range of 1-20. Then a description of the event; event statements and decision
tables (when applicable). The output from the program is mini-fault trees.
3.2.6.3 Fault Tree Generation Program
The fault tree generation program, FLTGEN, is a sub-program designed for fault tree
generation, plotting and manipulation. The program generates a fault tree as an array of
data before creating a drawing of the tree. To create the data, an undesirable event is
specified as the top event, and from there information of how the system would reach such
an event is compiled. To do this individual branches would be created from the appropriate
mini-trees. Starting with the top event, this would be the top event of a mini-fault tree
within an event model. This tree would be placed directly below the top event and the
input events would be mini-top events of other mini-fault trees that are either within the
same event model or a unit model connected to it. This creates the next level of mini-trees.
This process is continued until only basic or diamond events are left.
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Consistency checking is completed on the final tree to check that none of the boundary
conditions have been broken and faults that are not allowed to occur, haven’t. Series and
parallel consistency checks are required. Series consistency check each branch individually
for event consistency and this can be done whilst the tree is generated . Whereas parallel
consistency checks all branches against the others under an AND gate for event consistency,
but can only be done once the synthesis is complete.
Due to the number of unit models used to generate a fault tree a number of minor
or repeated faults can exist. The fault tree can also contain looped events or variable
deviations that exist else where in the tree. These are removed or suppressed to unclutter
the tree with unnecessary information. When a looped event is identified this is suppressed
and a diamond event is put in its place. By doing this the stored fault tree is affected as
the looped events are not created, but instead point to the one and only occurrence in
the tree. When a repeated fault is identified then these were removed by either full or
partial suppression. Full suppression removes the types of basic events from the stored and
drawn tree, whereas partial suppression only removes them from the drawn tree and not
the stored tree.
The fault tree is plotted and can be generated on screen. The tree is plotted using
GINO graph plotting facility. GINO generates the tree; producing its structure and a
graphical output. The tree generation has two parts; the first is the initial synthesis and
the second is the rationalisation process. This yields the fault tree.
3.2.6.4 Fault Tree Analysis Program
The sub-program fault tree analysis, FLTANL, has only two features; the first is executed
in MASTER, where the cut sets of the tree can be determined. The second is with the use
of other software packages specifically designed for fault tree analysis. One such package is
PREP and KITT (Vesely & Narum 1970). This is separate from the MASTER program.
This consists of three programs:
• TRIAD: Analyses and rearranges
• CUTSET: Calculates minimal cut sets
• KITT: Calculates top event frequency
The first two are part of the PREP, or preparation of the data before the top event
frequency can be found. Then KITT calculates the top event frequency.
3.2.6.5 Fault Tree Display and Evaluation Program
As mentioned earlier the tree produced in FLTGEN can be plotted and manipulated. The
Fault Tree Display and Evaluation Program extends this manipulation to editing the tree
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itself in terms of its structure to create a clearer structure and the descriptive text of the
events to a comprehensible form.
The editor can also be used for general fault tree creation which can be useful for simple
structures.
3.3 Summary
The methods presented here were very focused on the automatic generation of fault trees.
None of the methods researched constructed automatically a system undergoing a phased
mission, which implies that there is room for the work presented here. One of the methods
discussed in this section by Majdara and Wakabayashi (2009) was a method to trace a fault
using decision tables. This method provided a starting point as to how the components of
systems in this work would be described in order to generate a reliability model.
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4.1 Introduction
By automating the process of building the reliability model, the process of assessing a
system’s reliability becomes more efficient and reliable. To achieve this, the reliability
model generated must be versatile and easy to simulate once constructed. For these
reasons, Petri nets have been chosen as the modelling method. To construct the Petri
nets, the system and mission that the system is undertaking must be described sufficiently.
To achieve this, two techniques have been employed to describe the components within
a system; decision tables as discussed in Chapter 3 and the method by Majdara and
Wakabayashi (2009).
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Power 
Supply
(In) (Out)
(State)
Figure 4.1: Power Supply component
Table 4.1: Decision Table for a power supply
In State Out
1 C W C
2 – F NC
3 NC – NC
4.2 Model Inputs
The information required from the user includes a description of each component within
a given system, which includes the component’s failure and, when applicable, repair rates,
and the number of input and output connections the component has. This information can
then be used to create a system map that shows how each of the component’s connections
link to other components in the system. The mission of the system is also required from
the user; this details how a system can suceed or fail within each stage, or phase, of the
mission.
4.2.1 Component Description
Each component in the system is described using a decision table. If a component has
more than one operational mode, another table is also required: the operational mode
table, which describes how each mode affects the component’s behaviour. Operational
Mode tables are similar to state transition tables introduced by Majdara and Wakabayashi
(2009) and described in Section 3.2.1. A decision table is still required alongside the
operational mode table as the operational mode table describes the internal conditions of
a component, whereas the decision table is used to describe how the component interacts
within the system scope. An example of a component with a single operating mode is a
power supply, shown in Figure 4.1. The decision table for the power supply is given in
Table 4.1, where C and NC represent current and no current, respectively.
For components with a single operational mode, the headings in the decision table are
in, state and out. These correspond to the inputs and outputs to and from the component
and the state of the component, where the state is the working, failed or repair state of
the component. Depending on the system structure there may be multiple inputs and
outputs, as shown in Section 3.2.1. If a component is time dependent, then a time column
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Figure 4.2: Switch component
is necessary to capture this information.This can be particularly relevant to the time of a
phase within a given mission.
For components that have more than one operating mode, both tables are necessary.
A link is therefore required between the two tables. This is used to show how the internal
mode of the component affects the system. To show this connection the decision table has
a heading mode in place of the state heading in a normal decision table. The state of the
component is dealt with within the operational mode table. An example of a component
that requires an operational mode table and a decision table is a toggle switch. A toggle
switch requires an input from another component (usually an operator) and the input can
change the operating mode of the toggle switch. The decision table and the operational
mode table for the toggle switch can be seen in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. Where
the command values CL, OP and NA represent closed, open and no action, respectively
and the state values W , FCL and FOP represent working, failed closed and failed open,
respectively. The table headings relate to the inputs and output shown in Figure 4.2.
Table 4.2: Decision Table for toggle switch
In 2 Mode Out
1 – Open NC
2 NC – NC
3 C Closed C
Table 4.3: Operating mode table for toggle switch
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed OP W Open
4 Closed NA – Closed
5 Open – FOP Open
6 Open OP – Open
7 Open CL W Closed
8 Open NA – Open
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An operational mode table has four headings. Two relate to the mode of the component:
Mode 1 relates to the initial mode, or starting mode and Mode 2 relates to the resultant
mode. The other headings within the operational mode table are command and state, where
command relates to the input that can cause a change in the mode of the component. State
is the same as the state discussed in decision tables, representing the component’s working
or failed state. Mode 2 in the operational mode table is the mode value related to the
decision table heading Mode.
The principle idea is for the software to contain a list of common component decision
and, where applicable, operating mode tables. The user would then only be required to
create component tables for those components that are not commonly used. A number of
component tables have been generated for the example systems seen throughout the next
few chapters and are re-useable for other users.
The above information describes how the component behaves, but does not describe
how it fails. This is covered by the failure rate of the component, which can be constant or
follow a distribution. This information must also come from the user as it is not within the
scope of the software to hold failure rates of components, which can be variable depending
on manufacturer and version. The repair rate of a component will be covered in later
chapters.
4.2.1.1 Time Dependencies
A component’s behaviour within a system can sometimes be dictated by time, i.e. during
different time periods the component can behave in different ways. These times would
relate to the phases of the mission undertaken by the system, in which this component
resides. A good example of a component that acts in this way is a timer relay. A timer relay
initially energises when current is applied and, once a specified time has elapsed the relay
de-energises. This type of information is required in the decision table of the component, to
define what period of time, or specific time, the component changes, and how that change
affects the component’s outputs. The timer relay decision table is given in Table 4.4 and
this shows that the timer relay has one input of an electrical connection and two outputs.
The first output is to another component, such as a contact (EN and DE, energise and
de-energise, respectively), and the second output is another electrical connection. In the
table another column heading is included, t, representing time. The rows that include a
time element can only occur at the time or time frame stated. In the example the first
row can only occur between the time zero (inclusive) and some predefined time, t1, but
not at t1. This row states that the outputs would be EN and C during this time period,
as long as the pre-requisites from the input and state columns are met. The second row
states that this row can occur at time t1 and any time greater for a given mission. The
outputs for the row are different from the previous row, with DE and NC. Although both
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Figure 4.3: Example of a simple system with one circuit
PS
FS M
IN
IN
IN OUT
OUT
OUT
Figure 4.4: Example of a topology diagram
rows have the same input and component state they produce different outputs depending
on the time/time frame stated.
Table 4.4: Timer Relay Decision Table
t In State Out 1 Out 2
1 0 ≤ t < t1 C W EN C
2 t ≥ t1 C W DE NC
3 – – F DE NC
4 – NC – DE NC
4.2.2 System Description
The system description describes how the components link together. This information is
presented in the form of a system topology diagram. This infomation must come from
the user, but the labels of IN and OUT may be pre-defined if the user uses a library
component decision and operational mode tables. An example of a simple system is given
in Figure 4.3 and the topology diagram for this system is given in Figure 4.4. This system
has three components with unique identifiers, PS, M and FS, which represent a power
supply, motor and fuse, respectively. If there were more than one component of the same
type, then the identifiers would be numbered, for example PS1, PS2 for multiple power
supplies. Within the system topology diagram the outputs of each component, OUT are
linked to the input, IN , of the next component in the system structure. These IN and
OUT labels map to the decision and operational mode table In and Out columns.
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4.2.3 Circuit Description
Circuit descriptions are only required when the system contains electrical components. The
circuit description is in the form of a list containing the unique identities of components
in an electrical system. Circuits within a system need to be identified so as to determine
whether or not current flows in the system. This is completed by using the system and
component information described earlier in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.1, respectively.
The circuit models contain the critical states or modes of the components within the
circuit. If a component has more than one operating mode, then the mode can change
the circuit’s state. If a component does not have more than one operating mode then the
state of the component, working or failed, will affect the circuit. For the creation of the
circuit model the components within the circuit need to be identified along with the mode
or state that can create current or no current in the circuit. The decision tables of the
components hold this information and the software identifies this automatically.
It should be noted that within the software there is a location for the pre-determined
values used for C, NC (current and no current), which is used as part of the circuit list
generation. These values can be altered if necessary by the user.
4.2.4 Phase Description
The phase description specifies the mission that the system is to undertake. This
information will be given in the form of a table: the phase transition table. The phase
transition table describes the phases that the system undertakes, assuming the system
works from the beginning to the end of the mission. This details the length of the phase
and the condition that causes the phase to transition to the next phase. As the system
may not always work from the beginning to the end of a mission, other phases are required
to show system failure. The number of these phases depends on the system. All of this
information is included in the phase transition table.
It should be noted that each row of the phase transition table does not always have
time associated with it. In some cases a component’s output can be the trigger of a phase
transition.
The model generated from the phase transition table provides a method of monitoring
the time during a mission and will be covered in a later section.
4.2.5 Initial Conditions
The initial conditions required before a simulation can begin include the following
information:
• The starting mode of any components with more than one operating mode.
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• The initiating component that starts the system, and the input/output condition
of the component is required. For example a switch closing could be the initiating
condition, therefore it would be the switch with an input to close, CL.
• It is assumed that all components are in a working condition at the beginning of a
simulation.
4.3 Petri Net Models
In this section the Petri net models, CPNs, SPN, Circuit Petri Net (CiPN) and PPN are
described. In the previous section the input information required to create each of these
models was discussed. This section shows how the input information is translated into
these models by the software.
4.3.1 Component Petri Nets
The component description given in Section 4.2.1 is now used to generate the CPN. The
decision and operating mode tables described in section 3.2.1 are used in the construction
of the Petri net for the component.
4.3.1.1 Component Petri Net Construction
To create the CPN, each row of the decision and operational mode tables is taken as a single
transition. For decision tables, the values from the input and state/mode columns form
the input places to the transition and the output column values form the output places.
For operational mode transition tables, the values from the starting mode, command and
state columns form the input places to the transition and the resulting mode column values
form the output places.
If there is a time column associated with a decision table, this will be dealt with through
the PPN to be discussed later.
Construction Procedure
The procedure for constructing the CPNs is as follows:
1. Except for the time, t, column, identify types in each column, e.g. C and NC.
Ignore “–” entries.
2. Take each column and
(a) If column is mode1, mode2 or mode, then create one place for each type that
exists in all of these columns.
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(b) Else, create a place for each type.
3. Create an immediate transition for each row of the table.
4. Input places for a transition for an OMT table are mode1, in and state. Input places
for a DT are in and either state or mode. Taking each row of the table at a time,
create an arc from the row’s input place to the transition for that row (created in
step 3) as follows:
(a) If in column type, create single headed arc.
(b) If state column type, create double headed arc.
(c) If mode column type, create double headed arc.
(d) If mode1 column type, create single headed arc.
5. An output place(s) from a transition for an OMT table is mode2 and for a DT is
out. Taking each row of the table at a time. Create an arc from the transition to
the place representing column type depending on the column:
(a) If out column type:
i. If the only input arc to the transition is a double headed arc then a single
headed inhibit arc is used.
ii. Else, use a single headed arc.
(b) If mode2 column type:
i. If the only input arc to the transition is a double headed arc then a single
headed inhibit arc is used.
ii. Else, use a single headed arc.
4.3.1.2 Decision Table Example
To demonstrate the procedure, an example is shown in Figure 4.5 for a power supply. For
step one, Figure 4.5a, the types in the table are identified; {C, NC} in column in, {W ,
F} in column state and {C, NC} in column out. Step two moves through each column,
creating a place for each type identified in step one, as seen in Figure 4.5b. For step three,
the number of rows in the table is counted and an immediate transition is created for each
row (three in this case). This can be seen in Figure 4.5c. Step four moves through each
row of the table and generates arcs between the types in the in/state columns and the
transition representing that row. For example, on row one of the table, the in column type
C and the state column type W are the inputs to the first transition. The type of arc is
dependent on the column heading. For in column types a single-headed arc is required.
State column types require a double headed arc as the component can only change state
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when the time to failure is reached and is not dependent on whether current flows or not
through the component. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.5d. The fifth and final step is
to create the arcs from the transitions to the output type places. The type of arc required
is dependent upon the arcs that are connected to the transition from step four. If the
only input arc connected to the transition is a double headed arc then an inhibit, single
headed arc is required. This stops the possibility of continuous firing of tokens from the
state places. Otherwise a single headed arc is required from the transition to the output
place. An example of each type of arc can be seen in Figure 4.5e. This is the final part
of the Petri net to be added at this stage. The next to consider is the component failure
times, discussed in the next section.
To demonstrate the procedure for a component with multiple operating modes, the
toggle switch is used. Applying the steps to this component can be seen in Figure 4.6 and
Figure 4.7. Figure 4.6 is the construction process for the operational mode table and Figure
4.7 is the construction process for the decision table. It is not necessary for the operational
mode table to be assessed first, but for the purposes of demonstrating the procedure this
was considered first.
4.3.1.3 Operational Mode Transition Table Example
Starting with the operational mode table the first step is to identify the types in each
of the columns of the table. This can be seen in Figure 4.6a. The types identified in the
mode 1 column and themode 2 column should be identical. The next step in the procedure
creates a place for each type under all columns except for the mode 1 and mode 2 columns.
Places for the types in these columns are created once for both columns. The purpose of
the places for modes is to show the current mode of the component; this cannot be done
if there are multiple places representing the same information. This can be seen in Figure
4.6b. The next step is to create a transition for each row of the table, as seen in Figure 4.6c.
In step four the arcs used as input to the transition are generated, depending on the input
place and the row of the table the transition relates to. If the place is from the mode 1 or
in 1 column then a single-headed arc is used. If the place is from the state column then
a double-headed arc is used. The final step of the procedure is to create the output arcs
from the transition. As the only output is mode 2, the arcs are single-headed. The final
Petri net from the operating mode table of the toggle switch can be seen in Figure 4.6e.
As the toggle switch has multiple operating modes the procedure is applied to the
second table, the decision table. To begin step one is completed by identifying the types
in the columns of the decision table, as seen in Figure 4.7a. As the types identified in the
mode column were already identified during the process for the operational mode table,
these types do not need to be generated as places in step 2. The remaining columns,
however, do need to have a place created for each type, this can be seen in Figure 4.7b.
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In State Out
C
-
NC
W
F
-
C
NC
NC
(a) Identifying the types in each
of the columns
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
OUT=NC
OUT=C
(b) Creating a place for each
column type
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
OUT=NC
OUT=C
(c) Creating a transition for each
row of the table
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
OUT=NC
OUT=C
(d) Creating an arc from each
input place for each transition
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
OUT=NC
OUT=C
(e) Creating an arc from each
transition to the output places
Figure 4.5: Procedure steps for the construction of a Petri net representing a power supply
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Mode 2State
-
CL
OP
closed
closed
open
FCL
Mode 1 In 1
closed
NA
-
OP
CL
NA
closed
open
open
open
closed
-
W
-
FOP
W
-
-
closed
closed
closed
open
open
open
open
(a) Identifying the types in each of the
columns
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(b) Creating a place for each column
type
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(c) Creating a transition for each row of
the table
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(d) Creating an arc from each input
place for each transition
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(e) Creating an arc from each transition
to the output places
Figure 4.6: Procedure steps for the construction of a Petri net representing a toggle switch
using the OMT
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For step three the number of rows in the table is counted and an immediate transition is
created for each row, as shown in Figure 4.7c. Step four moves through each row of the
decision table and creates an arc between the place representing in 2 column types and
the mode column types. Arcs are added according to the column types, as before. This
can be seen in Figure 4.7d. The last stage of the procedure creates arcs from each of the
transitions. These arcs go from the transition of the row to the out column type associated
with the row. As before if the only input into the transition is a double-headed arc then
the output arc is a inhibit single headed arc. The result of the procedure applied to the
decision table and the operating mode table is seen in Figure 4.7e.
4.3.1.4 Component Failure
To account for the failure of a component, transitions are required between the working
and each possible failure state. For components with only one mode and one failure state,
there is only one working and one failed state, therefore a single transition is required
between the working and failed state. This transition is dictated by the failure rate or
failure distribution of the component, and therefore the transition is a delayed transition
where the delay is the time to failure. An example of how this is represented in Petri net
form is given in Figure 4.8a, where W represents the working state and F represents the
failed state of the component.
For components with more than one mode, this becomes slightly more complex. The
mode the component currently exists in must be accounted for in order to show which
failure mode has occurred. To demonstrate this an example is given in Figure 4.8b of a
component with two operating modes,M1 andM2, where both modes have the same time
to failure, tF . Whether multiple failure modes for a component have the same failure time
depends on the component and the operational mode. This information will need to be
provided as the input to the model. Another example of this can be seen in Figure 4.8c;
this figure shows that sometimes the component can have a different failure rate for each
time of failure. In this figure there are two failure modes, FM1 and FM2, and each failure
mode has a different time to failure, tFM1 and tFM2. The Petri net works in the same way
as Figure 4.8b.
There are also components that have multiple failure states but do not have muliple
operational modes. An example of such a component is a pressure gauge. If the main
failure of a pressure gauge is to fail stuck, then there is a possibility of the pressure gauge
failing at different levels on the gauge. Depending on the system, the values on the gauge
could be classified into different groups, for example, LOW , HIGH and V HIGH (low,
high and very high pressure). To transition from the working state to one of these failure
states the system must first transition to a dedicated failure place. This requires the normal
transition as seen in Figure 4.8a. To transition to the relevant failure state the information
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In Mode Out
C
-
NC
closed
open
-
C
NC
NC
(a) Identifying the types in each of the columns
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(b) Creating a place for each column type
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(c) Creating a transition for each row of the table
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(d) Creating an arc from each input place for each
transition
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(e) Creating an arc from each transition to the
output places
Figure 4.7: Procedure steps for the construction of a Petri net representing a toggle switch
using the DT
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from the component’s decision table is used. Within the decision table the different failure
states should be listed with their appropriate outcome in the output, OUT , column. The
decision table should have full coverage of the mission so the failure state can be determined
at any point during the mission. The failure state can then be determined using the other
rows of the decision table. The other rows of the table have an output that relates to
one of the outputs linked to a failure state. By using this information a transition to
represent each row of the decision table not related to a failure state is generated to show
the transitions into the failure states. An example of a pressure gauge decision table can
be seen in Table 4.5, where t1 is a period time in which the input, In can change, and the
corresponding work to failure state transitions can be seen in Figure 4.9. The construction
procedure to generate the transitions is described below:
1. This component has been identified as having multiple failure states and does not
have multiple operational modes. Create a place to represent that the component
has failed.
2. Create a timed transition and set the time to failure as the value generated using
the distribution identified for this component.
3. Create a single headed arc between the working place of the component and the
timed transition created in 2.
4. Create a single headed arc between the timed transition and the failed place created
in 1.
5. Moving through each row of the table: If the next row in the table is not associated
with a failure state then complete the following:
(a) Get the output types associated with this row of the table.
(b) Create an immediate transition.
(c) Create a single headed arc between the failed place created in 1. and the
immediate transition created in 5b.
(d) Using the output types identified in 5a identify the failure state would cause
the same output types.
(e) Create a single headed arc between the immediate transition and the failure
state identified in 5d.
(f) Get the input column types from the row and create a double-headed arc
between the place representing the input type and the immediate transition.
This representation of the component’s state is incorporated into the CPNs by linking
to the places that represent the working and failed states of the component.
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W
F
tF
(a) Example Petri net of the failure
rate for a single mode component
tFW
FM1
FM2
mode = M2
mode = M1
(b) Example Petri net of the failure rates for a multiple
mode component where the failure rates are the same
(c) Example Petri net of the failure rates
for a multiple mode component where
the failure rates are different
Figure 4.8: Example of using failure rates in Petri net models
W
IN=CONST
IN=DEC
IN=INC
F
F_LOW
F_HIGH
tF
Figure 4.9: Example of a component with multiple failure states and one operating mode
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Table 4.5: Decision table for a pressure gauge
t In State Out 1
1 t < t1 CONST W LPR
2 t < t1 INC W LPR
3 t1 CONST W LPR
4 t1 INC W HPR
5 – DEC W LPR
6 – – F_LOW LPR
7 – – F_HIGH HPR
4.3.2 Circuit Petri Nets
4.3.2.1 Circuit Petri Net Construction
CiPNs are necessary to track the flow of current in electrical systems or subsystems.
A CiPN is required for every electrical ciruit identified in a given system. Once the
components have been identified in a given circuit the decision tables of those components
can be searched. Moving through each row of the decision tables, the component
states/modes that can cause current/no current within a circuit are identified.
From this information the Petri nets for ‘current in circuit n’ and ‘no current in circuit
n’ are developed. For the Petri net ‘current in circuit n’, all components in circuit n need
to pass current. For ‘no current in circuit n’, it only takes one component in circuit n to
not pass current.
Construction Procedure
1. Take circuit list n and create a place representing “Current in circuit n” and a place
representing “No Current in circuit n”.
2. For “Current in circuit n” and “No Current in circuit n” identify the rows in the
decision tables of the components in circuit list n that have an out column that
represents this circuit having current and no current.
3. For each row identified:
(a) If “–” exists in either state or mode column then ignore that row.
(b) Else, identify type in state or mode column.
4. For “Current in circuit n”, create a single immediate transition and for “No Current
in circuit n” create an immediate transition for each row identified in step 2.
5. Create a single headed inhibit arc from the transition(s) to the places representing
“Current in circuit n” and “No Current in circuit n”.
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PS1
PS2
OUT
OUT
OUT
OUT 1
OUT
IN
IN
IN
ININ
OUT 1
OUT 2
OUT 2IN
J1 J2
Figure 4.10: Example of a system with multiple circuits
6. For each state or mode type identified for “Current in circuit n”, create a double
headed arc from the place representing this state or mode in the CPN to the
transition.
7. For each state or mode type identified for “No Current in circuit n” create a double
headed arc from the place representing this state or mode in the CPN to the
transition representing that row.
Each CiPN connects to a component within the circuit list through the transitions created
from the decision tables. The component that is identified is determined by the software
by using the system topology information and the circuit list.
To demonstrate the procedure the example given in Figure 4.3 is extended to include
another circuit as shown in Figure 4.10. In this new system there are two power supplies,
PS1 and PS2, a fuse F a motor, M and two junctions, J1 and J2 as labelled in the
diagram. From the diagram there are two circuits that exist in this system and are listed
below:
1. { PS1, J1, FS, M, J2 }
2. { PS2, J1, FS, M, J2 }
The procedure begins with step one using the circuit lists given above. Taking circuit
1 first, a place is created to represent ‘current in circuit 1’ and another to represent ‘no
current in circuit 1’. Each row of each component decision table is considered, to find any
rows that result with an output (out) with C or NC. As seen in Figure 4.11b, all rows
of each of the tables have a C or NC output and therefore all must be considered for the
next step. Step three moves through each of the rows identified in step two and identifies
which state (or mode when applicable) of the component leads to either current or no
current. Figure 4.11c shows the states identified for each of the three components. Figure
4.11d shows the Petri net representation of the information found in this step. These
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places representing the components’ states are linked to the places within the individual
CPNs, similar to those found in Section 4.3.1.1. The next step, step four, generates a
single transition which links to the ‘current in circuit 1’ place. Step four also generates
a transition for every component state that can contribute to ‘no current in circuit 1’.
Figure 4.11e shows these transitions. Step five adds the arcs between the transition and
the places for ‘current in circuit 1’ and ‘no current in circuit 1’. A single, single-headed
inhibit arc is required between the transition and the places. An inhibit arc is required
to ensure that firing of the transition will not occur constantly. Steps 6 and 7 generate
double-headed arcs from the component state places and the transition. All arcs from the
places representing component states that lead to current connect to the same transition,
as seen in Figure 4.11g. Each component state that leads to no current have an individual
arc to connect to, as seen in Figure 4.11h.
This same procedure was also applied to the circuit 2 list producing the Petri net in
Figure 4.12.
If a component with multiple operational modes was included in the circuit, such as
the toggle switch then the method would be the same, except instead of the state identified
in step three it would be the component’s mode.
The CiPNs indicate the current state of the circuit at a given time, therefore a Petri net
extension is required to track the changes within the circuit. An example of this extension
can be found in Figure 4.13. Another purpose of this extension is to ensure that there is not
a constant flow of tokens from the CiPN. The first iteration of the connection of the CiPN
to the SPN proved that a simple link between them would cause a significant increase in
the number of tokens moving around the SPN. This would cause multiple tokens to exist
in a single place at any given time. The method demonstrated here reduced the likelihood
of too many tokens moving through the SPN.
Where the connection between the CiPN and the SPN occurs is an automated decision
made by the software. From the initiating component a flow of connections is explored.
When the first component in the circuit is found, this becomes the connecting component.
The software establishes the connection between the CiPN and the SPN on this component.
4.3.3 System Petri Nets
4.3.3.1 System Petri Net Construction
The SPN is formed from the individual CPNs (described in Section 4.2.1) to create a single
model of the overall system. The CPNs are connected together according to the system
topology.
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Figure 4.11: Procedure steps for the construction of a Petri net representing circuit 1
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Figure 4.12: Petri net for current and no current in circuit 2
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Figure 4.13: Petri net for the monitoring of the state of circuit 2 and the connection to
the SPN
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Construction Procedure
The procedure moves through the components in the order that they are given by the user.
The procedure for the completion of the SPN is given as follows:
1. Check: Does component A connect to another component/entity in the system
structure?
(a) Yes: continue to step 2.
(b) No: This is going to the boundary out of the system structure. Create single
headed arc from output place to a boundary line. Return to step 1 for next
component.
2. Taking CPN of component A, identify output linked to an input of a component,
B, using the topology information. Are the output/input types the same?
(a) Yes: Continue to step 3.
(b) No: This connection is labelled incorrectly or there is an error in the decision
table for this component.
3. In the CPNs there will be an output place of component A that can be linked to an
input place of component B, e.g. “OUT = C” and “IN = C”. Merge the places in
the Petri nets into a single place.
4. Are there any other outputs associated with component A?
(a) Yes: Repeat steps 1-3 for new output connection.
(b) No: Go back to step 1 for new component.
To demonstrate this procedure, the system in Figure 4.3 was used. Starting with the power
supply, PS1, as seen in Figure 4.14a, step one looks at the topology and identifies whether
component PS1 is connected to any other component in the system. PS1 is identified
to be connected to the component FS (Figure 4.14b). Step two identifies which output
place of the component PS1 is connected to which component FS input place. The values
within the input and output places are checked to ensure that they have the same values,
e.g. C and NC. Step 3 merges the place output and input places as seen in Figure 4.14c.
Step four looks to identify any other PS1 outputs, as there are none the procedure moves
on to the next component, FS. The procedure is repeated for each component in the
system. These can be seen in Figures 4.14d-4.14f.
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(b) Identifying the link between the power supply’s
out and the next component in the system topology,
the fuse FS
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(c) Creating the arc between components PS1 and
FS
FF
(d) Identifying the link between the fuse’s out and
the next component in the system topology, the
motor M
FF
(e) The arc between components FS and M is
created
FF
(f) As the system topology identifies PS1 as the
component connected to M and arc is created
between M component out and PS1 component in
Figure 4.14: Procedure steps for the construction of the system Petri net
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4.3.4 Phase Petri Nets
The main property of the phase Model is that this monitors the time of the simulation.
Any components that are governed by a specified time are controlled by the Phase
model. Although the phase transition table may not have all associated time frames where
components change, the Phase model must still account for all possible combinations.
4.3.4.1 Phase Petri Net Construction
The PPN is constructed principally from the phase transition table. However, as the Phase
Petri net controls components, when the component decision table contains a time heading,
these need to be accounted for. Therefore, the second set of information comes from the
component decision tables.
Construction Procedure
The procedure for generating the Petri nets to show the phases of the mission is detailed
below:
1. Going through the phase transition table, identify the main phases using the time
column. The times will exist in rows where a main phase is in the fromphase
column. The times listed represent the phase length by taking the value in the time
column minus any previous phase lengths identified. The symbol δ, which represents
a small amount of time, is ignored in this step. For each of the phases identified and
times listed in the table a place is created.
2. Between places representing the phase names/numbers and places representing a
phase length, t, create a timed transition with a delay of time t.
3. Create a single headed arc between the place representing the phase name/number
and the transition. Also create a single headed arc between the transition and the
place representing the phase length, t.
4. Between the places representing the phase length t and the next phase name/number
in the list, create an immediate transition.
5. Create a single headed arc between the place representing the phase length, t and
the immediate transition and create a single headed arc between the immediate
transition and the place representing the next phase name/number.
6. Using the phase transition table, identify all types (phase names/numbers) in the
From Phase and To Phase columns.
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7. Apart from the phase names/numbers, found in step 1, create a place representing
each phase name/number.
8. Moving through each row of the phase transition table:
(a) Create an immediate transition if;
i. There is a time associated with the row i.e. not ‘-’ apart from δ.
The transition is placed between the place representing the phase length
(associated with the row) and the To Phase place.
ii. Either the From Phase or To Phase is not one of the main phases identified
in step 1. The immediate transition is placed between the FromPhase
place and the ToPhase place.
(b) For any rows that contain δ a timed transition is created with a delay of δ and
placed between the FromPhase place and the ToPhase place.
(c) Create a single-headed arc:
i. Between the phase that either represents the phase length or the From
Phase, depending on step 8(a).
ii. Between the transition generated in step 8(a) and the To Phase place.
(d) The condition column states which component and either the mode or output
that can instigate the change in phase. Therefore a link is created between the
CPN holding the place representing the component mode or output type and
the transition representing the row. A double headed arc is used.
9. Finally, time columns in component decision tables are considered if there are any
in the system.
(a) A list of the different times, or time frames, that exist in the component decision
tables are generated.
(b) Create a place if the following are true:
i. The time does not already exist as a place created in step 1.
ii. If there are any component decision tables that include a time frame that
the main phases effectively represent, e.g. 0<t<1.5. If the main phase is
length 1.5.
(c) When all places are created, an immediate transition is generated for each time
frame in the list. An arc is created between the newly created transition and
the place representing the time frame.
(d) Input places into the transition depends on the following:
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i. If the time frame stated has a ≤ sign associated with the first half of the
time frame, then the input arc comes from the place that represents that
instant in time.
ii. Else, the input place comes from the main phase that begins at the same
time as the time frame.
(e) The arc from the place representing the time frame depends on the second half
of the time frame:
i. If the second half of the time frame stated has a ≤, then the arc connects
to the same transition as the place that represents that specific moment in
time, created in step 1.
ii. Else, the arc connects to the same transition as the one of the main phases
that also has the same end of the time frame. This transition will be one
that was created in step 3.
10. A connection is then made between the time frame places generated in step 9 and
the component transition that has a time element associated with it. A double
headed arc is used here.
To demonstrate the procedure the system in Figure 4.15 is used. This system has three
phases; the first is a discrete phase which is the closing of the switch, the second phase the
heater, H, for a time, t1 is on and the third phase the heater is off and the fan is turned
on, for a length of t2. The phase transition table for this system can be seen in Table 4.6.
The nine phases listed in the table are as follows:
1. Start-up Phase
2. Heating Phase
3. Cooling Phase
4. System failed to start
5. System failed to heat for correct amount of time
6. System failed to cool for correct amount of time
7. System overheated due to heater on for too long
8. System overcooled due to fan on for too long
9. Mission Completed
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All components are assumed to be in a working condition at the start of the mission and
the heater, H, and the fan, F are OFF . Timer relay, TIM1, should last for a length of
time, t1 + t2 and timer relays, TIM2 and TIM3, should last for a length of time, t1.
The initial modes of the components are as follows:
• Toggle switch, TS, mode = OP
• Normally-open contact, C1, mode = OP
• Normally-open contact, C2, mode = OP
• Normally-closed contact, C3, mode = CL
• Normally-open contact, C4, mode = OP
The system is started by pressing the switch, TS, closed. This initiates the timer relay,
TIM1, which closes the contact C1. By closing C1 this completes the inner circuit, and
starts timers TIM2 and TIM3. By starting timer relays TIM2 and TIM3 these close
and open normally-open contact, C2, and normally-closed contact, C3, respectively. At
this point the heater, H, is ON . Relay, R, is also energised and closes contact C4. After
a time t1, the timer relay TIM2 de-energises and opens normally-open contact C2. This
breaks the circuit to the heater, and turns the heater OFF . Also at time t1, the timer relay
TIM3 de-energises and normally-closed contact, C3, closes. This completes the circuit and
the fan turns ON . After a time t1 + t2, the timer relay TIM1 de-energises and opens the
normally-open contact, C1. As no current is flowing through the relay, R, this de-energises
and opens contact C4. Therefore there is no longer any current in the circuit with the
fan, therefore turning the fan OFF . S1 and S2 are sensors for the components H and F ,
respectively.
Table 4.6: Phase Transition Table for heater fan system
t From Phase To Phase Condition
1 0 1 2 C1 MODE=CL
2 δ 1 4 C1 MODE=OP
3 - 2 5 S1 OUT=OFF
4 t1 2 3 S1 OUT=OFF
5 t1 2 7 S1 OUT=ON
6 - 3 6 S2 OUT=OFF
7 t1 + t2 3 8 S2 OUT=ON
8 t1 + t2 3 9 S2 OUT=OFF
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(a) Schematic of the heater, fan system
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(b) System topology diagram
Figure 4.15: System diagram and topology for a heater and fan system
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Table 4.7: Decision Table for Timer Relay TIM1
t In State Out 1 Out 2
1 0 < t < t1 + t2 C W EN C
2 t1 + t2 C W DE NC
3 – – F DE NC
4 – NC – DE NC
Table 4.8: Decision Table for Timer Relays TIM2, TIM3
t In State Out 1 Out 2
1 0 < t < t1 C W EN C
2 t ≥ t1 C W DE NC
3 – – F DE NC
4 – NC – DE NC
Following the steps listed the PPN for this system was generated using the phase transition
table in Table 4.6 and the component decision tables. The component decision tables which
incorporate time (the timer relays) are given in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. This procedure was
split into three sections; identifying and creating the main phase places and connections,
the phase transition table and the component decision tables. Figure 4.16 represents the
main phases, steps 1-5. Figure 4.17 represents the phase transition table, steps 6-8. Figure
4.18 represents the component decision tables, steps 9-10.
Starting from the phase transition table, the main phases were identified as phase 1,
2 and 3, as these have a time associated with the row. The phase lengths were identified
as t = 0, t = t1 and t = t2. This step can be seen in Figure 4.16a. Step two created
a timed transition with a delay of the phase length for each of the phase lengths given.
This can be seen in Figure 4.16b. Step three created single headed arcs between the
places representing the phases and the transitions. A single-headed arc was also connected
between the transition and the time place. This can be seen in Figure 4.16c. The next step
created an immediate transition between the places representing the phase lengths and the
next phase. This can be seen in Figure 4.16d. The final step in the first stage generated
a single-headed arc between the places representing the phase lengths and the immediate
transitions generated in the previous step. Finally, single-headed arcs were created between
the immediate transitions and the next phase places.
The second stage used the phase transition table to first identify all phase names/numbers
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. Once all were identified, as seen in Figure 4.17a, a place was
created for each, except those that were already created in the first step, which can be
seen in Figure 4.17b. Step eight moves through each row of the table, if a time exists in
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the row then the arc is created from the place representing that time, to an immediate
transition. This can be seen in row 5 where the time is t1 and the phase moves from 2 to 7.
Otherwise it comes from the place representing the From Phase. An arc is created between
this place and the transition, and another arc is created between the transition and the
phase listed in the To Phase column. The condition column states the component and
then either the mode or the output that initiates the transition. Therefore a connection
was made between this place in the CPN and the transition associated with the row using
a double-headed arc. For example in row 1 the condition is that the component C1 is in
an operating mode of CL for the phase to transition. There is then an arc from the CPN
place for mode = CL to the transition. The result of this step can be seen in Figure 4.17c.
The third stage moved through each of the component decision tables, to find any with
a time associated row. In this example there were three timer relays, TIM1, TIM2 and
TIM3, which had rows associated with time. If any of the times had been the exact same
as the length of one of the main phases these would have been ignored. In this system
there are four time frames; (0 < t < t1), (0 < t < t1 + t2) and (t ≥ t1). The first
time was represented by phase 2 and therefore ignored. The second spans two phases and
therefore a place was created to represent this time frame and an immediate transition was
generated. A single headed arc was created between the transition and the new place. As
phase 1 shared the same start time as this time frame a double-headed arc was generated
between this place and the transition created. As the second half of the time frame was
linked to the phase lengths, then the value given minus any previous phase lengths (i.e.
t = t1 + t2− (t1 +0)) was the transition that the place must link to. The other time frames
were generated in a similar fashion. This can be seen in Figure 4.18a. The final step was
to create a link between these time frames and the transitions in the CPNs associated
with these time frames. These are given as double headed arcs. Figure 4.18b shows the
completed PPN.
4.4 Algorithm
The generation of the Petri nets discussed in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.4 are performed by the
software. An overview of the design flow in the context of the program is presented below.
The algorithm is presented in the flow chart in Figure 4.19.
1. The information required from the user is the following:
(a) Information about the components in the system; how they work, fail and what
type of connections each component has.
(b) A system topology diagram of how the components link together.
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Phase 1
t=0
Phase 3
t1<t<t1+t2t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t=t1+t2t=0
(a) Create a place for each phase and each phase length
Phase 1
t=0
Phase 3
t1<t<t1+t2t1 t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t2 t=t1+t2t=00
(b) Create a timed transition with a delay of the phase length
Phase 1
t=0
Phase 3
t1<t<t1+t2t1 t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t2 t=t1+t2t=00
(c) Create an arc between the phase places and the timed transition and an arc between the
timed transition and the place representing the length of the phase
Phase 1
t=0
Phase 3
t1<t<t1+t2t1 t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t2 t=t1+t2t=00
(d) Immediate transitions are created between the places representing the length of the phase
and the next phase
Phase 1
t=0
Phase 3
t1<t<t1+t2t1 t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t2 t=t1+t2t=00
(e) Create an arc between the places representing the length of the phase and the immediate
transition and an arc between the transition and the next phase
Figure 4.16: Steps 1-5 of the construction procedure applied to the heater, fan system
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t From Phase       To Phase Condition
1 0 1 2 C1 MODE=CL
2 1 4 C1 MODE=OP
3 - 2 5 S1 OUT=OFF
4 t1 2 3 S1 OUT=OFF
5 t1 2 7 S1 OUT=ON
6 - 3 6 S2 OUT=OFF
7 t1+t2 3 8 S2 OUT=ON
8 t1+t2 3 9 S2 OUT=OFF

(a) Identifying all phase names/numbers in the phase transition table
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t1<t<t1+t2t1 t=t1
Phase 2
0<t<t1 t2 t=t1+t2
Phase 5
Phase 7
Phase 9
Phase 6
Phase 4 Phase 8
t=00
(b) Generating a place for each of the phase names/numbers identified in step 6
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OUT=OFF
S2
OUT=ON
Phase 8

t=00
(c) Creating the transitions, arcs using the rows of the phase transition table
Figure 4.17: Steps 6-8 of the construction procedure applied to the heater, fan system
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(a) Time frames identified in the component decision tables have a place generated
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(b) Links to the component Petri nets is established
Figure 4.18: Steps 9-10 of the construction procedure applied to the heater, fan system
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(c) A phase transition table of the mission. The user is required to know how
many phases the system can reside in and how the system can change from one
phase to another.
(d) Component failure rates, or failure distributions.
(e) Initial component modes for components that have multiple modes of operation.
(f) Initiating component information.
2. This information is presented in five types of files:
(a) Text-based decision tables for components that don’t already exist in the
component library.
(b) Text-based operational mode tables for components that don’t already exist in
the component library.
(c) A text-based description of the system topology, listing instances of components
and their connections.
(d) A text file containing the phase transition table for the system.
(e) A text file containing the simulation information including the failure data,
initial operating modes and the initiating component.
3. The component decision tables and operational mode tables are added to the
component library in the system. This library is persistent and allows re-use of
components in the future.
4. The circuit lists are automatically generated by the software using the information
in the component tables within the library and the system topology.
5. The following Petri nets are now automatically generated by the software:
(a) CPNs: Generated for every type of component in the system found in the
component library. These are stored in a CPN library.
(b) CiPNs: Generated for every list found by the software.
(c) SPN: For every instance of a component listed in the system topology file,
there is a copy of the CPN made from the CPN library. With the information
in the system topology file, the CPNs are connected together. The CiPNs and
the CPNs make up the SPN. As the CPN library holds the generic CPNs, the
component failure data is only added within the SPN. The component failure
data is given by the user in the form of a text file.
(d) PPN: This is generated from the phase transition table and the component
decision tables found in the component library.
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6. The reliability model is the SPN and the PPN connected together. The last piece
of information required from the user is the initial conditions which contains the
following:
(a) Initial modes of components that have operational mode tables.
(b) The initiating component with the output/input and the value.
7. Once the initiating condition is set then the simulation can begin.
8. After the software has run information about the reliability/unreliability of the
system undertaking the mission specified will be given to the user.
4.5 Summary
The procedures demonstrated here form the basis of the algorithms for the software created.
These procedures could also be used by individuals to generate the reliability models
by hand as they are simple and efficient. They show a reliable method of taking the
information held within the text-based files and generating the reliability models from
them.
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Figure 4.19: Flow chart of the algorithm
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5.1 Introduction
The procedures discussed in Chapter 4 are brought forward to be demonstrated using a
pressure tank system. This pressure tank system is a simple system with few phases,
making it an ideal system to demonstrate the procedure. This chapter discusses the
pressure tank system in terms of the process the system undertakes, for the purposes
of understanding how the system can move from one phase to another. There are two
distinct sections of this chapter. The first section describes each element of the system:
the components, the circuits and the structure. This section also describes each of the
phases the system can reside in through the mission. The second section takes these
descriptions and, using the procedure outlined in Chapter 4, shows the final Petri nets:
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S1
V
P
FS
M
R
PG T
TIM
OP
S2
S1 – Push Switch
S2 –Toggle Switch
TIM – Timer Relay
R – Relay
TC – Timer (TIM) Contact
RC
TC
RC – Relay (R) Contact
PS1, PS2 – Power Supplies
FS – Fuse
M – Motor
P – Pump
T – Tank
V - Valve
PG – Pressure Gauge
OP - Operator
PS1
PS2
KEY
Figure 5.1: Pressure Tank System
the component Petri nets, the circuit Petri nets, the system Petri net and the Phase Petri
net.
5.1.1 The Pressure Tank System
The pressure tank system as a schematic can be seen in Figure 5.1. This shows all the
individual components in the system and how they connect to each other.
5.1.1.1 System Process
The system is initially started by depressing switch S1, momentarily applying power to the
timer relay, TIM , whose contacts close and start the timer. Note that switch S2 is closed
at system startup. Switch S1’s contacts open. Power is applied to relay R whose contacts
close and start the pump motor. The tank starts to fill. After a time t1 the timer relay
contacts open, relay R de-energises and its contacts open, thus removing power from the
pump motor. When TIM is de-energised, the timer clock resets. The operator will notice
the tank pressure by the pressure gauge and will open the valve to empty the tank. After
a time t2, the tank will have emptied sufficiently for filling to start again by the operator
closing the valve and depressing switch S1. Switch S2 is a safety mechanism built into the
system so that, in the event that a failure occurs and the tank overfills, the operator, who
will be alerted by the pressure gauge, can stop the pump by opening that switch, cutting
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power to R.
5.1.1.2 Initial Conditions of the System
All components are assumed to be in a working condition and that the following
components exist in these initial modes:
• Switch S1 is open.
• Switch S2 is closed.
• Tank is empty.
• Relay contact, RC is open.
• Timer relay contact, TC is open.
• Valve V is closed.
5.2 System and Mission Description
This section discusses the components within the pressure tank system and how each of
these components behaves through the decision tables and, when applicable, operational
mode tables. Electrical circuits present within the system are listed. The system itself is
described in terms of its structure and the mission is desribed through a phase transition
table representing the process described in Section 5.1.1.1.
5.2.1 Components
The components of a non-repairable system are described by the following information:
• Decision Tables
• Operational Mode Tables
• Failure Data
Each component in the pressure tank system is discussed in detail below.
5.2.1.1 Decision and Operating Mode Tables
The component tables describing the pressure tank system can be seen in Tables 5.1-5.15.
Tables 4.1-4.3, which showed the component tables for a power supply and toggle switch,
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are re-used here to represent PS1, PS2 (power supplies) and S2 (toggle switch). As push-
switch S1 behaves differently to S2, this component requires a different set of component
tables.
Table 5.1: Operational mode table for push switch S1
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed NA W Open
4 Open – FOP Open
5 Open CL W Closed
6 Open NA – Open
Table 5.2: Decision table for switches S1 and S2, and contacts TC and RC
In 2 Mode Out
1 C Closed C
2 NC – NC
3 – Open NC
Table 5.3: Operational mode table for toggle switch S2 and Valve V
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed OP W Open
4 Closed NA – Closed
5 Open – FOP Open
6 Open OP – Open
7 Open CL W Closed
8 Open NA – Open
Table 5.4: Decision table for power supplies PS1 and PS2, and fuse FS
In State Out
1 C W C
2 – F NC
3 NC – NC
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Table 5.5: Decision table for relay R
In State Out 1 Out 2
1 C W EN C
2 – F DE NC
3 NC – DE NC
Table 5.6: Decision table for timer relay TIM
t In State Out 1 Out 2
1 t < t1 C W EN C
2 t ≥ t1 C W DE NC
3 – – F DE NC
4 – NC – DE NC
Table 5.7: Operational mode table for timer relay contact TC and relay contact RC
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed EN – Closed
3 Closed DE W Open
4 Open – FOP Open
5 Open DE – Open
6 Open EN W Closed
Table 5.8: Decision table for junctions J1 and J3
In 1 In 2 Out 1
1 C – C
2 – C C
3 NC NC NC
Table 5.9: Decision table for junctions J2 and J4
In 1 Out 1 Out 2
1 C C C
2 NC NC NC
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Table 5.10: Decision table for motor M
In State Out 1 Out 2
1 C W C ON
2 – F NC OFF
3 NC – NC OFF
Table 5.11: Decision table for pump P
In State Out 1
1 ON W FL
2 – F NFL
3 OFF – NFL
Table 5.12: Decision table for tank T
t In 1 In 2 State Out 1 Out 2
1 – FL Open W CONST FL
2 – FL Closed W INC NFL
3 – NFL Closed W CONST NFL
4 t ≤ t1 NFL Open W CONST NFL
5 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 NFL Open W DEC FL
6 t ≤ t1 – – F CONST NFL
7 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 – – F DEC NFL
Table 5.13: Decision table for pressure gauge PG
t In State Out 1
1 t < t1 CONST W LPR
2 t < t1 INC W LPR
3 t1 CONST W LPR
4 t1 INC W HPR
5 – DEC W LPR
6 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 CONST W HPR
7 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 INC W VHPR
8 – – F_LOW LPR
9 – – F_HIGH HPR
10 – – F_VHIGH VHPR
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Table 5.14: Decision table for operator OP
t In 1 State Out 1 Out 2 Out 3
1 0 LPR W CL CL CL
2 0 < t < t1 + t2 LPR W NA NA NA
3 – HPR W OP NA NA
4 – VHPR W NA OP NA
5 – – F NA NA NA
Table 5.15: Decision table for valve V
In 2 Mode Out
1 – Closed NFL
2 NFL – NFL
3 FL Open FL
5.2.1.2 Component Failure Data
The failure data for each component in the pressure tank system is listed within Table
5.16.
Table 5.16: Pressure tank system component failure data
Component identifier Failure Mode Failure Rate
S1 F_closed 0.1
S1 F_open 0.1
S2 F_closed 0.8698
S2 F_open 0.001
PS1 F 0.001
PS2 F 0.001
CT F_closed 0.1
CT F_open 0.1
CR F_closed 0.00023
CR F_open 0.00023
TIM F 0.001
R F 0.1
M F 0.001
FS F 0.01
P F 0.1
T F 0.0001
V F_closed 0.03
V F_open 0.03
PG F_LOW 0.01
PG F_HIGH 0.01
PG F_VHIGH 0.01
OP F 0.1
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Figure 5.2: Schematic of Pressure Tank System
5.2.2 System Structure
The system description requires the following elements:
• Component Descriptions: Using the component decision tables to identify the number
of input and outputs.
• Schematic of the system: How the components link together showing the relationship
between one component’s output and another component’s input.
The system topology diagram (or schematic) of the pressure tank system can be seen in
Figure 5.2.
5.2.3 Circuits
If a system contains electrical components then there will be circuits within that system.
These must be identified as current flowing in a circuit depends on all its components
simultaneously; identifying circuits simplifies the analysis of these components. Within
the pressure tank system five circuits were identified as seen below:
1. {PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}
2. {PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, CT , J1, PS1}
3. {PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, CT , J1, PS1}
4. {PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}
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5. {PS2, FS, CR, M, PS2}
The above list of circuits begin and end with the same component, in this case the power
supply, to show that a continuous loop must be present for it to be a circuit. This list of
circuits would be used to generate the CiPNs as discussed in 4.3.2.
5.2.4 Mission Profile
The mission profile is represented through a phase transition table, but before it can be
constructed all phases that a system can enter must be identified. The pressure tank
system has four phases and are listed as follows:
• Phase 1: Start up, a discrete phase, only occurring momentarily when switch S1 is
pressed at t=0
• Phase 2: Filling of the tank, T , with duration t1
• Phase 3: Opening the valve, V , a discrete phase at t=t1.
• Phase 4: Emptying the tank, T, with duration t2
These four phases would be the normal mission for the pressure tank system as long as
no component or combination of components cause the system to fail. Additional phases,
representing different failures, must also be identified. The phases representing a failure of
the pressure tank system are shown below:
• Phase 5: System failure due to overfill
• Phase 6: System overfill with system shutdown (aborted by operator using switch
S2)
• Phase 7: System overfill with failure to shutdown system (abort failed)
• Phase 8: System failure not from overfil (unrelated component failure)
Finally, a phase is designated as mission success and in this case this was assigned to
Phase 9.
5.3 Pressure Tank System Model Construction
This section shows how the information captured in the previous section is represented as
the Petri Nets described in Chapter 4: CPNs, CiPNs, SPN and PPN.
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Table 5.17: Phase transition table
Row Number t From Phase To Phase Condition
1 0 1 2 TC Mode=Closed
2 δ 1 8 TC Mode=Open
3 t1 2 3 T Out1=CONST
4 – 2 8 T Out1=CONST
5 – 3 4 V Mode=Open
6 δ 3 5 V Mode=Closed
7 t1 + t2 4 9 T Out1=DEC
8 – 4 8 T Out1=CONST
9 δ 5 6 RC Mode=Open
10 δ 5 7 RC Mode=Closed
5.3.1 Component and System Petri Nets
Using the procedure in Section 4.3.1.1 and the component tables listed in Section 5.2.1.1,
the CPNs were constructed for each component type. Figure 5.3b and Figures 5.6-5.8
show the constructed CPNs for the pressure tank system. The dashed lines connecting
to the transitions of the Petri nets seen in Figures 5.5, 5.7a, 5.8b, 5.8c and 5.8d are the
connections that link to the PPN.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a Petri net for a component with multiple modes of
failure, but only a single failure rate which is common to all failure modes. Examples of
such components are S1, S2, TC, RC and V.
The pressure gauge, PG, has multiple failure states and only one operational mode.
This component requires a different set of working-to-failed transitions. This is shown in
Figure 5.5.
The operational mode table and decision table equivalents of each of the components
in the pressure tank system can be seen in Figures 5.6 - 5.8.
The system Petri net is created by using the system schematic/topology diagram. For
every instance of a component type found within the diagram, an instance of the equivalent
Component Petri net is used. Identifying the relationships between one component’s output
and another component’s input connects the component instance places together. The
system Petri net for the pressure tank system can be seen in Figures 5.9-5.12.
5.3.2 Circuit Petri Nets
The circuit Petri nets are created directly from the circuit lists and within the pressure
tank system five circuits were identified as listed in Section 5.2.3. Each of the lists is used to
create an individual circuit Petri net. The equivalent circuit Petri nets for the listed circuits
can be seen in Figures 5.13 and 5.14. The place that represents each of the components
in the list is dependent on whether the component has a single or multiple mode(s) of
operation. If the component has a single mode of operation, then the component’s state,
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mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=NA
IN1=CL
(a) Petri net of Switch S1 from the operational
mode transition table
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=NA
IN1=CL
(b) Petri net of S1 with the addition of the decision table
information
Figure 5.3: CPN construction and integration of the component tables for the component
push-switch (S1)
i.e. working or failed, is used to represent the component as this dictates if the component
can allow current or no current to pass through it. If the component has multiple modes
of operation then the component’s mode is used to represent the component as this will
dictate the potential current condition or no current condition.
The circuit Petri nets link, via a specific component in each circuit, to the system Petri
net. The component in each circuit that makes this link is identified by an algorithm that
follows component inputs and outputs of type (C, NC) from the initiating component. The
first component encountered that has more than one operational mode is selected. If no
such components are found then the first circuit component encountered by the algorithm is
selected instead. The preference for components with multiple modes of operation reduces
the propagation time of changes between modes in circuit components. The circuits seen
in Figure 5.13a and Figure 5.13d are connected through component S1, circuits in Figure
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Figure 5.4: Component Petri net of the failure rate for components S1, CR, CT and V
W
IN=CONST
IN=DEC
IN=INC
F
F_LOW
F_HIGH
F_VHIGH
tF
Figure 5.5: Pressure Gauge , PG, transitions between the working state and the different
failure states
5.13b and Figure 5.13c are connected through TC, and circuit in Figure 5.14 is connected
through component RC. The method of connection can be seen in Figure 5.15.
5.3.3 Phase Petri Net
The PPN is created in a similar fashion to the decision tables and operational mode
tables in that each row of the table is represented by a unique transition within the PPN.
However, due to the time element of the PPN, the overall construction process is a little
more complex. As the PPN effectively manages the time element of the mission, there are
a number of connections to components within the pressure tank system from the PPN.
These connections enable phase-based transitions within components to fire.
The phase transition table that is detailed in Table 5.17 can be mapped to the the
PPN in Figure 5.16.
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IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
(a) Switch S2 Petri net
IN1=EN
IN1=DE
FOP
FCL
W mode=closed
mode=open
IN2=NC
IN2=C
OUT=C
OUT=NC
(b) Contacts CR and CT Petri net
mode=closed
mode=open
IN2=NFL
IN2=FL
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
OUT1=FL
OUT1=NFL
(c) Valve V Petri net
Figure 5.6: Petri nets for components with multiple modes of operation
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(a) Timer Relay TIM Petri net
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W
F
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OUT2=NC
OUT2=C
OUT1=EN
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(b) Relay R Petri net
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IN=NC
W
F
tF
OUT=NC
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(c) Petri net for Power Supplies,
PS1 and PS2, and Fuse FS
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
tF
OUT1=NC
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OUT2=OFF
OUT2=ON
(d) Motor M Petri net
(e) Junctions J1 and J3 Petri net
IN=C
OUT1=C
OUT2=C
OUT1=NC
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(f) Junctions J2 and J4 Petri net
Figure 5.7: Petri nets for components within circuits
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(a) Pump P Petri net
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(b) Tank T Petri net
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(c) Pressure Gauge PG Petri net
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(d) Operator OP Petri net
Figure 5.8: Component Petri nets for non-circuit components
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5.3.4 The Completed Model
Petri nets have now been generated for each component and assembled into the system
Petri net, following the system structure. Circuit Petri nets, representing electrical circuits
in the system, have been generated and connect to the system Petri net. Finally, a phase
Petri net, dealing with the discrete stages of the mission, has been generated and connected.
This forms a single large Petri net to model the overall phased mission system.
5.4 Summary
This chapter demonstrates how each of the construction procedures described in Chapter
4 were applied to a defined system and mission. Each of the different Petri nets shown
here was generated using these procedures. Although these were generated manually, it
will be shown in the following chapter how this process can be automated using software
that reads text-based input files. In the next chapter this system and the Petri nets shown
here are used to validate the software’s capabilities.
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(d) Circuit Petri Net for Circuit 4
Figure 5.13: Circuit Petri Nets for Circuits 1 to 4 of the Pressure Tank System
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Figure 5.14: Circuit Petri Net for Circuit 5 of the Pressure Tank System
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(c) Circuit Petri net 5 linkage
Figure 5.15: Circuit Petri net linkage Petri nets
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns the automation of the process discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The
chapter begins with the files used to describe the system and the mission to be undertaken.
Discussion is made relating to how the software extracts the different pieces of information
from each of the file types entered. The chapter then moves on to the construction of the
Petri net: how the information given in the input files is translated into the model used to
simulate the system and mission. The next section gives details of the simulation process,
from the initial conditions to any changes made to the model through the simulation process
and then the results obtained at the end. The way in which the results are represented
is also discussed at the end for completeness. The final section of the chapter details the
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testing of the software and provides validation of the model through the testing of the
pressure tank system described in Chapter 5.
6.1.1 Object-Oriented Programming in C++
The programming language chosen, C++, is an object-oriented programming language.
Object-oriented programming uses the concept of a class to describe an object. A class is
a module of code that contains functions and data in the form of variables. Other parts of
the code interact with the class to access its data and perform its functions. This abstracts
the complexity of the functions and data within, a concept known as encapsulation. For
instance if a library were modelled as a class, some of the variables could be the name of
the library, a list of books held by the library and the membership details of those that use
the library. A function of the library could be to lend a book, or to enrol a new member.
Books and members contained within the library could also be classes. Using classes as
part of an object-oriented programming language aids in structuring large software projects
such as the one discussed here and references will be made to this concept throughout the
chapter.
6.1.2 Key Definitions
There are a number of phrases that will be used continually throughout this chapter and
have been listed here for convenience.
• port - A component port is an input or output of a component.
• link type - This refers to the type of connection between components, e.g. circuit
connection C, NC.
• link name - This is the name given to refer to a link between two connected
components in the system topology.
• class - A module of code that encapsulates a set of related functions and data.
• function - Performs a defined process which operates on input data to provide output
data.
• variable - Stores data of a certain type.
• object - An instance of a class.
• string - A collection of characters (letters, numbers and symbols).
• vector - A container for a series of variables of the same type. Vectors can be nested
within one another to form multi-dimensional series of variables.
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6.2 Software Files
The description of the system and mission are written in text files which are processed by
the software. A single file is provided to the software, the project file, which contains a list
of all files required to describe the system and the mission to be undertaken. This project
file has a file extension of .prj to identify it as such. Within the project file the other files
must be listed in a given order, as seen below:
1. Component Decision and Operational Mode Tables (file extensions .dt and .omt,
respectively)
2. System Topology (file extension .ss)
3. Phase Transition Table (file extension .ptt)
4. Simulation Information (file extension .sim)
Each file type has a unique file extension in order to differentiate between them.
The project file is designed to contain only one system and one mission, and therefore
should never contain another project file. The files contained within the project file
are given in the order above due to numerous checks carried out by the software. The
component files are listed first to identify the components to be used in the current
system. The system topology file includes the list of connections between instances of
the components, therefore if a component is listed in the system topology file that was
not included in the component files an error would be issued to the user. The same would
occur if a component was listed in the phase transition table file and was not included in
the list of component files. The software cannot continue until all necessary files are added.
Each file contains a single entity (i.e. one component) to aid clarity.
The fourth file type, simulation information, includes the following:
1. Initial component modes
2. Failure data
3. Initiating component
The initial component modes are listed in terms of the modes listed within the table files
(DT and OMT). The name for the initial mode must match exactly with a mode contained
in the DT or OMT. The failure information is given by using one of the following:
1. Exponential distribution (parameter: mean time to failure)
2. Weibull distribution (parameters: characteristic life and shape parameter)
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3. Normal distribution (parameters: standard deviation and mean time to failure)
4. Time to failure
The first three points are the distributions that can be used to describe how a
component fails and the fourth gives the user the ability to let a component fail at a
specific time.
The last item included within the simulation file is the initiating component which, as
it states, initiates the simulation process.
The following sections look at each of the file types: component tables, system topology,
phase transition table and simulation information, discussing in detail the contents of each
file.
6.2.1 Component Description Files
The component description files include the decision and operational mode tables discussed
in Section 4.2.1.
6.2.1.1 Decision Table Files
For each type of component that exists within the system structure, a DT is required. A
table is not required for each instance of the component as each instance of a component
identified within the system topology file uses the same DT.
File Layout
The DT file includes the file identifier, component type and the associated DT. An example
of a single mode component, a power supply, can be seen in Figure 6.1. A general line-by-
line breakdown of the decision table file is given below:
• Line 1: File identifier, ‘DT ”, followed by the component type, which must be unique
• Line 2: Open curly brace, ‘{’, to signify the beginning of the decision table.
• Line 3: The headings of the decision table:
– Input headings: in : in1, in : in2, ... , in : inM , where M is the total number
of inputs into the component.
– State heading or mode heading: state : state1 or mode : mode3
– Output headings: out : out1, out : out2, ... , out : outN , where N is the total
number of outputs from the component. Once all outputs have been identified,
a semi-colon is used to signify the end of the headings.
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DT power_supply
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
C, W, C;
-, F, NC;
NC, -, NC;
}
Figure 6.1: Decision table file input format for single mode components
• Lines 4-P: (P is dependent on the number of rows in the decision table.) This
contains the decision table, using commas to signify the next column and a semi-
colon to signify the end of the row.
• Line P+1: Closing curly brace, ‘}’, to signify the end of the decision table.
The format described above must be adhered to otherwise the software will not allow
the entry of the file and halt any further processing of the files.
6.2.1.2 Operational Mode Table Files
When a component has multiple modes of operation, an OMT file must be created in
addition to the DT file. Similar to the decision table file, an identifier is used to show what
type the file is, followed by the component type and the OMT.
File Layout
The OMTs are presented in the format seen in Figure 6.2, and described below:
• Line 1: File identifier, ‘OMT ’, followed by the component type. The component
type field acts as a unique identifier to relate an OMT to its corresponding DT.
• Line 2: Open curly brace, ‘{’, to signify the beginning of the component information.
• Line 3: the headings of the operational mode table:
– Starting mode: mode : mode1
– Command: This will be the input from an outside influence, such as an operator.
Instead of the word command it is written as in : inS, where S is the input
connection number.
– State heading: state : state1
– Final mode: mode : mode2. After this mode a semi-colon is used to signify the
end of the headings.
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DT contact
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, open, NC;
NC, -, NC;
C, closed, C;
}
(a) Decision table file input format for
multiple mode components
OMT contact
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, FC, closed;
closed, EN, -, closed;
closed, DE, W, open;
open, -, FO, open;
open, DE, -, open;
open, EN, W, closed;
}
(b) Operational mode table file input format for multiple
mode components
Figure 6.2: Examples of the file format required for multiple mode components
• Lines 4-P: (P is dependent on the number of rows in the OMT.) This contains the
OMT itself, using commas to signify the next column and a semi-colon to signify the
end of a row.
• Line P+1: Closing curly brace ‘}’ to signify the end of the OMT.
6.2.2 System Topology Description
The system topology file lists the connections between each component in the system.
Component instances are listed, with each instance including a list of that component’s
ports. Each port is assigned a link name; these names are arbitrary and are used to connect
the ports of different components together. There should only be one file for the system
topology and this should include every component within the system.
6.2.2.1 File Layout
The system topology file follows the following format:
• Line 1: File identifier, SS, followed by the name of the topology/system.
• Line 2: The word ‘begin’ should appear on the next line to signify the beginning of
the topology.
• Line 3: Following the word begin is the first of the components in the topology. Each
of the components is structured in the following way:
– The first line of the new component takes the following format: ‘compo-
nent_identifier : component_type’, for example PS1 : power_supply. The
component identifier is arbitrary and unique to that component.
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– The next line denotes the beginning of the port list, in which ports are mapped
to links: port map(
– The next lines show the connections to each of the components ports (in, out).
For each port the following syntax is used: in1 => link_one; and out1 =>
link_two; This is completed for each of the component’s ports. link_one and
link_two are examples of arbitrary link names. These same names are then
used to connect these ports to the ports of another component.
– When all the ports have been considered, the next line ends with ‘)’to signify
the end of the component’s ports.
• Last line: Once all the components have been considered the file ends with the word
‘end’ to signify the end of the topology for the system.
Each link between component ports requires a unique name. In the example given in
Figure 6.3, the link names use a naming convention related to the component instance
identifiers. The identifiers can be whatever the user chooses, as long as the link name is
repeated only once with the connected component. For example in Figure 6.3 component
S1, port Out1 shares the same link name (S1_J1) with the component J1, port In2 as
these components are connected through these ports. Note that to connect one output to
multiple component inputs, a junction component is required.
6.2.3 Mission Description
File Format
The description of the mission, the phase transition table as discussed in Section 4.2.4, is
described in the phase transition table file (.ptt). An example of such a file can be seen
in Figure 6.4. A line-by-line breakdown of the general format of this file type can be seen
below:
• Line 1: File identifier, ‘PTT ’, followed by the name of the mission.
• Line 2: Open curly braces ‘{’ to signify the beginning of the phase transition table.
• Line 3: Table headings time, from_phase, to_phase, condition;
• Lines 4-P: (P is dependent on the number of rows in the phase transition table).
These lines contain the phase transition table itself. Each row of the transition table
is formatted as follows:
– The ‘time’ at which the transition can occur, which can be presented in three
forms:
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SS pressure_tank_system
begin 
    S1 : switch
port map(
in1 => OP_S1;
in2 => J4_S1;
out1 => S1_J1;
)
J1 : junction_two_in
port map(
in1 => CT_J1;
in2 => S1_J1;
out => J1_PS1;
)
…
…
…
OP : operator
port map(
in1 => PG_OP;
out1 => OP_V;
out2 => OP_S2;
)
end
Figure 6.3: Example topology file format
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PTT mission_1
{
time, from_phase, to_phase, condition;
t_0, 1, 2, CT.mode3=closed;
t_0, 1, 5, CT.mode3=open;
t_1, 2, 3, PG.out1=HPR;
…
…
…
-, 4, 6, CR.mode=closed;
}
Figure 6.4: Example mission file format
∗ A literal time, such as 0.
∗ An inequality in terms of t, specifying a range of times. This must be
written in brackets; for example (3 <= t < 5)
∗ No time value, signified by ‘–’. This means the phase transition is not
time-dependent.
– The ‘from_phase’ is a number or word that signifies which phase this transition
is moving from.
– The ‘to_phase’ is a number or word that signifies which phase this transition
is moving to.
– The ‘condition’ information is comprised of three elements: the component
identifier, the component port and the value in the port. This is represented by
the following format: ‘component_identifier.port_name = port_value;’, for
example ‘PS1.out1 = C;’. The component identifier states which instance of
the component can cause the transition, followed by a full stop. This full stop
signifies the port of this component will follow. The equals sign shows which
value within that port will cause the transition. The semi colon signifies the
end of the row.
• Line P+1: When the table is complete a closing curly brace ‘}’ is used.
6.2.4 Simulation File
The simulation file holds information related to each of the components in the system.
This information includes the following information:
1. Initial operational modes for multiple operational mode components
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SIM
COMPONENT MODES
{
S1 mode = open;
}
FAILURE
{
S1 F_closed exponential(10);
S1 F_open exponential(10);
PS1 F exponential(1000.000);
R F exponential(10.000);
}
INITIAL
{
S1 in1 = CL;
}
Figure 6.5: Example simulation file format
2. Failure distribution data for each component
3. Initiating component
In order to simulate the system, initial operational modes must be stated for any
components with multiple modes of operation. There should be failure data for each
component, but if it is desired to test one part of the system assuming one or more
components never fail, then this is catered for. When detailing the failure data of each
component, if a component has multiple failure modes then each failure mode must be
considered and listed. If the failure of a component is not affected by the mode that the
component is in, then if each failure mode listing is the same the software will handle
this. The initiating component is the component, port and port value that can start the
simulation. An example of this file can be seen in Figure 6.5.
File Format
The simulation file has the following structure:
• The file identifier of ‘SIM’ is found at the top of the file.
• The initial component modes are listed as follows:
1. Starting with the opening line COMPONENT MODES {
2. List each component with multiple modes in the following format: ‘compo-
nent_identifier mode = mode_value;’.
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3. This list is completed by including ‘}’ to signify that all component modes have
been identified.
• The failure distributions for each component (or each component mode) are then
listed in the following format:
1. Starting with the opening line FAILURE {
2. For each component listed, the following format is used: ‘component_identifier
failure_value(or mode) failure_distribution(parameter(s));’.
3. This section finishes with ‘}’.
• The last information held within the file is the initiating component. The following
format is used:
1. This starts with the opening line INITIAL {
2. There is only one component listed as the initiating component as follows:
‘component_identifier port_name = port_value;’.
3. This section is completed with ‘}’.
6.2.5 Setup File
The setup file includes configuration variables for the software. It is always included in
projects and does not need to be listed in the .prj file. The setup file specifies the values
used in electrical wires for current/no current and the value used to denote the working
case within all decision and operational mode tables. This information defaults to the
following:
• Current: C
• No Current: NC
• Working State: W
This setup file can be altered by the user if variations are required, but this is not
recommended.
File Format
The file takes the following structure:
• The file identifier INI at the top of the file
• The working state value used in the tables is given next by the line ‘working state ::
W; ’
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• The current, no current values used in the tables are given in the line ‘wire type :: C,
NC;’. The values are listed specifically in the order of current and then no current.
When all files are created and the name of each file is included in the project file, the user
is ready to add their system to the software. Section 6.3 introduces the structure and how
the information from all file types described above are dealt with and how this information
is turned into a working model for the purpose of simulation.
6.3 Software Structure
The structure of the software can be split into three sections:
1. File parsing
2. Model creation
3. Simulation
The first step interprets the files discussed in the previous section and stores their contents
in memory. The next section discusses this interpretation process. The second step takes
the information from the files and generates a working model. The process of model
construction concerns the following Petri nets, as discussed in chapter 4: component Petri
nets (Section 4.3.1), circuit Petri nets (Section 4.3.2), system Petri net (Section 4.3.3), and
phase Petri net (Section 4.3.4). The third step uses the model to simulate the system over
a specified time for a given mission.
6.3.1 Storage of System and Mission Description
This section describes how the files created in the previous section are interpreted by the
software and then stored to be used to build the model in the software.
Within the software there are a number of classes used to store the information held
within the different files discussed above. For parsing the files and storing the information
the primary classes used are fileHandler, topSystem and compLib. Each has a specific
role within the software. The first, fileHandler, manages access to files and performs file
parsing operations. Functions within this class are used to collect the information from
the files listed within the project file. Depending on each file type (extension), the class
executes a different set of functions. The topSystem class holds all the information that
the fileHandler class extracts from the files. The fileHandler class dictates where in the
topSystem class the information is held. The compLib class is the component library which
holds all the individual component types found in the component decision and operational
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class topSystem
-compLib componentLibrary;
-compPNLib componentPNLibrary;
-vector<topology> systemTopologies;
-vector<phaseTable> missionProfiles;
-string defaultWorking;
-linkType defaultWire;
-initial initialComp;
-masterPetriNet theMasterPN;
-unsigned int idCounter;
-idGenerator newGeneration;
class compLib
-vector<component> compList;
class fileHandler
-string filePath;
-string fileExtension;
-string strToLower(string);
-fstream theFile;
-vector<string> theFiles;
Figure 6.6: Class view of topSystem, fileHandler and compLib
mode tables. The information held within the component library is later used to generate
instances of the components.
A class representation of each of the above can be seen in Figure 6.6.
6.3.1.1 Storage of Component Descriptions
This section describes how the information in the component files is extracted by the
software and stored as useful information in preparation for the model generation. Both
the decision table and operational mode table files are considered here.
Figure 6.7 shows each class used when a component object is created. The figure shows
how the other classes relate to the component class. At this point in the software process,
the only class that would not be directly called on is the failRepair class. This is dealt
with at a later time.
The component class contains two strings; the component type, name and the
component identifier, id. There are two vectors of ports relating to the decision table and
operational mode table columns. Each port of the component (In, Out) contains values
and these are captured within the port class. Lastly, the component class also includes the
full decision table and, where applicable, an operational mode table as it is found within
the file (excluding the port names).
Each port class object created holds the name of the port, for example, In1, and the
direction of the port, for example In. This is the only information that is captured from
the decision and operational mode table files. Other information held within the port class
is added at a later time.
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class port
-string name;
class component
-string id;
-vector<port> dtPorts;
-string name;
-vector<port> omtPorts;
-table decisionTable;
-table OMTable;
-failRepair theRepair;
-port* findPort(string);
-int findConstPort(string) const;
-linkType type;
-string theLink;
-string direction;
-string initialMode;
-vector<failRepair> theFailures;
class table
-string informationType;
-vector< vector<string> > tableContents;
class linkType
-void cleanValues();
-vector<string> values;
class failRepair
-string compId;
-string frType;
-string failureType;
-string distribution;
-double para1;
-double para2;
-double randomNumber;
-double timeToFailure;
-bool warmStandby;
Figure 6.7: Class representation of the component class and its sub-classes
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Decision and Operational Mode Tables
Each file with a file extension, .dt or .omt, would be identified as a component decision
table or operational mode table, respectively. Each file would be subject to the algorithm
seen in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. This algorithm is used to create a new component class object
and then store the port information and the table details. Once this is complete, the new
component class is added to the component library class, compLib.
6.3.1.2 Storage of the system structure
The information contained within the system topology file (file extension .ss), gives the
overall structure of the system. The information describes links between one component’s
input port and another component’s output port. It is important that all component
decision and operational mode table files are listed before the system structure file within
the project files, as the component decision and operational mode table files describe the
component type. The system structure then relies on knowledge of these components and
their ports when describing instances of these components. Therefore if a component type
is listed within the system structure file that was not previously listed in the component
decision and operational mode files then the software identifies that the file is missing and
issues an error to the user.
If a component is dependent on the operational mode of another component, then this
is presented in the decision tables and the system structure files. Within the decision
tables, the component that is dependent has a specific input port that represents the
other component’s mode of operation. There is a link for this input port in the system
structure file. For the component that has multiple modes of operation, a mode output
must be provided to link to the dependent component. An example of this is seen within
the pressure tank system from Chapter 5. The component tank, T , is dependent on the
operational mode of the component valve, V . Therefore the input port, in2 of the tank
component is linked to the mode, mode3, of the valve component.
The process for abstracting and storing the information held within the system
structure file can be seen in Figures 6.10 - 6.12.
6.3.1.3 Storage of Mission Description
Within the .ptt file there should be only one phase transition table describing the mission.
As the information held within this file is parsed, the information is stored in a new
phaseTable class object. There are only two variables within the phaseTable class: the
name of the mission and the phase transition table contents. The phaseRow class holds
a row of the table: time (if present), from phase, to phase and condition. The condition
variable is the pttContents class which holds the component information; a link (referred
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Is the string the 
identifier DT/
OMT?
Obtain the next 
string in the file
The DT/OMT 
identifier is not 
present within the 
.dt file. Issue error 
to the user.
Obtain the next 
string, the 
component type
Add the component 
type to the new 
component class 
object
Is the next string 
‘{’
The indicator ‘{’ 
was not present in 
the file. Issue error 
to user.
START
Is the string ‘;’?
Create port class 
object
Add the port 
direction ‘in’, ‘out’, 
‘mode’ or ‘state’
Is the next string 
‘:’?
Issue Error: 
Indicator ‘:’ not 
found
Obtain the next 
string the port name 
(e.g. in1) and add 
this to the port class 
object
Is the next string 
‘,’?
Issue Error: There 
are no headings to 
the table
END1 END END END
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Figure 6.8: First section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a .dt
or .omt file
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class and add the 
class object to the 
component library
END
Is the string ‘;’?
1
Is there already a 
component of 
this type in the 
compLib class 
object?
Merge the 
component class 
objects
Add the new 
component
END
Issue Error: There is 
no ‘;’ to end the 
headings of the table
END
Issue Error: There is 
no ‘,’ or ‘;’ to 
signify next column 
or the end of the line
END
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Figure 6.9: Second section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a
.dt or .omt file
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START
Is the next string 
“SS”?
Obtain the next 
string, the name of 
the topology, and 
store the name 
within a new 
topology instance
Is the next string 
“begin”?
Is the next string 
“end”?
Obtain the next 
string, component 
identifier, and store 
it in a local variable
Is the next 
string, the 
component type, 
an existing type 
within the 
compLib 
variable?
Issue error to the 
user: Missing 
identifier “SS” in 
the file
Issue error to the 
user: Missing 
“begin” from the file
END
Yes
No
Is the next string 
“:”?
Issue error to the 
user: Missing ‘:’ 
between component 
identifier and the 
component type
Issue error to user: 
Component type is 
not recognised
END END ENDEND
Create an instance 
of that component 
type from the 
compLib variable
Assign the 
component 
identifier to the new 
copy of the 
component
Add the component 
to the topology 
instance
1
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Figure 6.10: First section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a .ss
file
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1
Is the next set of 
strings “port” 
“map” “(”?
Is the next string 
“)”?
Issue error to user: 
One of the 
following is missing 
“port”, “map”, “(”
Is the next string 
“=”?
Is the next string 
“>”?
Is the next string 
“;”?
Set the local 
variable parseState 
to ‘p’
Set the local 
variable parseState 
to ‘l’
Set a local variable 
parseState to ‘p’
Is the local 
variable 
parseState 
currently ‘p’?
Set the string, the 
link name, to a local 
variable 
Add the link name 
to a new link class 
object 
Add the link name 
to the variable 
theTopology 
Call a function to 
create a connection
ENDEND
Issue error to user: 
Missing “>” from 
the file
END
2
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Set the string, the 
port name, to a local 
variable
No
Yes
Figure 6.11: Second section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a
.ss file
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2
Obtain a link 
(pointer) to the 
component class 
instance
Obtain a link 
(pointer) to the port 
class instance 
Is the link class 
instance already 
connected?
Set the link type (the 
port values)
Are the link 
types (port 
values) the 
same?
Obtain a link 
(pointer) to the link 
class instance
Issue error to user: 
The link types are 
not the same
Are the number 
of links 
associated to the 
link class 
instance 3+?
Issue error to user: 
The link to this 
component cannot 
be made as the link 
has too many 
connections to 
create a new link
Increase the number 
of connections to 
the link class 
instance
Add the link name 
to the port class 
instance
END END END
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Figure 6.12: Third section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a
.ss file
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to as pointer) to the component, the component’s port and value of the port.
The process for abstracting and storing this information can be seen in Figures 6.13 -
6.15.
6.3.1.4 Storage of Simulation Information
The simulation file contains the information regarding component failure data and initial
component mode for those with multiple modes. It also contains the initiating component:
the component identifier, the port name and the value of that port. For example OP out1
= CL.
Component failure data
As each set of component failure data in the list is parsed into the software, the following
steps are completed:
1. The component instance is located within the systemTopologies variable of the
topSystem class.
2. The state or mode used in the failure data is checked against the component instance
to ensure the state or mode is present in the component.
3. A new instance of the class failRepair is created. The failRepair class stores
information about the component’s failure data.
4. The failure distribution information is then assigned to the class.
5. The class calls a function to calculate the first time to failure, based on the failure
data provided.
6. This failRepair class instance is added to the component instance held within the
variable systemTopologies.
Initial component modes
The initial component modes in the file are parsed and the system handles them in the
following manner:
1. The component instance is located in the systemTopologies variable of the
topSystem class.
2. The mode used in the initial mode data is checked against the component instance
to ensure the mode is present in the component.
3. The port class object in the component that represents the component mode is
updated with the specified value.
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START
(2) Create a new 
phaseTable instance
(3) Retrieve the 
mission name and 
store it in the 
phaseTable instance 
created in (2)
(1) Is the next 
string “PTT”
(4) Is the next 
string “{”?
(5) Is the next 
string “time”?
(6) Is the next 
string 
“from_phase”?
(7) Is the next 
string 
“to_phase”?
(8) Is the next 
string “,”?
(9) Is the next 
string “;”?
(1a) Issue error to 
the user: “PTT” 
missing from file
STOP
(4a) Issue error to 
the user: “{” 
missing from the 
file
STOP
(5a) Assign the 
column number to a 
variable associated 
with the string
(8a) Increase the 
column number by 1
(10) This is the end 
of the row. Column 
number returns to 0 
and row number is 
increased by 1
(9a) Issue error to 
the user: This is an 
unrecognised string
STOP
1
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 6.13: First section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a
.ptt file
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2
(16) Does the 
component exist 
in the topology 
class
(17) Create a new 
pttCondition class 
instance
(18) Add the 
component 
identifier to the 
pttCondition class
(19) Is the next 
string in the file 
“.”
(20) Does the 
next string, the 
port name exist 
in the 
component?
(21) Add the port 
name to the 
pttCondition 
instance
(22) Is the next 
string in the file 
“=”?
(23) Does the 
next string, the 
value of the port 
exist in the port 
in the 
component?
(24) Add the value 
to the pttCondition 
instance
(25) Create a new 
phaseRow instance 
and add the time, 
from_phase, 
to_phase values and 
the pttCondition 
instance
(26) Add the 
phaseRow to the 
phaseTable instance
1
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
(16a) Issue error to 
user: The 
component within 
the phase row 
condition is 
unrecognised
STOP
(19a) Issue error to 
the user: ‘.’ is 
missing from the 
phase row condition 
statement
STOP
(20a) Issue error to 
the user: The port 
name given does not 
match a port 
associated to the 
component
STOP
(22a) Issue error to 
the user: The string 
‘=’ is missing from 
the condition 
declaration
STOP
(23a) Issue error to 
user: The value 
associated with the 
port does not exist
STOP
Figure 6.15: Third section of the algorithm for parsing and storing information within a
.ptt file
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Initial component
The initial component information is stored directly into a variable held within the
topSystem class, ‘initial initialComp’, where ‘initial’ is a class with three string variables
which store the component identifier, the port name and the port value.
When parsing the file, the software checks the topology class instance to ensure that a
component with that identifier, port name and port value exists.
6.3.1.5 Circuit List Generation
After all the files have been entered into the software, a list of circuits in the system is
generated. This section describes the recursive function that is used to generate the list of
circuits for any given system, as seen in Figure 6.16.
The software identifies the first component within the topology that has wire types, as
discussed in 6.2.5, for one of its output ports. Once identified, the software searches for the
components that are connected to each of the component’s ports that have a wire link type.
Wherever a circuit branches (e.g. at a junction), the same function is called recursively
on each branch. At the end of a branch (having returned to the first component in the
top-level circuit), a completed circuit is returned. Figure 6.17 demonstrates the building
of the circuit lists using the pressure tank system from the previous chapter. The figure
shows how, starting from a single component (in this case the power supply PS1), circuits
are discovered via a number of branches. Only when the software reaches the original
component is a circuit complete and stored by the software.
Calling this small function recursively is an elegant and effective method of mapping
all the electrical circuits in a system topology.
6.3.2 Building the Petri Net Model
6.3.2.1 Introduction
Once the system, phase and simulation information has been added, the model can be
generated. The model building section of the software uses the component tables and
phase table to construct the Petri net model. The model can be split into four distinct
parts:
1. Component Petri Net
2. System Petri Net
3. Circuit Petri Net
4. Phase Petri Net
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START
Does the 
component have 
outputs of type 
wire?
Yes
No
No
Yes
STOP
Add the component 
to the circuit list
Find the next 
component on the 
other end of a wire 
output.
Is there another 
output to consider?
Is the next 
component 
already in the 
circuit list?
Is it the first 
component in 
the list?
The current circuit is 
complete.
Yes
Yes
No
Recursive call 
to the current 
diagram, based 
on the next 
component.
No
For each returned 
circuit, create of 
copy of the current 
circuit and join the 
two.
Store the circuit(s) 
in temporary 
memory
Return all circuits in 
temporary memory.
Figure 6.16: Process for the generation of the circuit lists
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Figure 6.17: Circuit detection method used for the circuit system in the pressure tank
system
Each of these are built individually and in the order given above. They are built in this
order due to the connections that exist between the different Petri net sections. Each of
the following sections discusses the construction of each of the above Petri net types and
how each connects to the previous Petri net type.
This section of the software introduces a number of new classes that relate directly
to Petri nets. Petri nets comprise of place, transition and arc classes. All Petri nets
generated in the software are stored within a single masterPetriNet class instance within
the topSystem class.
6.3.2.2 Component Petri Net
The component Petri nets are the first to be built as these are the building blocks for
all other Petri nets. All component information was added to the software via the .dt,
.omt and .sim files. The .dt and .omt files contain the information relating to how the
component works under different conditions, and the .sim file contains the information
relating to the failure data and initial modes (for components with multiple modes).
This process follows the construction procedure established in section 4.3.1.1. Starting
with the information contained within the component class objects, the software moves
through each port of the component. In each port, a port name, direction and link type
exist. For each link type value, a new place class object is created. For each of the places
created, an identifier is created in the following format:
component.componentType.componentID.portName.value
For example, a place representing a value of C in an input port in1 of a power supply
with unique identifier PS1 would be written as component.power_supply.PS1.in1.C. This
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unique identifier is necessary when making connections between places and transitions
within the component Petri net or between other Petri nets.
Each transition created for the component Petri net is based on a row of either a
decision table or operational mode table. This distinction is reflected in the identifier used
for each of the transitions created:
component.componentType.componentID.tableType.rowNumber
For a transition representing the second row of a DT for a power supply with the unique
identifier PS1, the transition identifier would be component.power_supply.PS1.dt.2.
Using the information stored about the DT and OMT (if applicable) for each
component, arcs are created for each link. The arc class includes a place identifier, a
transition identifier and the arc type. Possible arc types are shown in Table 6.1. The
software determines the arc type to use according to the procedure discussed in section
4.3.1.1, items 4 and 5.
Table 6.1: Software arc type definitions
Software Arc Type Description Arc Diagram
0 Single-headed arc
1 Double-headed arc
2 Single-headed inhibit arc
3 Inhibit arc
6.3.2.3 System Petri Net
The system begins by generating a component instance for every component in the system.
The name/type of the component and the component identifier are added to the component
Petri net object. If the component has multiple modes of operation then the starting mode
is represented by a token in that mode’s place in the component Petri net object instance.
There is one last part of the component Petri net that is not built initially with the rest
of the Petri net: the working-to-failed relationship. The information stored in the port
representing the state of the component is located and passed to the component Petri net
to build this information into the Petri net. The process for this can be seen below:
1. Locate the place representing the working state in the component Petri net.
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2. If the state port was located within the decision table ports, then for each failRepair
object associated with the port, create the following:
(a) Create a transition object instance.
(b) Set the time to transition equal to that listed within the failRepair object
instance.
(c) Create the identifier of the transition which follows;
component.componentName.componentID.timed.failTime
(d) Set the identifier to the transition.
(e) Add the transition to the component Petri net.
(f) Create an arc object instance to show the connection between the working place
and the newly created transition.
(g) Locate the failed place of the component
(h) Create a new arc object to represent the connection from the timed transition
to the failed place.
3. If the state port was located within the operational mode table them the following
steps should be taken:
(a) If the component’s modes fail at the same rate complete the following:
i. Create a transition object instance.
ii. Set the time to transition equal to that listed within the failRepair object
instance.
iii. Create the identifier of the transition as follows;
component.componentName.componentID.timed.failTime
iv. Set the identifier to the transition.
v. Add the transition to the component Petri net.
vi. Create a new place instance to represent the failure of the component.
vii. Add this new place to the component Petri net.
viii. Create an arc object instance to show the connection between the working
place and the newly created transition.
ix. Create an arc object instance to show the connection between the timed
transition and the newly created transition.
x. Create a new immediate transition object for each failure mode place.
xi. Create an arc instance to represent the connection between the failure place
and the new transition.
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xii. Create an arc instance to represent the connection between the component
mode place and the transition.
xiii. Create an arc instance to represent the connection between the transition
and the failure mode place.
(b) If the component’s modes do not fail at the same rate then complete the
following:
i. Create a transition object instance for each failure mode.
ii. Set the time to transition equal to that listed within the failRepair object
instance for each failure mode.
iii. Create an arc instance for each failure mode to represent the connection
between the working place and the timed transition.
iv. Create an arc instance for each mode to represent the connection between
the component mode place and the transition.
v. Create an arc instance for each mode to represent the connection between
the timed transition and the failure mode place.
The rest of the SPN is created using the system topology information provided by
the user to generate the connections between the components. This consists of locating
the output place of one component and an input place of the connected component and
merging these places so that only one place remains. The algorithm of the software follows
the construction procedure seen in section 4.3.3.1.
6.3.2.4 Circuit Petri Net
After the circuits are detected as described in section 6.3.1.5, the CiPNs can be generated.
Once created, each CiPN is stored within an instance of a circuitPN class. This contains
a vector that holds all CiPN instances within the masterPetriNet class. The algorithm for
generating these Petri nets follows the construction procedure outlined in section 4.3.2.1.
The software generates a number of places to represent current and no current within
a given circuit. These use the following place identifier format:
circuit.curcuit_number.wireType
The places the are defined as the circuit control places have the following format:
controlPlace.circuit.curcuit_number.wireType
The transition identifiers created as part of the CiPN show the relationship between the
wire type and the component. For example, the transition that would link a component’s
mode to a circuit’s no current place would have the following transition identifier:
circuit.circuit_number.component.componentID.transition.mode
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6.3.2.5 Phase Petri Net
The algorithm of the software for generating the PPN follows the construction procedure
seen in section 4.3.4.1.
The main phase places are the places that the system should move through if the
mission completes successfully without any failures. The main phase places are identified
within the software by the place identifier:
phase.phase_Number.start_time->end_time
If the place is used to represent a specific moment in time then the place identifier uses
the following format:
phase.time.time_value
Other phase places, such as failure places, generated from the phase transition table
are identified by the following format:
phase.phase_Number
There are a number of different types of transitions created. The timed transitions
created as part of the model creation from the phase transition file (.ptt file extension) are
given the following identifier:
phase.timed.time_value
If the transition has a delay of δ then the transition is given the following identifier:
phase.timed.delta.row_number
Where row_number relates to the row number within the phase transition table. Other
transitions created from the phase transition table use the following format:
phase.table.row_number
Time Dependent Components
During this stage of construction the software moves through each decision table searching
for any component that is dependent on time. If a component is located then the software
assess whether there is already a suitable PPN place that represents this specific moment
in time or a given time frame. If there is no place suitable then the software creates a new
place to represent this time frame. The time frame is checked to see that it can be related
to a PPN place first. Components should only change behaviour according to times related
to a phase within the mission. If a new place is required the place identifier follows the
following format:
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phase.dt.start_time->end_time
If a new place is required then a new transition is also necessary. The transition
connects between the place that represents the start time of the time frame and the new
place created above. The new place then connects to the transition that would then enter a
place representing the end time. This place would then connect to the relevant immediate
transition created during the CPN model creation. The transition generated here would
have the following identifier format:
phase.transition.start_time->end_time
If the inequality expressing the time frame is inclusive (i.e. greater than or equal to,
less than or equal to) then this is also demonstrated within the identifier by use of an
equals sign between start_time and − > or between − > and end_time.
When the PPN is generated it is stored within the phasePN class instance that is held
within the masterPetriNet class instance. All final Petri nets are stored here until they are
required for the simulation which is described in the next section.
6.3.3 Simulating the Petri Net Model
The Petri net simulator created as part of the software is the most complex part of the
entire software. The simulator was designed to handle the type of model discussed in
section 4.3. The simulator has one particular feature that has not been identified within
any other Petri net simulator: the ability to wipe clean specific tokens within a Petri net
model. It is very important that this can occur when handling the model generated. The
details of this feature and its purpose are described within this section.
This section discusses the main class associated with the simulation of the model,
simulation. This class is described in detail from the initial preliminary simulation of the
model to the main simulation and the main functions used to simulate each transition in
the Petri net. The main algorithm used to simulate the whole model is also discussed.
This algorithm assesses the system at different stages to find the moment at which the
simulation has run its course.
Before the simulation functions are executed, the Petri nets that are stored within the
masterPetriNet class instance are transfered to the simulation class instance. The Petri
nets are transferred as separate vectors of places, transitions and arcs. Each of the places
and transitions are assigned integer identifiers as string identifiers take considerably longer
to validate during a simulation run. These identifiers are then also stored within the arcs
for reference. At this point the Petri nets are no longer identifiable as discrete from one
another, but form a single, large Petri net. The matrices required to simulate the transitions
firing during a simulation are then created. The method of marking transformation is
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described in section 1.4.3.2. The software generates the incidence matrix, AT , using the
places and the arcs to determine the values. This is done automatically the user has no
further input at this point. Once each of these matrices are created the simulation process
can commence.
6.3.3.1 Simulation Algorithm
The user can initiate a simulation from the main menu of the software. The user specifies
the number of simulations to run and the duration of each simulation, which are the only
two arguments to the simulation command. This section describes the different algorithms
used when a simulation is run. These algorithms are as follows:
1. Before the actual simulation can begin, the input data is processed automatically
to locate key elements of the model, separated as follows:
(a) All simulation end places including the mission success place and failure phases
that terminate the mission
(b) All places that represent component states
(c) All places that represent component modes
(d) All places related to the circuit Petri net with IDs containing the key words
controlPlace and state
(e) All the phase timed transitions
(f) All places that represent phases including main phases that the system moves
through during a mission with no failures
(g) All other phase places
(h) All timed transitions (phase timed transitions and component failure timed
transitions)
(i) Times to failure and phase times
2. A preliminary simulation is performed in which all component times to failure are
set a large value, i.e. they will not fail. The purpose of this simulation is to validate
the model, ensuring that mission success is feasible. The preliminary simulation
also analyses components with multiple modes and times to failure. The simulator
measures the time spent in each mode to determine which failure mode will occur
first. This informs how and when the component fails during the full simulation.
3. All the information required to run the full simulation is now available, including
component failure times generated during model construction. The mission involving
the first component failure is now simulated. The preliminary simulation has
180 Chapter 6. Automated Reliability Modelling
established that the mission is successful when no components fail; therefore the
simulator identifies in which mission the first component fails. For example, with
a mission length of 20 hours and a component failing no earlier than 65 hours, the
simulator would begin at 60 hours, having assumed three successful missions.
4. After a single mission has been simulated, the function returns a value: the number
of tokens located in the mission success place (0 or 1). If the value is 1 then the
simulation was successful despite one or more component failures. If the mission
end time is still less than the total simulation period, the simulation is set to run
again, taking into account the failed components.
5. If the simulation comes back again as a mission success, then this shows that the
component that failed is not a component that can cause a mission failure on its
own. Further missions are simulated. If no new components fail in a mission, the
simulator will skip ahead to the next mission in which a component fails, as it did
in the first mission.
6. The simulator continues to run missions until the simulation time (specified by the
user) elapses. If at any point a mission is unsuccessful, then the simulation ends
early and the data is collected and written to file.
7. When a simulation ends, either in success or failure, new component failure times
are generated and inserted into the model for the next simulation.
8. This process is repeated for the number of simulations stipulated by the user.
9. The simulation is complete and the results are written to two files.
6.3.3.2 Simulation of the Model
This section describes the process for executing the timed transitions in the model. To
begin, all timed transitions are identified within the model and their positions are stored
locally within the simulation class. These times are then sorted in preference of earliest
first.
The function that completes this specific set of tasks is the simulateModel function.
This manages when different transitions fire.
There are a set activities that must be completed before the main section of the function.
These are covered below:
Mission Length
The user is not required to provide a definitive mission length as this information is
abstracted from places created as a result of the phase transition table. The main phase
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places (not mission failure or success places) created as part of the modelling process
described in section 6.3.2.5 are identified. As the identifier for the places includes the time
frame that the phase represents, this value is taken and temporarily stored. When all time
frames are identified these are sorted, earliest first. From this list, the largest time value
can be determined and set as the length of an individual mission.
Active Time
A concept of active time is used within the software as a method of tracking the age of a
transition. This is particularly important for components with multiple modes of operation
with different failure rates. This active time is determined using a preliminary run of the
system and mission entered by the user, as described in section 6.3.3.1, step 2. The active
time is used to calculate the true overall time to failure of the component in the specific
mode.
Enabled Timed Transitions
This is a list of all timed transitions that have been determined as enabled. To identify
which timed transitions are enabled, each time value is tested to see if it would be possible
to fire this transition. If it is possible then the transition is added to the list of enabled
timed transitions. The identifiers of the transitions are stored for reference for when the
enabled value is fired.
Mission Start and End Time
Before a mission is run, it is necessary to determine the earliest enabled time. This process
was discussed briefly in 6.3.3.1, step 3. The phase times are not considered during this
process as this is to determine the earliest time to failure. The earliest time to failure is
then used to work out when the mission should commence. The preliminary run of the
system and mission ensures that the model created is viable. If the system and mission
are not viable then the simulation of the preliminary run would return a failure of the
mission without a component failing. It is assumed that the mission would be successful
if all components are working. By assuming this the software locates the earliest time to
failure of a component and re-works the new mission start time. The value is reworked by
completing the following:
1. Take the earliest time to failure and divide it by the mission length.
2. Remove any remainder from the value calculated in 1.
3. The start time is then calculated by multiplying the value calculated in 2. by the
mission length.
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4. The end time is the addition of the start time and the mission length.
After the start time and end time are calculated, these values are tested against the
user defined simulation length. If the start or end time is beyond the simulation time then
this simulation is determined to be completed successfully. If the start and end times are
within the limits then the simulation can begin.
Unchanging Place Tokens
During a simulation the system is wiped of tokens, with some exceptions. These unchanging
places are the component working and failed places, circuit control places and all places
representing phases of the mission. Before the simulation commences, the number of tokens
in each is stored within the simulation class. This is to track the tokens within these places.
6.3.3.3 Simulating Transitions
To simulate the transitions firing, the method of marking transformation as discussed
in section 1.4.3.2 is used. This is implemented in the software using a matrix class
written specifically for the software. An instance of this class contains the matrix elements
themselves and functions to perform matrix operations including addition, multiplication
and transposition.
There are two functions that manage the simulation of the transitions: simulateTran-
sitions and createFiringValues. The process used by the function simulateTransitions can
be seen in Figure 6.18. Blocks (4) and (9a) mention an intermediate step matrix: this
holds the matrix that results from the multiplication of the AT and
P
matrices.
The function createFiringValues determines which transitions are enabled based on the
places and arcs connected to each transition. The function completes the following tasks:
1. Identify the places that are inputs to the transition
2. For single- and double-headed arcs: do all the places contain a token?
a. Yes: Move on to 3.
b. No: This transition is not enabled. If there are any more transitions to assess
return to 1.
3. For inhibit arcs: do any of the places contain a token?
a. Yes: This transition is not enabled as it is inhibited. If there are any more
transitions to assess return to 1.
b. No: Move on to 4.
4. Identify the places that are outputs from the transition
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5. For single-headed inhibit arcs: do any of the places contain a token?
a. Yes: This transition is not enabled as it is inhibited. Return to 1. for the next
transition.
b. No: Move on to 6.
6. The transition is enabled. Set the value within the
P
matrix to 1. If there are any
more transitions to assess return to 1.
6.3.3.4 Model Simulation Algorithm
Figures 6.19 and 6.20 show the process that works through the simulation of the model.
Within Figure 6.19 there is a key which shows a set of blocks. These blocks show the order
in which the timed transitions are considered. Each block contains a variable StartLocation
which is used within the software as an identifier to keep track of where the simulation is
in relation to each block. It is especially important when (6a) occurs as this breaks out of
the loop shown in the key to assess the enabled time transitions.
Blocks (3bi) to (3biv) in Figure 6.20 are required when a phase delta transition is
dependent on a component’s output value to move between phases. As tokens flow around
the model, it cannot be guaranteed that the output place contains a token at the correct
time. To aid this, these blocks continuously move through time = delta and time = 0
transitions until the token is present.
Blocks (6ci) and (6d) in Figure 6.19 set the begin time of a newly enabled time
transition. When moving through the blocks seen in the key in Figure 6.19, the simulation
could break out of the loop before or after the next enabled time transition has fired. If a
transition has become enabled before the next enabled time transition has fired then the
start time for this component is the last enabled time transition to have fired (Block(6ci)).
If there has been no previously fired time transitions then the value is set to the start of
the mission. If the transition has become enabled after the next enabled time transition
has fired then the start time is set to this value (Block (6d)).
6.3.3.5 Simulation Results
The results from each simulation are logged to file and held in memory. This is so that if
the simulation were to be stopped part way through by design or accident the results of
the simulation are not lost. There are three files generated as part of the results and are
listed below:
• Simulation_results.txt
• Supplementary_details.txt
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START
(1)Is this a delta 
transition and is 
this not the first 
iteration?
No
(1a) Call the 
simulateTransition 
for time = 0
Yes
(2) Set M0 matrix to 
the Mn 
(3)Update the 
tokens in the places 
from the Mn matrix
(4) Clear the 
contents of the 
intermediate step, 
Mn and ∑ matrices
(5) Create the ∑ 
matrix
(6) Are there any 
enabled timed 
transitions and 
is the time not 
delta?
(7) Set Mn to M0
STOP
(6a) Populate the 
intermediate step 
matrix with the 
multiplication of AT 
and ∑ 
(6b) Populate the 
Mn matrix with the 
addition of the 
intermediate step 
matrix and M0 
No
Yes
(6c) Has there 
been a change in 
the unchanging 
places?
(6d)Has the 
mission moved 
into a new 
phase?
(6ci) Restart the 
matrix by wiping the 
tokens of non-
unchanging places
(6e) Has the 
software 
finished 
assessing this 
time?
STOP
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Figure 6.18: Flow chart of the process of the simulation of a transition
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START
(1) Retrieve the next 
enabled timed 
transition
No
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(2) Is this the 
first enabled 
timed transition 
in the list?
(4) Simulate the 
transition at time 
associated to the 
block
(5) Set the token 
values of the 
unchanging places
(2a) Has the 
previous enabled 
timed transition 
fired?
(2b) Return to the 
previous enabled 
timed transition
Yes
NoYes
No
[A] StartLocation=0
Time = 0
[B] StartLocation=1
Time = delta
[C] StartLocation=2
Time = 0
[D]StartLocation=3
Time=enabled 
transition time
[E] StartLocation=4
Time=0
KEY: 
(6) Has the 
simulation come 
to an end?
(7) Locate enabled 
timed transitions
(10) Are there 
any new enabled 
timed 
transitions?
(8) Set the enabled 
timed transitions
(9) Register the next 
startLocation
(6b) Is this a 
break due to 
simulation end?
(6a) Break out of the 
loop
No
Yes
(6c) Is this 
before a timed 
transition has 
fired in this 
loop?
No
Yes
(6ci) Set the start 
time as the previous 
timed transition 
value for the new 
enabled timed 
transitions
(6bi) Did any 
time to failure 
transitions fire?
(6bii) Sort the 
failure times
(6biii) Identify the 
last failure time
(6biv) Create a new 
simulation record
(6bv) Return the 
number of tokens 
within the mission 
success place
STOP
No
Yes
(3) Is this block 
[D]?
No
1
2
3
(6d) Set the start 
time as the recently 
fired timed 
transition value for 
the new enabled 
timed transitions
(6e) Remove any 
previously fired 
timed transition 
values
(6f) Recreate the 
enabled timed 
transition values
Yes
No
Yes
(11) Move onto the 
next block
Figure 6.19: Flow chart of the process of the simulation of the model, part 1
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(3d) Simulate the 
transition at time 
associated to the 
block
(3f) Set the token 
values of the 
unchanging places
1
(3a) Is the 
mission Length 
less than the 
enabled timed 
transition?
(3ai) Set the 
identifier 
StartLocation to 4
(3b) Is the 
enabled timed 
transition greater 
than the 
simulation 
length?
(3c) Is the 
enabled timed 
transition greater 
than the end 
time of the 
current mission?
(3e) Add the 
enabled timed 
transition value to 
the fired transition 
list
(3g) Was the 
timed transition 
a phase 
transition?
(3bi) Simulate 
time = 0
(3bii) Has the 
simulation come 
to an end? 
(3biii) Simulate 
time = delta
(3biv) Has the 
simulation come 
to an end? 
2
(3gi) Add the timed 
transition identifier 
to a list of failed 
components
3
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 6.20: Flow chart section of the process of the simulation of the model, part 2
6.4. Testing and Validation 187
• ExcelFileSimResults.txt
The first file has the unreliability data for each set of 50 simulations and the final
unreliability data at simulation end. The second file details each simulation run including
the phase sequence and the component failures that have occurred during the mission. The
third file is a tab-delimited file of the results that can be opened with excel to generate
graphs and other data. A time-stamp of when each of the files is created (at the start of
the simulation process) is included.
6.3.3.6 Summary
The simulator created as part of this software is complex but necessary to prove the validity
of the models generated using the software. This section has covered the main aspects and
processes used to generate reliability data for the model completing a mission or multiple
consecutive missions. In order to prove whether the results obtained from the simulation
are within acceptable tolerances, an analytical solution must be calculated. The following
section discusses the modelling method used to generate the analytical values.
6.4 Testing and Validation
In order to validate the modelling method, the system described in Chapter 5 was used.
Files representing the decision and operational mode tables, seen in Tables 5.1 - 5.15,
were created. The topology diagram seen in Figure 5.2 was converted into the system
structure file format as discussed in Section 6.2.2. The simulation file was populated with
the information displayed in Table 6.2 and the following initial conditions were used:
• Push switch, S1 : mode = open
• Toggle switch, S2 : mode = closed
• Relay contact, CR : mode = open
• Timer relay contact, CT : mode = open
• Valve, V : mode = closed
Each component follows an exponential distribution. To validate the simulation results,
a set of analytical values were calculated to compare against those generated from the
software. To calculate the unreliability of the system over the mission, the reliability
modelling method of phased fault trees as discussed in section 2.2.1 was used.
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Table 6.2: Pressure tank system component failure data
Component identifier Failure Mode Failure Rate
S1 F_closed 0.1
S1 F_open 0.1
S2 F_closed 0.8698
S2 F_open 0.001
PS1 F 0.001
PS2 F 0.001
CT F_closed 0.1
CT F_open 0.1
CR F_closed 0.00023
CR F_open 0.00023
TIM F 0.001
R F 0.1
M F 0.001
FS F 0.01
P F 0.1
T F 0.0001
V F_closed 0.03
V F_open 0.03
PG F_LOW 0.01
PG F_HIGH 0.01
PG F_VHIGH 0.01
OP F 0.1
6.4.1 Validation using Phase Fault Trees
To validate that the software provides results accurate to within a tolerance of ± 5%, the
software was set to run for a single mission. Using the relationship between failure rate
and mean time to failure (µ = 1/λ), the failure rates in Table 6.2 were converted into their
equivalent mean times to failure. These were entered into the .sim file.
The phase fault trees for this mission can be seen in Figures 6.21 - 6.24. Each phase
fault tree was evaluated using the data given in Table 6.2 and using the procedure seen
in section 2.2.1.3 by La Band (2005). The subscript numbers within the basic events
demonstrate when these basic events can occur i.e. in which phases these basic events can
occur which would contribute to the failure in the current phase. This generally affects
components with multiple modes of operation, as the time in which the component fails
dictates the mode in which the component fails.
The phase unreliability was calculated using the minimal cut set upper bound
approximation described in Section 1.4.1.1. This was applied to each of the phase fault
trees and can be seen in equations 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.4 and 6.4.6 to represent the unreliability
of phase 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
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Phase 1 
Failure
S1 Fails
Open
PS1 
Fails
Timer contact 
does not close
TIM 
Fails
TC Fails 
Open
S1OP PS11
TCOPTIM1 1
1
Figure 6.21: Pressure tank system phase 1 fault tree
Phase 2 
Failure
Tank does not 
Fill
T
Fails
P 
Fails
P12T12
Relay, R, 
De-energised
R 
Fails
R12
PS1 
Fails
PS112
TIM 
Fails
TIM12
No Power to 
Pump
M 
Fails
M12
PS2 
Fails
PS212
FS 
Fails
FS12
RC Fails
Open
RCOP1
Figure 6.22: Pressure tank system phase 2 fault tree
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Phase 3 
Failure
V Fails
Closed
Valve is not 
Opened
OP
Fails
PG 
Fails Low
VCL
PGLOP13
13
13
Figure 6.23: Pressure tank system phase 3 fault tree
Phase 4 
Failure
Motor circuit 
still energised
Relay still 
energised
S1 Fails
Closed
TC Fails 
Closed
RCCL
TCCLS1FC
12
1 12
Figure 6.24: Pressure tank system phase 4 fault tree
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Q(Phase1) = 1− (1− P (S1OP1)(1− P (PS11))(1− P (TCOP1))(1− P (TIM1)) (6.4.1)
Q(Phase2) =1− (1− P (X ·R12))(1− P (X ·RCOP1))(1− P (X ·M12))
(1− P (X · FS12))(1− P (X · PS212))(1− P (X · T12))(1− P (X · P12))
(1− P (S1OP1 · PS11 · TCOP1 · TIM2))
(1− P (S1OP1 · TCOP1 · TIM1 · PS12)) (6.4.2)
Where X is defined by the equation 6.4.3.
X = S1OP1 · PS11 · TCOP1 · TIM1 (6.4.3)
Q(Phase3) = 1− (1− P (Y · VCL13)(1− P (Y ·OP13))(1− P (Y · PGL13)) (6.4.4)
Where Y is defined by the equation 6.4.5.
Y =S1OP1 · PS112 · TCOP1 · TIM12 ·R12.M12 · FS12 · P12 · T12 ·RCOP1 · PS212 (6.4.5)
Q(Phase4) = 1− (1− P (Z ·RCCL12)(1− P (Z · S1CL1))(1− P (Z · TCCL12)) (6.4.6)
Where Z is defined by the equation 6.4.7.
Z =S1OP1 · PS112 · TCOP1 · TIM12 ·R12 ·M12 · FS12 · P12 · T12 ·RCOP1 ·
PS212 · VCL13 ·OP13 · PGL13 (6.4.7)
Each of the above equations were calculated and the results obtained can be seen in
Table 6.3. The next section details the results obtained from the software with a comparison
to the values obtained using the above equations.
6.4.1.1 Single Mission Simulation Results
The software completed 10,000 simulations of a single mission of the pressure tank system.
The final simulation results obtained can be seen in Table 6.3. Figures 6.25, 6.26 and
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Table 6.3: Pressure tank system simulation results from 10,000 simulations
Phase Number
1 2 3 4 Mission
Analytical 0 0.1927 0.1061 0.0670 0.3658
Simulation 0 0.1990 0.1080 0.0645 0.3715
Difference(%) 0 3.25 1.80 3.74 1.56
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
U
nr
el
ila
bi
lit
y 
Number of Simulations 
Analytical Simulation
Figure 6.25: Phase 2 simulation convergence results
6.27 show the phase unreliability for phases 2, 3 and 4 respectively. These show how the
simulation results begin to converge on the analytical values calculated in section 6.4.1.
6.4.1.2 Analysis
Convergence Study
To validate the results a convergence study was carried out for each individual phase of
the mission and the overall unreliability of the mission. The first phase of the mission, a
discrete phase, was completed successfully during each mission run during the simulation.
The further three phases of the mission (2, 3 and 4) began to converge at approximately
2,100 simulations. This is a convergence within a ± 5% tolerance. The mission unreliability
can be seen to converge at approximately 1,250 simulations within a ± 5% tolerance.
To show this convergence the values between 2,000 simulations and 10,000 simulations
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Figure 6.26: Phase 3 simulation convergence results
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Figure 6.27: Phase 4 simulation convergence results
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Figure 6.28: Mission simulation convergence results
were taken and displayed in Figure 6.29. This shows the values staying within the tolerances
of ±5%.
The simulation results shown for the convergence study and the simulation of multiple
missions, discussed in the next section, were published in Stockwell and Dunnett (2013).
6.4.1.3 Simulation of Multiple Missions
The previous sections discussed using the software for calculating single mission unreliabil-
ity. This section takes this one step further and discusses using the software for calculating
the unreliability of multiple continuous missions. For this type of simulation it is assumed
that the system does not shutdown, but as one mission ends the next begins. For this
study the failure data in Table 6.2 was divided by 103. This was to enable components
to last multiple missions. As the reliability and the availability of a non-repairable system
are equal as discussed in section 1.3.4.1. Figure 6.30 shows the unavailability of each phase
of the system over 5,000 consecutive missions. Figure 6.31 shows the unavailability of the
system over 5,000 consecutive missions. As expected, Figure 6.31 shows that increasing
the demand on the system reduces the probability of mission success. At approximately
3,000 missions the unavailability of the system is very close to zero. The curve of the data
follows that of an exponential function. This is unsurprising given that this system is a
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Figure 6.29: Section of the mission unreliability graph for a non-repairable pressure tank
system
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Figure 6.30: Individual phase unavailability over time
non-repairable system and that each component within the system follows an exponential
failure distribution.
6.5 Summary
This chapter has detailed the three main aspects of the software created: file input, model
creation and simulation. Each of these has been discussed in detail to show the complexity
of the software generated. It has described a number of the major classes and functions
that make up the software. Flow charts of the procedures that the software completes in
order to achieve specific goals have been shown.
The files that the user must create are simple and require no specialist knowledge of
risk and reliability techniques. The tables that describe the system topology, mission and
component behaviours are intuitive for design engineers and are created as simple plain
text files. There are defined instructions for the user to generate each file type and how
to change any predefined values and libraries of components can be generated and stored
for future use. To generate the model and perform a simulation, simple commands with
minimal arguments are entered into the main menu of the software.
The model building section detailed how the software uses the novel techniques
discussed in chapter 4 to generate each of the four Petri net models: CPN, SPN, CiPN
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Figure 6.31: Mission unavailability over time
and PPN from the user input files. The different Petri nets are assembled by the software
to form a single model of the overall system.
The software handles items such as automatically generating circuit lists without any
further aid from the user. This means the model construction process is repeatable between
different systems and different users. As long as the user defines the system correctly within
the component tables and the system topology the software will identify each circuit within
a system.
The implementation of a new simulator, written specifically for the generated models,
was discussed in detail. The simulator can perform a number of simulations specified by the
user to calculate the unreliability of the system across a single mission or multiple successive
missions, making the software suitable for a wider range of systems. The simulator outputs
unreliability data as well as more detailed data on phase failures and component failures.
The results validate the novel model generation technique and show great potential for
the software developed. The software proved that it can calculate mission unreliability
that agrees with an analytical solution to within a tolerance of ±5% for individual phases
and for the overall mission.
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7.1 Introduction
The procedure given in Chapter 4 is built upon in this chapter to cater for systems that can
be repaired during a mission. The software has been designed so that any system can have
both repairable and non-repairable components. For the purposes of demonstrating the
repairable capabilities, all components within this chapter are assumed to be repairable.
The standard Petri net to represent failed to repair can be seen in Schneeweiss (1999), an
example of which can be seen in Figure 7.1. Figure 7.1 shows the original working to failed
states, seen previously in Figure 4.8a, with the addition of a new place to represent the
under repair status of a component. An immediate transition is placed between the failed
state place and the under repair state place. This shows that once the component enters a
failed state it is automatically assumed to be under repair. Between the under repair state
place and the working state place a timed transition, tR, is created. This represents the
time the component requires to be repaired to bring it back to a fully working state.
W
UR
FtF
tR
Figure 7.1: Petri net showing the transition between working, failed and under repair states
of a component
This chapter focuses on the repairable nature of systems by looking at different
methods of maintenance and the use of standby systems and voting systems as methods
of redundancy. The maintenance methods covered in this work include preventative and
corrective maintenance. Redundancy has been investigated through standby systems: cold,
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Figure 7.2: General preventative Petri net
warm and hot standby. Voting systems have also been considered for their redundancy
applications.
As part of the new work presented here, a new variable defaultRepair was added to
the topSystem class to ensure, in a similar way to the working state value, that there is
consistency of use of the value.
7.2 Preventative Maintenance
Preventative maintenance or scheduled maintenance as discussed in section 1.3.4.2 has
been considered in the software. It has been considered both on a system-wide level
and component-by-component basis. The Petri net that represents the preventative
maintenance for any given component can be seen in Figure 7.2. This is based on a version
of the Petri net found in Schneeweiss (1999). The Up and Down places represent that the
component is under a preventative maintenance cycle and not, respectively. Additional
inhibit arcs between the failed place, under repair place and the transition representing the
maintenance cycle coming to an end were created. This is to ensure that the preventative
maintenance cycle completes the repair before returning to the Down place.
This section describes the user expressions required within the input files and the
manner in which the information is stored and used to build the Petri net model seen in
Figure 7.2.
7.2.1 File Input
All maintenance plans are expressed within the simulation file (.sim). This includes
system-wide and component-based maintenance plans. These are written within a
MAINTENANCE header in the file. The preventative maintenance cycle has been
modelled for individual components by the user stipulating the following:
preventative componentID (time_between_maintenance_cycles);
or it can be stipulated for the system by using the following expression:
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MAINTENANCE
{
preventative compA(20); 
system preventative (20);
}
Figure 7.3: File Input expressions within the simulation file
class planDetails
-bool systemStatus;
-string componentId;
Figure 7.4: planDetails class view
system preventative (time_between_maintenance_cycles);
An example of the entry for a preventative maintenance cycle for both a system-wide
event and a component-specific plan can be seen in Figure 7.3.
The time between cycles is assumed to be divisible by the mission length as it is assumed
that preventative maintenance cycles are not completed within a running mission, but at
the end of a mission.
7.2.2 System Storage
There are two classes that are used when storing this information from the simulation file:
planDetails and preventative. The planDetails class can be seen in Figure 7.4. This class
forms the basic information for each maintenance plan. This is used to stipulate whether
the plan is component based, in which case the variable componentId would be populated.
If the plan is system wide then the systemStatus variable would be set to true. The
preventative class inherits the attributes within the planDetails class. This is also true of
the corrective class to be discussed in the next section. The preventative class can be seen
in Figure 7.5; this class has one variable duration which is the time between maintenance
cycles.
class preventative : public planDetails
-double duration;
Figure 7.5: preventative class view
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class maintenance
-vector<corrective> corPlans;
-vector<preventative> prePlans;
-vector<standby> standPlans;
-vector<voting> votPlans;
Figure 7.6: maintenance class view
All maintenance plans are stored within a maintenance class instance which holds a
vector of each maintenance item and any standby and voting system plans as seen in Figure
7.6. The maintenance class instance is a variable added to the topSystem class as part of
the repairable work shown here.
The procedure for taking the file and storing the information for preventative
maintenance cycles has been detailed in Figure 7.7.
The Petri net construction process based on this information is considered in the next
section.
7.2.3 Construction Procedure
The construction procedure detailed here takes the information stored within the preven-
tative class instances held within the maintenance class instance to generate the Petri net
model.
1. Create a new place to represent the simulation is under maintenance: simula-
tion.maintenance
2. Consider each preventative plan: Is this a system wide plan?
(a) Yes
i. Create a place to represent the system undertaking preventative mainte-
nance: component.system.wide.preventative.up
ii. Create a place to represent the system not undertaking preventative
maintenance: component.system.wide.preventative.down. Set the place to
have a single token.
iii. Create a timed transition to represent the time between maintenance
cycles. This transition has the following identifier:
component.system.wide.timed_p.time_between_cycles
iv. Create the following arcs:
A. Create a single-headed arc between the place created in 2(a)ii and the
transition to represent time between cycles created in 2(a)iii.
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START
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component 
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preventative class 
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(3)
(6) Is the next 
string “(”?
(7) The next string is 
the time between 
cycles. Set this value 
within the 
preventative class 
instance created in 
(3)
(8) Is the next 
string “)”?
(9) Is the next 
string “;”?
STOP
(4a) Issue error to 
the user: The 
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not exist in the 
current system
(6a) Issue error to 
the user: The 
declaration is 
missing ‘(‘
(8a) Issue error to 
the user: The 
declaration is 
missing ‘)’
(9a) Issue error to 
the user: The 
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missing ‘;’
(1b) Create a 
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instance 
(1c) Set the 
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wide event
STOP STOP STOP STOP STOP
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Figure 7.7: Flow chart showing the steps to taking the file input and storing the
preventative maintenance information
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B. Create a single-headed arc between the timed transition created in
2(a)iii and the place representing the undertaking of maintenance
created in 2(a)i.
v. Create an immediate transition. This immediate transition allows the
transition between the maintenance up place to the maintenance down
place. The identifier for the transition is as follows:
component.system.wide.immediate_p.upToDown.
vi. Create the following arcs:
A. Create a single-headed arc from the under maintenance place created
in 2(a)i to the immediate transition created in 2(a)v.
B. Create a single-headed arc from the immediate transition created in
2(a)v to the not under maintenance place created in 2(a)ii.
C. Create an inhibit arc from each component failed places to the
immediate transition created in 2(a)v.
vii. Identify each component in the system that is repairable and not already
maintained through a corrective maintenance plan and complete the
following:
A. Create an inhibit arc from each component failed place to the
immediate transition created in 2(a)v.
B. Create an inhibit arc from the component’s under repair place to the
immediate transition created in 2(a)v.
C. A double-headed arc from the under maintenance place created in 2(a)i
to each of the immediate transitions that link a component’s failed
place and under repair place.
(b) No
i. Retrieve the component associated to the plan.
ii. Create a place to represent that the component is undertaking mainte-
nance: component.componentType.componentID.preventative.up
iii. Create a place to represent that the component is not undertaking
maintenance: component.componentType.componentID.preventative.down.
This place is set to have one token, as all components are assumed to be
working from time zero.
iv. Create a timed transition to represent the time between maintenance
cycles. The identifier for this transition is
component.componentType.componentID.timed_p.time_between_cycles
v. Create the following arcs:
206 Chapter 7. Modelling of Repairable Systems
A. Create a single-headed arc between the place created in 2(b)iii and the
transition to represent time between cycles created in 2(b)iv.
B. Create a single-headed arc between the timed transition created in
2(b)iv and the place representing the undertaking of maintenance
created in 2(b)ii.
vi. Create an immediate transition. This immediate transition allows the
transition between the maintenance up place to the maintenance down
place. The identifier for the transition is as follows:
component.componentType.componentID.immediate_p.upToDown.
vii. Create the following arcs:
A. Create a single-headed arc from the under maintenance place created
in 2(b)ii to the immediate transition created in 2(b)vi.
B. Create a single-headed arc from the immediate transition created in
2(b)vi to the not under maintenance place created in 2(b)iii.
C. Create an inhibit arc from each component failed places to the
immediate transition created in 2(b)vi.
D. Create an inhibit arc from the component’s under repair place to the
immediate transition created in 2(b)vi.
E. A double-headed arc from the under maintenance place created in
2(b)ii to each of the immediate transitions that link a component’s
failed place and under repair place.
An example of a single component has been given in Figure 7.2. An example of a
system wide preventative maintenance plan has been given in Figure 7.8. This shows
three components within a system that are all repairable and are not covered by another
maintenance plan.
The next maintenance plan type to consider is corrective maintenance which is covered
in the next section.
7.3 Corrective Maintenance
Corrective maintenance or unscheduled maintenance as discussed in section 1.3.4.2 has also
been considered in the software. As with preventative maintenance, corrective maintenance
can be considered on a component-by-component basis or as a system-wide event. Both will
be discussed here. The Petri net structures used in this section are based on Schneeweiss
(1999).
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Figure 7.8: Flow chart showing the steps to taking the file input and storing the
preventative maintenance information
7.3.1 File Input
The declarations for each type of corrective maintenance plan is given within the
MAINTENANCE heading within the simulation file. The declaration for a component
is as follows:
corrective componentID(maintenance_engineer_identifier);
and the declaration for a system wide corrective maintenance plan is as follows:
system corrective (number_of_personnel);
The component corrective maintenance declaration requires an identifier to show which
maintenance engineer completes maintenance for the component identified. This is to
cater for the possibility that a single maintenance engineer would cover the maintenance
for multiple components within a system. The system-wide corrective maintenance
plan requires the number of maintenance personnel that are available to carry out the
maintenance of the system.
7.3.2 System Storage
Each individual corrective maintenance plan is stored within a corrective class instance.
The class view can be seen in Figure 7.9. The corrective class inherits the attributes of
the planDetails class. The component that the plan applies to (or the system-wide event
indicator) is stored within the attributes of the planDetails class. Within the corrective
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class corrective : public planDetails
-vector<string> personnel;
-unsigned int noOfPersonnel;
Figure 7.9: corrective class view
class, a list of maintenance engineer identifiers (as discussed in 7.3.1) is stored, relating
to individual component corrective maintenance. Also stored within the corrective class is
the number of maintenance personnel available for system-wide maintenance. The set of
corrective classes are stored within the maintenance class instance as seen in Figure 7.6.
The process for storing this information can be seen in Figure 7.10.
7.3.3 Construction Procedure
The construction procedure for a corrective maintenance plan has been described below:
1. Identify all engineer identifiers from each corrective maintenance plan
2. For each identified in 1 create a place to represent that engineer is available to
complete maintenance. The identifier would use the following format: compo-
nent.corr.eng.engID.up
3. For each place identified in 1, create a place to represent that the engineer
has completed maintenance. The identifier would follow the following format:
component.corr.eng.engID.down
4. Is this a system-wide event?
(a) Yes:
i. Create a place to represent the engineers available. The place identifier
would follow the following format:
system.corr.eng.plan_number.number_of_engineers
ii. Set the number of tokens in the place created in 4(a)i to the number of
engineers stated in the file (‘number_of_engineers’)
iii. Identify the repairable components in the system (components with an
under repair place) and complete the following:
A. Retrieve the transitions that are linked between the failed places and
under repair place
B. Create a single-headed arc between the place created in 4(a)i and the
transitions identified in 4(a)iiiA
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Figure 7.10: Flow chart for the process of taking in the file and interpreting the corrective
maintenance plan
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C. Retrieve the time to repair transition of the component
D. Create a single-headed arc between the time to repair transition and
the place created in 4(a)i
E. Retrieve the failed places for the current component
F. For every other repairable component in the topology listed after the
current component complete the following:
• Locate the immediate transitions connected between the failed places
and the repair place for the components identified
• Create an inhibit arc between the failed places of the current
component and the immediate transitions identified in the previous
step
(b) No:
i. Retrieve the engineer identifiers from the corrective class instance
ii. Create a place to represent that there is an engineer available for the
component. This place follows the following format:
component.componentType.componentID.maint.a
iii. Create a place to represent that maintenance has completed on the
component. This place follows the following format:
component.componentType.componentID.maint.c
iv. Set the token to value to 1 in the engineer available place created in 4(b)ii.
v. Retrieve the immediate transitions linked between failed places and the
repairable place of the component
vi. Create a single-headed arc between the engineer available place created in
4(b)ii and each immediate transition
vii. Retrieve the time to repair transitions
viii. Create a single-headed arc between the time to repair transitions and the
maintenance complete place created in 4(b)iii
ix. For every engineer assigned to this component complete the following:
A. Create a place to represent that the engineer is carrying out main-
tenance. This place identifier has the following format: compo-
nent.maint.corr.engID.up
B. Create a place to represent that the engineer is not currently carrying
out maintenance. The place identifier has the following format:
component.maint.corr.engID.down
C. Set the place token value to 1 for the place created in previous step
7.3. Corrective Maintenance 211
D. Create an immediate transition that will transition between the
engineer carrying out maintenance place and the engineer not carrying
out maintenance. The transition identifier follows the following format:
component.transition.corr.engID.upToDown
E. Create an immediate transition that will transition between the
engineer not carrying out maintenance place and the engineer carrying
out maintenance place. The transition identifier follows the following
format: component.transition.corr.engID.DownToUp
F. Create a single-headed arc between the maintenance complete place
and the transition created in 4(b)ixD
G. Create a single-headed arc between the engineer completing mainte-
nance place and the transition created in 4(b)ixD
H. Create a single-headed arc between the transition created in 4(b)ixD
and the engineer not completing maintenance place
I. Retrieve the failed places of the component
J. For each of the failed places complete the following:
• Create an immediate transition will connect the place representing
the engineer not completing maintenance and the engineer complet-
ing maintenance. The transition identifier follows the following for-
mat: component.transition.corr.engID.componentID_FailureValue
• Create an inhibit arc between any places already created for other
maintenance engineers as created in 4(b)ixB
• Create a double-headed arc between the failed place and the
transition created in 4(b)ixE
• Create a single-headed arc between the transition created in 4(b)ixE
and the maintenance available place created in 4(b)ii
• Create a single-headed arc between the engineer not carrying out
maintenance place created in 4(b)ixB and the transition created in
4(b)ixE
• Create a single-headed arc between the transition created in 4(b)ixE
and the engineer completing maintenance place created in 4(b)ixA
K. For each corrective plan left that has a common maintenance engineer
complete the following:
• Retrieve the immediate transitions linked between failed places and
the repairable place of the component
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Figure 7.11: Petri net for a single mode component under a corrective maintenance plan
• For each failed place of the original component create an inhibit arc
between the failed place and each transition identified in the previous
step
If there is more than one component that uses the same engineer then only a single
place representing this engineer would be created. The appropriate links would then be
created for each of the components maintained by the engineer.
Using the construction procedure above, three examples have been generated. The first,
Figure 7.11, shows a single operational mode component under a corrective maintenance.
The second, Figure 7.12, shows the construction of two components; one with a single
operational mode and another with multiple operational modes. This is an example of
two components sharing a single maintenance engineer. The third example, Figure 7.13,
shows three repairable components within a system that are maintained by a system wide
corrective maintenance cycle with two maintenance engineers.
7.4 Standby Systems
Standby systems are used as a method of redundancy within a system structure. There
are three types of standby systems: cold, warm and hot. Each of these will be discussed
in detail with examples of their Petri net equivalent. The procedures for the construction
of each type will also be discussed.
7.4.1 File Input
Any standby components that exist within a system must be described as part of the
system description to input into the software. This is dealt with within the simulation file
(.sim) under the header STANDBY. An example of this can be seen in Figure 7.14. The
first two declarations within the STANDBY header show that compB is in standby for
compA and vice versa where compB is the first component in standby.
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Figure 7.13: Petri net for a system-wide corrective maintenance plan with two maintenance
engineers
STANDBY
{
compA * COLD(compB);
compB COLD(compA);
compC WARM(compD);
compE HOT(compF);
}
Figure 7.14: Declarations used within the STANDBY header within the simulation file
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class standby
-string componentId;
-bool primary;
-string type;
-vector<string> standbyIds;
Figure 7.15: The standby class
Figure 7.14 shows the header STANDBY, which is used to signify the next set of
information to the software. The curly braces signify the beginning and the end of the
standby information. Each line uses the following syntax:
compID *type(compID1, compID2, · · ·, compIDN );
Where a * is required if components can be in standby for one another. This identifies
which component is in standby at the beginning of a simulation.
The syntax states that should component compID fail, component compID1 takes
over; should compID1 fail then compID2 takes over and so on until no other components
are available. If the system is designed such that, upon failure, the original component
compID is repaired and placed into standby for the other components then another line
would be required to show this in this section of the system description, e.g. compID1
type(compID, compID2, · · ·, compIDN ).
The Petri net is constructed according to the standby type (keywords: COLD, WARM
and HOT). Each of the following sections shows an example of the construction procedure
needed to generate the correct Petri net directly from the information above. At the point
the standby section of the component/system is generated, the overall component Petri
net has already been generated including the working to failed Petri net. The integration
performed here simply connects the component to the standby components or systems.
7.4.2 System Storage
Each standby declaration as those seen in Figure 7.14 are held within a standby class
instance. When each class instance is created it is held within the maintenance class
instance. The standby class can be seen in Figure 7.15. The variable type would be COLD,
WARM or HOT. The procedure for taking the information from the file and storing it
within each standby class instance can be see in Figure 7.16.
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START
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Figure 7.16: Flow chart for the storing of the standby components
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7.4.3 Construction Procedure
The construction procedure for a standby system is given below:
1. Retrieve the component identifiers of those components in standby.
2. Retrieve the primary component’s CPN.
3. Retrieve the standby components’ CPNs.
4. For each standby component complete the following:
(a) Create the place identifier (not the place) to represent the component
within a standby state. The place identifier follows the following format:
component.componentType.componentID.state.standby
(b) Retrieve the time to failure transitions of the standby components.
(c) If the standby component is of type COLD : Create an inhibit arc between the
standby state place in 4a and each time to failure transition.
(d) If the standby component is of type WARM : Create an inhibit arc between the
standby state place in 4a and every other time to failure transition that is not
the standby time to failure transition.
(e) Create a new place to represent that the standby component is no longer in
standby. The place identifier has the following format:
component.componentType.componentID.state.up.
(f) If the standby component is of type WARM : Create an inhibit arc between the
place created in the previous step and every other time to failure transition
that is not the standby time to failure transition.
(g) Does this component already have a standby place (a place with an identifier
of the format seen in 4a)?
i. Yes: Move on to the next step
ii. No:
A. Create the standby state place for the standby component. If this is
not the primary component, set the token value for the place to 1.
B. Create a standby ‘up’ place. The format for the identifier is as follows:
component.componentType.componentID.state.up. If this is not the
primary component then set the place to have a token value of 1.
C. Create a standby ‘down’ place. The format for the identifier is as
follows: component.componentType.componentID.state.down.
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(h) Retrieve the working state place identifier and the failed state place identifiers
of the standby component
(i) For each failed place identifier complete the following tasks:
i. Create a new immediate transition within the following transition identi-
fier: component.componentType.componentID.standbyTransition.
original_componentID.original_failValue
ii. Create a single-headed arc between the standby state place and the
transition created in 4(i)i.
iii. Create a double-headed arc between the failed place identifier and the
transition created in 4(i)i.
iv. Create a single-headed arc between the transition created in 4(i)i and the
up place created in 4(g)iiB.
(j) Retrieve the working state place identifier and the failed state place identifiers
of the original component
(k) For each failed place identifier complete the following tasks:
i. Create a new immediate transition within the following transition identi-
fier:
component.componentType.componentID.standbyTransition.downToStandby
ii. Create a single-headed arc between the down place created in 4(g)iiC and
the transition created in 4(k)i.
iii. Create a single-headed arc between the transition created in 4(k)i and the
standby state place.
iv. Create a double-headed arc between the working state place of the
component and the transition created in 4(k)i.
(l) Retrieve the DT transitions for the standby component.
(m) For each transition create a inhibit arc between the standby state place and
each transition.
7.4.4 Cold Standby
During the construction process cold standby components simply add inhibit arcs to stop
the time to failure transitions from aging. When a cold standby component becomes
operational then the time to failure transition begins to age. An example of a cold standby
connection can be seen in Figure 7.17. Figure 7.17 shows two power supplies in cold
standby. PS1 is the primary component and PS2 is the initial standby component.
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Figure 7.17: Example of power supplies in cold standby
7.4.5 Warm Standby
When work to fail Petri nets are created another time to failure transition is created that
this is the rate of failure of the component whilst in warm standby. The relationship
between working and standby failure rate can be seen in Figure 7.18. When entering this
within the simulation file the following format is used:
componentID failure_value(or mode) standby failure_distribution(parameter(s));
An inhibit arc is used on the operational time to failure transition to ensure this does
not age. Once operational the operational time to failure transition becomes enabled. An
example of a warm standby connection is seen in Figure 7.19.
7.4.6 Hot Standby
As hot standby components fail at the same rate as if they were in operation no further
transitions or inhibit arcs are required on the time to failure transitions. An example of a
hot standby component can be seen in Figure 7.20.
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Figure 7.18: Example of work to fail to repair relationship for a single mode component in
warm standby
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Figure 7.19: Example of power supplies in warm standby
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Figure 7.20: Example of power supplies in hot standby
7.5 Voting Systems
Voting systems can also be used as a method of redundancy and therefore have been
included in the software. This section describes how the user defines a voting system and
how the software takes this information, stores it and generates the appropriate model
from it.
7.5.1 File Input
The user defines a voting system within the simulation file (.sim). The header VOTING
is used to identify the following declarations. To declare a voting system the following
syntax is used:
Number_Working (CompID1, CompID2, · · ·, CompIDN );
The Nth component has a limit of five components. The reason for this is the model
becomes very large and would slow the software. It has been defined in the software to
limit this value for performance considerations only. An example of this written within the
simulation file has been given in Figure 7.21.
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VOTING
{
2(compA, compB, compC);
}
Figure 7.21: Example of a VOTING declaration
class voting
-int number;
-vector<string> componentIds;
Figure 7.22: The voting class
7.5.2 System Storage
Each voting system defined in the simulation file is created in an instance of the voting
class. The voting class can be seen in Figure 7.22. The procedure for storing information
on the voting plans is shown in the flow chart in Figure 7.23.
7.5.3 Construction Procedure
The construction procedure for generating the Petri net for voting systems is listed below:
1. Retrieve the list of components associated with the voting plan
2. Retrieve the CPN for each of the components associated to the voting plan
3. Retrieve the working state place for each component
4. For each working state value (this is applicable to failed state values) for all
components create a new place with the identifier of the format:
component.compID1_compID2_···_compIDN .componentType.portName.value.
5. Create a list of combinations of components working/failed.
6. For each place created in 4 complete the following:
(a) For every combination found in 5 create an immediate transition with the
following identifier:
component.V OTING.compID1_compID2_ · · ·_compIDN .portV alue.
combinationListNumber.
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Figure 7.23: Flow chart for the storing of the voting information
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Figure 7.24: An example of a 2-out-of-3 voting system Petri net
(b) For each voting component entered in the file, in the order listed, consider
every combination created in 5. Create an inhibit arc between the component’s
working place and any combination, represented by a transition, that includes
only components further down in the voting list. This is only applicable to
working places.
(c) Create a single-headed inhibit arc between the immediate transition created in
6a and the place created in 4.
(d) For each combination, represented by a transition, create a double-headed arc
between the component places identified in 3, where the component is part of
the combination.
7. Repeat from step 3 for failed identifiers.
8. During a later part of the model creation only one decision table is used between the
voting components. The arcs between the one of the component’s working/failed
states are transfered to the voting component’s working/failed states created in 4.
Due to the nature in which the Petri net has been created there is a need to control
certain aspects of the Petri net to ensure multiple firing of tokens does not occur across
the Petri net. Step 6b is used to limit the firing of the voting Petri net by creating inhibit
arcs to the later transitions. An example of a two-out-of-three voting system can be seen
in Figure 7.24.
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ABORT
{
S1 (F_open) : (1);
A (F) : (3,4);
}
Figure 7.25: File format for the ABORT header within the simulation file
7.6 Mission Abort
Within phased-mission systems there is scope to include the aborting of a mission based on
a component failing within a given phase. An example of such an occurrence is an aircraft
with 4 engines and one fails during flight, if this were to happen, then the likelihood is
that the plane would be diverted to the nearest airport, particularly if there is a fear of
further engine failure. The software caters for this eventuality.
7.6.1 File Input
There is a section defined in the simulation file (.sim) that covers mission abort due to
a specific component failure within a given phase. This can be found under the ABORT
header. The user can stipulate the information as follows:
componentID(component_failure_mode) : (Phase_number);
When mission abort is considered there is additional information within the final results
file output from the simulation showing the number of aborted missions (as well as the
number of failed missions). An example of the representation can be seen in Figure 7.25.
The example given states that should component S1 be in the state F_open at any
point in phase 1 then the mission is aborted. Similarly if the component A is in the state
F at any point during phase 3 or phase 4 the mission is aborted.
7.6.2 System Storage
The information obtained from the simulation file is stored within a separate class instance
called abortMission. The abortMission class can be seen in Figure 7.26. The process for
parsing this section of the simulation file can be seen in Figures 7.27 and 7.28.
7.6.3 Construction Procedure
To construct the Petri net that represents the aborting of a mission is completed during
the procedure to create the PPN. The construction of the Petri net to account for an
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class abortMission
-string componentId;
-vector<string> compStates;
-vector<string> phaseNumbers;
Figure 7.26: The abortMission class
aborted mission is described below:
1. Create a place representing mission abort. This would be given the place identifier
phase.abort.
2. Locate all phase transitions that are not related to mission abort.
3. For each transition identified in 2 create an inhibit arc from the place created in 1
to each transition.
4. For each abort condition found from the simulation file complete the following:
(a) Retrieve the phases that are associated with the abort condition
(b) Retrieve the phase places that are associated to the phase numbers retrieved
in 4a.
(c) Create an immediate transition with the identifier
component.abort.componentID.component_fail_value.phase_number
(d) Create an arc for the following:
i. A single-headed arc between the phase place identified in 4b and the new
transition created in 4c.
ii. A single-headed inhibit arc between the transition created in 4c and the
abort place created in 1.
(e) Retrieve the place that represents the component fail place value
(f) Create an arc between the place located in 4e and the transition created in 4c.
Using the example in Figure 7.26, an example of the presentation of the abort conditions
can be seen in Figure 7.29. In step 4(d)ii inhibit arcs are created between the abort phase
place and the other transitions. The reason for this is to halt any other movement within
the PPN once the mission has entered an abort phase.
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Figure 7.27: The first part of the software algorithm to populate the system with abort
conditions
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Figure 7.28: The second part of the software algorithm to populate the system with abort
conditions
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Figure 7.29: Example representation of the abort process within a PPN
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7.7 Simulating a Repairable System
The previous sections have dealt with the repairable aspects of the system in terms of how
these are given in files to the software and how the software interprets the files in order
to construct each model. This section describes how these repairable elements affect the
way the software simulates a given repairable system and mission. The general simulation
process as discussed in section 6.3.3.1 still applies to systems that are repairable. There are
a number of new additional steps used in order to process some of the repairable aspects of a
system. This is particularly important for preventative maintenance plans as these require
a simulation of just the maintenance rather than the whole system. This section discusses
the additional steps needed in order to simulate a repairable system. During the writing
of the code to incorporate the repairable system aspects, much of the simulation code was
altered and as a result became more efficient. These changes were already incorporated
into the algorithms and procedures seen in Chapter 6.
7.7.1 Simulation Algorithm
The simulation algorithm for a repairable system builds on the algorithm described in
section 6.3.3.1. In step 1 within the algorithm in section 6.3.3.1 there are a number of
places and transitions that are located and their positions stored. For the repairable case
the following places and transition positions must also be stored:
• Locate standby place positions
• Locate repair place positions
• Locate the positions of the time to repair transitions and the time between
maintenance cycle transitions.
• If there are any preventative maintenance plans then the location of the simula-
tion.maintenance place created as part of the preventative maintenance Petri net
should also be stored.
All these place and transition locations are necessary in order to make the software
more efficient. This is particularly useful when identifying the simulation end and the
change in the system state.
Step 8 in the algorithm described in section 6.3.3.1 describes what occurs when a
simulation of the mission has occurred. For a repairable mission this changes to the
following:
1. Find the earliest time to failure and run a single simulation of the mission
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2. If the mission was successful and the simulation end time has not been reached
complete the following:
(a) Test if there is a preventative maintenance cycle due at the end of the mission.
(b) Yes: The software simulates the maintenance process. Go to step 1.
(c) No: Re-run the mission to test if the component would cause a failure in the
next mission. If this is again successful return to 1, otherwise go to step 3.
3. If the mission was not successful complete one of the following:
• If there are no further simulations to run, end the simulation
• If there are further simulations change the timed transitions and restart the
process from step 1.
4. After maintenance has occurred simulate the model again. Return to step 1.
7.7.2 Simulation of the model
Every item completed as part of the simulation of the model seen in section 6.3.3.2 is still
applicable for the repairable case. There a few additions to this part of the process which
have been included below:
• To test for simulation end when considering the earliest time the down time created
as part of the preventative maintenance cycle is accounted for.
• During the process shown in Figure 6.19 there is a further step after (3g) where
the timed transitions, namely the time to failure and time to repair transitions are
re-initialised.
7.7.3 Simulating Transitions
There is a single difference within this process and that is in the creation of the
P
matrix.
This is split depending on whether a maintenance cycle is in progress or the normal
operational mission. For the creation of the
P
matrix during the maintenance cycle the
only transitions that are considered during the process is the time to repair transitions and
the preventative time between cycle transitions.
7.8 Repairable Bulb System
7.8.1 Introduction
To demonstrate the capabilities of the software for the processing of a repairable system,
a bulb system was used. The bulb system consists of four major components: a bulb, a
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PS1
PS2
B
S
OP
Figure 7.30: Schematic of the bulb system
toggle switch and two power supplies, one of which is in standby for the other. An operator
is also used as part of the system, but is assumed not to be capable of failure. Figure 7.30
demonstrates the system considered.
7.8.1.1 System Process
The system is initiated by switching the toggle switch from an open operational mode to
a closed operational mode. The bulb, B, turns ON. After a time of 20 hours the operator
opens the toggle switch, S, and the bulb, B, turns OFF.
7.8.1.2 Initial Conditions of the System
All the components within the bulb system are assumed to be working from time =0. The
component toggle switch, S, has a starting mode of open.
7.8.2 System Description
7.8.2.1 System Topology
The bulb system schematic in Figure 7.30 was transformed into the topology diagram seen
in Figure 7.31. The power supply, PS2, is in standby for the power supply, PS1. Even
when components are in standby the connections to these components must still be stated
in the system topology.
Circuit Lists
There are two circuits that are present within this system:
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Figure 7.31: System topology diagram for the bulb system
1. {PS1, J2, S, B, J1, PS1}
2. {PS2, J2, S, B, J1, PS2}
7.8.2.2 Component Decision and Operational Mode Tables
Each of the components were described using DTs and where applicable, OMTs. The DTs
and OMTs for the bulb system can be found in Tables 7.1-7.5. The under repair state, UR,
has been included within the DTs and OMTs. This should be included to show how the
component behaves when the component is under repair. This is particularly important
for components under a corrective maintenance plan.
Table 7.1: Decision table for the component Bulb
In 1 state Out 1 Out 2
1 C W C ON
2 NC – NC OFF
3 – F NC OFF
4 – UR NC OFF
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Table 7.2: Decision table for the Operator
Time In 1 state Out 1
1 0 OFF W CL
2 0 < t ≤ 20 OFF W NA
3 0 < t < 20 ON W NA
4 20 ON W OP
5 – – F NA
Table 7.3: Decision table for the component power supply
In 1 State Out 1
1 C W C
2 – F NC
3 NC – NC
4 – UR NC
Table 7.4: Decision table for the component Toggle Switch
in 1 Mode Out 1
1 C Closed C
2 – Open NC
3 NC – NC
Table 7.5: Operational Mode Transition Table for the component toggle Switch
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed OP W Open
4 Closed NA – Closed
5 Closed – UR Open
6 Open – FOP Open
7 Open OP – Open
8 Open CL W Closed
9 Open NA – Open
10 Open – UR Open
7.8.2.3 Component Failure and repair data
Each of the components apart from the operator are repairable components. The failure
and repair data for the bulb system can be seen in Table 7.6. Each of the components fails
by an exponential distribution.
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7.8.3 Mission Description
The system process described in section 7.8.2 has been transformed into the phase
transition table seen in Table 7.7. The phases of the mission have been described below:
• Phase 1: System start-up
• Phase 2: Bulb is lit
• Phase 3: Mission Success
The failure phases are as follows:
• Phase 4: System fails to start
• Phase 5: System fails and the Bulb turns OFF
• Phase 6: System fails and bulb remains lit
7.8.4 Maintenance Plan
Each component within the system is maintained through a corrective maintenance cycle
and there is an engineer assigned to each component. The component PS2 is in standby
for the component PS1. If PS1 fails and then repaired this component then becomes the
standby component for PS2.
7.8.5 Petri Net Models
7.8.5.1 Component Petri Nets and System Petri Net
The CPN created from the DTs and OMT seen in Tables 7.1-7.4 can be seen in Figures
7.32a-7.32d. There is no change in the way that these component tables are used to
generate the CPN models.
After generating the CPNs the SPN was built by connecting the components by using
the system topology. It should be noted that there is no special connection between standby
components. The SPN for this system can be seen in Figure 7.33.
Table 7.6: Failure and repair data for the components of the bulb system
Component Identifier Failure Rate Repair Rate
S 0.001 0.1
B 0.005 0.1
PS1 0.0067 0.02
PS2 0.0067 0.02
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Table 7.7: Phase transition table for the bulb system
Time From Phase To Phase Condition
1 0 1 2 B OUT2 = ON
2 δ 1 4 B OUT2 = OFF
3 20 2 3 B OUT2 = OFF
4 – 2 5 B OUT2 = OFF
5 δ 2 6 B OUT2 = ON
W
F
UR
In1=C
In1=NC
Out2=ON
Out2=OFF
Out1=NC
Out1=C
(a) CPN for the component Bulb, B
W
F
In1=OFF
In1=ON
Out1=OP
Out1=NA
Out1=CL
(b) CPN for the component Operator, OP
OUT=C
OUT=NC
IN2=NC
IN2=C
mode=closed
mode=open
W
FCL
FOP
IN1=CL
IN1=NA
IN1=OP
UR
(c) CPN for the component Toggle Switch, S
IN=C
IN=NC
W
F
OUT=NC
OUT=C
UR
(d) CPN for the component
Power Supply, PS1 and PS2
Figure 7.32: CPNs for the components of the bulb system
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Figure 7.34: PPN of the bulb system
7.8.5.2 Phase Petri Net
By using the phase transition table in Table 7.7 the PPN was generated as seen in Figure
7.34.
7.8.6 Validation
The bulb system discussed above was used to verify that the software could cater for
repairable systems. In order to verify the system an analytical solution was required.
The modelling method used was Markov modelling as discussed in section 2.3.1. The
Markov approach was the simplest method to provide an analytical solution. A number of
assumptions were made and are discussed in the following section.
7.8.6.1 Assumptions
1. Switch S cannot fail in operational mode open, FOP . The switch changes from
open to close in a discrete phase and only returns to this mode at the end of the
mission and therefore does not spend any time in this mode for it to age. As a result
the markov model only considers the failure mode FCL.
2. The component operator is assumed to be perfect, i.e. it cannot fail.
7.8.6.2 Markov Model
The Markov model states can be found in Table 7.8. The full Markov diagram can be
seen in Figure 7.35. By using the method described by Clarotti et al (1980) and the
Markov diagram shown the analytical values were calculated. The transition matrix for
the Markov model can be seen in equation 7.8.1. Using this and the initial conditions as
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seen in equation 7.8.2 the analytical values for the bulb system were calculated for each
phase of the mission.
Table 7.8: Markov model states for repairable bulb system
State B S PS1 PS2
1 W W W S
2 W W S W
3 F W W S
4 F W S W
5 W FCL W S
6 W FCL S W
7 W W F W
8 W W W F
9 F FCL W S
10 F FCL S W
11 F W F W
12 F W W F
13 W FCL F W
14 W FCL W F
15 W W F F
16 F FCL F W
17 F FCL W F
18 F W F F
19 W FCL F F
20 F FCL F F
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Figure 7.35: Markov Model of the Bulb System
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P (0) =
h
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
iT
(7.8.2)
7.8.6.3 Single Mission Condition
The software was used to simulate the condition of a single mission in order to validate the
model generated using the algorithms discussed in sections 6.3.3 and 7.7. As a consequence
of running the simulation for a single mission the system preventative maintenance cannot
be tested for this simulation set. Each component therefore was set to be part of a corrective
maintenance policy. The simulation was run for 5,000 simulations and the results can be
seen in Table 7.9. To prove repeatability the simulation was re-run for a further 5,000
simulations. The results of which can be seen in Table 7.10. Each set of results remain
within the ± 5% tolerance.
Table 7.9: Bulb system simulation results for 5,000 simulations
Phase Number
1 2 Mission
Analytical 0 0.12 0.12
Simulation 0 0.1222 0.1222
Difference(%) 0 1.83 1.83
Table 7.10: Second set of simulation results for the bulb system for 5,000 simulations
Phase Number
1 2 Mission
Analytical 0 0.12 0.12
Simulation 0 0.1172 0.1172
Difference(%) 0 2.33 2.33
Figure 7.36 shows the results obtained from both simulation runs together with the
error margins and the analytical value calculated using the Markov model discussed in
Section 2.3.1. The values remain within the ± 5% margins after approximately 3,700
simulations.
7.8.6.4 Analysis
The simulation results showed good convergence upon the analytical values calculated
using the Markov model in Figure 7.35 after approximately 3,700 missions during the
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Figure 7.36: Simulation results for the repairable bulb system for 5,000 simulations
convergence study. The simulation results also showed that the values are repeatable to
give the approximate same value.
7.9 Summary
This chapter has discussed the main repairable aspects that the software has been designed
to handle. The corrective and preventative maintenance policies were the main aspects of
a repairable system. The user input to define a repairable aspect, such as the maintenance
policies, are easily implemented. There is not much more user information required for the
software to cater for a repairable component/system as the software abstracts this process
from them. The hardest aspect to implement within the software was the simulating of a
preventative maintenance cycle.
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8.1 Conclusion
This thesis began by considering different modelling methods that were available that
could potentially be used as part of the software. The modelling method was required
to be versatile with the capability of being applied to both non-repairable and repairable
systems. Modelling phased-mission systems adds a further level of complexity; specific
methods applied to such systems were discussed to identify any methods that could be
taken forward as part of the solution. After taking these criteria into account, Petri nets
presented the most suitable modelling method. The main reason for this choice was due to
the versatile nature of Petri nets. As was seen in section 1.4.3.2 Petri nets can be applied in
a wide range of cases, including direct model conversions from other reliability modelling
methods. Petri nets also stood out for the ability to model different aspects of a system
and the mission undertaken, simultaneously modelling individual component states and
more abstract aspects of the system such as progress through the current mission.
Literature considered in chapter 2 provided a grounding in current methods relating
to phased-mission systems, including phase fault trees and repairable vs. non-repairable
systems. The simulation process discussed in section 2.3.2 was of particular interest in
relation to the simulation of the model, as discussed later in the thesis. The third chapter
gave an overview of some of the methods used in automating the process of creating
reliability models. Most automated methods were based around fault trees. As fault
trees are unable to model dependencies required for repairable systems they were deemed
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unsuitable as a modelling method for the software. Most of the methods describe taking
an input file of the model and then using this to generate the data. As the software was
required to take some form of file input from the user about the system, its components
and the mission, this was of particular interest. One method that stood out was that
of Henry and Andrews (1997) which takes in a system description from an AutoCAD
diagram, decision tables and diagraph. After stating the top event for the system the fault
tree was generated based on information in the input files. This method did not generate
the data, but the files of the fault trees that could be used by commercial software to
generate the data. The ability to model the component states using decision tables was of
particular interest as this modelled the behaviour of individual components and provided
a relatively intuitive format for component description. Further to decision tables, state
transition tables provided a method of showing the behaviour of components with multiple
operational modes. Combining these as part of the component description provided a solid
foundation for the software.
The next chapters detailed the way in which Petri nets, decision tables and state
transition tables were taken forward and used as the basis for the software. Chapter 4
detailed the method by which the system and mission description were broken down into
simple input files. The methods of taking this information and transforming it into the four
Petri net types (Component Petri nets, System Petri nets, Circuit Petri nets and Phase
Petri nets) were discussed. The idea of breaking the Petri nets up into individual sections
and components made the construction procedure for each type of Petri net self-contained
and manageable. The biggest challenge in this work was to abstract as much of the model
generation process as possible from the user. This ensures that the user is required to
give only minimal information and requires the software to infer other information and
completely automate the model generation process. This is a key aspect of the novel work
presented in this thesis.
Once the process for model generation had been established it was applied to a pressure
tank system in chapter 5. This system served to illustrate the key concepts involved in the
model generation and was an important aspect of validating the process. This system was
later used in simulations to validate the software for the non-repairable case.
Chapter 6 discussed in more detail the structure and algorithms involved in the
implementation of this large and complex piece of software. The chapter can be divided
into the three elements of the software: the input files written by the user, the model
generation process and the simulation process. The chapter demonstrates each of the file
types required from the user by showing a step-by-step guide of how each is formatted.
Each file type requires minimal information for the software to build and simulate the
model. The input files are simple to construct where the only complexity is understanding
how a new component behaves. A function to create the circuit lists through recursive
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exploration of the system topology was generated for this reason. This is a particularly
useful function in that it only needs the information stored within the component table
and the system topology files. These lists then form the basis of the Circuit Petri nets.
The simulation process discussed is specific to the model that has been generated and
therefore includes unique steps that are not seen in other simulators. One particular
step is the need to wipe clean the memory of the Petri net when there is a change of
component and therefore system state. The simulator allows the user to specify the number
of simulations as well as the duration of each simulation. This means that the simulator
supports multiple consecutive missions performed by the same system, making it more
flexible in its application. The simulator outputs detailed failure data for components,
phases, missions and the overall system. The results of the simulations served to validate
the software as a whole; from user input files through the unique model generation methods
to the simulation that yields the final results. The results show an agreement with the
analytical solution to within a tolerance of ±5%. This showed convergence on the analytical
values calculated using phase fault trees within a few thousand simulations. The run time
for these results was approximately 2.5-3 days to complete the 10,000 simulations on a
typical laptop computer. It is likely that this could be reduced by an order of magnitude
with code optimisations. The time taken to generate the Petri net model itself is in the
order of tens of seconds, with execution time expected to rise in line with system size and
complexity. What would usually take an individual days or weeks to complete takes less
than a minute through this automated process.
The final chapter discusses how this software was further developed to cater for
repairable components, adding a further layer of complexity. The chapter discusses the
different maintenance plans that can be applied at either a component level or a system-
wide event. By incorporating the preventative maintenance plan, the software simulation
needed to change to account for the system being repaired outside the mission space. The
software also caters for standby components which allows a user to model redundancy
within a system. This would aid a design engineer in identifying to what extent providing
a standby component for one prone to failure would increase the success rate of their
system.
For further validation and to test the repairable case, the software was further applied to
a bulb system. The simulation results obtained from the software showed that the software
could produce results again within a tolerance of ±5%. Following minor simulation code
optimisations, the simulation time for the 5000 simulations carried out for this system took
less than 12 hours to produce. Multiple separate instances of the software can be run in
parallel in order to run a number of design solutions at the same time. Once the files
are generated, a single command performs the model generation and simulation process
unaided.
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This thesis has demonstrated a novel approach to generating a reliability model for
phased-mission systems using Petri nets. The approach requires a simple expression of
the system structure, its components and the mission the system is to undertake. This
allows engineers with little or no experience in the field of risk and reliability to perform
effective analyses of complex systems. From these inputs, a full model of the system is
generated. A software implementation of the model generation process is discussed and
used, in conjunction with a simulator written for the purpose. Further, the process has
been extended to support systems with repairable and redundant components. The overall
comparison of the results after 5,000 simulations with analytical results shows an error of
less than ±5% in both repairable and non-repairable cases.
8.2 Further Work
8.2.1 Optimisation Study
The software has already undergone a small optimisation study in which the time for
a simulation dropped to about a third of the previous value. It became apparent that
using strings to identify places and transitions affected significantly the performance of
the software, particularly when simulating the model, hence why a numeric identifier was
introduced. The building process relies heavily on the string identifiers in order to connect
the places and transitions together. If these were identified instead by numeric values then
the time to build the model would also be reduced.
8.2.2 Minimal Cut Sets
Currently the software returns the overall system unreliability for the mission and each of
the individual phases. Another output file lists the failures, repairs and maintenance that
takes place during each simulation run of the mission. Another potential output from the
software could be, for non-repairable systems, the minimal cut sets. This could be achieved
manually by the user if so desired by setting components to fail in certain phases of the
mission on each run to determine the minimal but sufficient component failures within the
system that would cause the system to fail. There is no reason this process could not be
automated using the software created. Instead of simulating the mission using generated
time to failures the software could be programmed to move through each component in the
topology and set the time to failure within a given phase and then run the mission. This
could be repeated for each individual component and then combinations of components
within a phase. If a component on its own could fail a given phase then this would not be
tested further within this phase as it is proven that it is sufficient to cause a phase failure.
This process would require a significant amount of computing time for larger systems when
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considering combinations of the system’s components. This would also depend on whether
time is a factor in working these minimal cut sets out. If a user was willing to wait a
significant amount of time then this may still be acceptable
This may even provide a faster method of generating the system reliability data for a
non-repairable systems of smaller systems. By using the minimal cut sets and applying the
work by La Band (2005). There is also no reason that the software could then produce an
output file that could be used within an application that can display the fault tree visually.
More study would be required into the feasibility of generating the analytical values from
the simulation model within a time that is satisfactory.
8.2.3 Automatic Generation of the System Structure File
From the files the user is required to generate as input to the software the system structure
file (.ss) has the greatest chance of error whilst generated by the user. The software will
detect most errors but the file would take time to create for larger systems. A method
to take a CAD diagram or Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (PID) and automatically
generate the file from these would save the user considerable time and effort, particularly
for larger systems. This is a method that has already been considered by Henry and
Andrews (1997) in which an AutoCAD diagram of the system is converted into a file to
show the component connections. This addition would reduce the overall time to generate
the simulation results, particularly for larger systems.
8.2.4 Multiple Interacting Systems
This software could easily be expanded to handle multiple systems that interact with each
other. This could be of particular interest if the user were designing an airport with a fleet
of aircraft. This would be done by allowing the user to enter multiple topology files into
the software and then generate a System Petri net for each system and then link them
together. If each system is undertaking a different mission this may be difficult to model
in a single Petri net model. This is due to the way in which the software simulates the time
of the mission. The Phase Petri net is used as a way of monitoring the time throughout
the simulation. If another Phase Petri net were included, any conflict between the two
would need to be resolved.
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Appendix A
User Interaction
A.1 Menu Interaction
The following shows how the user interacts with the software. The main menu of the
software can be seen in Figure A.1. This has 5 options:
1. Loading the project file name into the software
2. Build the Petri net model
3. Simulate the built Petri net model
4. Output the system to a file and to screen
5. Delete the current system and mission
If the first option is selected then the user is presented with a prompt as seen in Figure
A.2. This is where the user enters the project file (.prj), this must include the extension
of the file.
The second option is selected by the user once the file has been loaded. There are no
further prompts for the user.
The third option is selected by the user once the first two options have been selected.
The user is required to enter two further details:
• The number of simulations
• The simulation length. This should be divisible by the mission length. E.g. if a
mission is 20 hours long and the user wants to run the mission 5 consecutive times
then the simulation time is 100.
The fourth option allows the current system stored in the software to be printed to
file in a user friendly form. The file name is set as SystemFile.txt. This includes each
individual component class instances including the decision and operational mode tables,
the phase transition table and the circuit lists in the current system. The Component Petri
net instances, System Petri net, Circuit Petri net and Phase Petri net descriptions are also
included.
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Figure A.1: Main Menu Screen
Figure A.2: Main Menu Option 1
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Figure A.3: Main Menu Option 3

Appendix B
Pressure Tank System
B.1 Input Files
This section includes the files used to generate the Petri net based on the non-repairable
Pressure Tank System
B.1.1 Project File
File Name: p2.prj
- - PROJECT pressure_tank_system
- - DT files:
contact.dt;
fuse.dt;
motor.dt;
operator.dt;
powerSupply.dt;
pressureGauge.dt;
pump.dt;
relay.dt;
pushSwitch.dt;
toggleSwitch.dt;
tank.dt;
timerRelay.dt;
valve.dt;
junctionTwoIn.dt;
junctionOneIn.dt;
boundary.dt;
- - OMT files:
contact.omt;
pushSwitch.omt;
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toggleSwitch.omt;
valve.omt;
- - SS file:
ss_pts.ss;
- - PTT file:
ptt_m4.ptt;
- - SIM file:
simulation_3.sim;
B.1.2 Component Files
This section covers the decision and operational mode table files of each component type
within the pressure tank system.
B.1.2.1 Component Contact Decision and Operational Mode Table
File Name: contact.dt
DT contact
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, open, NC;
NC, -, NC;
C, closed, C;
}
File Name: contact.omt
OMT contact
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, F_closed, closed;
closed, EN, -, closed;
closed, DE, W, open;
open, -, F_open, open;
open, DE, -, open;
open, EN, W, closed;
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}
B.1.2.2 Component Fuse Decision Table
File Name: fuse.dt
DT fuse
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
C, W, C;
-, F, NC;
NC, -, NC;
}
B.1.2.3 Component Motor Decision Table
File Name: motor.dt
DT motor
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2;
C, W, C, ON;
-, F, NC, OFF;
NC, -, NC, OFF;
}
B.1.2.4 Component Operator Decision Table
File Name: operator.dt
DT operator
{
time:time1, in:in1, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2, out:out3;
(t=0), LPR, W, CL, CL, CL;
(0<t<3), LPR, W, NA, NA, NA;
-, HPR, W, OP, NA, NA;
-, VHPR, W, NA, OP, NA;
-, -, F, NA, NA, NA;
}
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B.1.2.5 Component Power Supply Decision Table
File Name: powerSupply.dt
DT power_supply
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
C, W, C;
-, F, NC;
NC, -, NC;
}
B.1.2.6 Component Pressure Gauge Decision Table
File Name: pressureGauge.dt
DT pressure_gauge
{
time:time1, in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
(t<1), CONST, W, LPR;
(t<1), INC, W, LPR;
(1), CONST, W, LPR;
(1), INC, W, HPR;
-, DEC, W, LPR;
(1<t<=3), CONST, W, HPR;
(1<t<=3), INC, W, VHPR;
-, -, F_LOW, LPR;
-, -, F_HIGH, HPR;
-, -, F_VHIGH, VHPR;
}
B.1.2.7 Component Pump Decision Table
File Name: pump.dt
DT pump
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
ON, W, FL;
-, F, NFL;
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OFF, -, NFL;
}
B.1.2.8 Component Relay Decision Table
File Name: relay.dt
DT relay
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2;
C, W, EN, C;
-, F, DE, NC;
NC, -, DE, NC;
}
B.1.2.9 Component Push Switch Decision and Operational Mode Table
File Name: pushSwitch.dt
DT push_switch
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, open, NC;
NC, -, NC;
C, closed, C;
}
File Name: pushSwitch.omt
OMT push_switch
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, F_closed, closed;
closed, CL, -, closed;
closed, NA, W, open;
open, -, F_open, open;
open, NA, -, open;
open, CL, W, closed;
}
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B.1.2.10 Component Toggle Switch Decision and Operational Mode Table
File Name: toggleSwitch.dt
DT toggle_switch
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, open, NC;
NC, -, NC;
C, closed, C;
}
File Name: toggleSwitch.omt
OMT toggle_switch
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, F_closed, closed;
closed, CL, -, closed;
closed, OP, W, open;
closed, NA, -, closed;
open, -, F_open, open;
open, OP, -, open;
open, NA, -, open;
open, CL, W, closed;
}
B.1.2.11 Component Tank Decision Table
File Name: tank.dt
DT tank
{
time:time1, in:in1, in:in2, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2;
-, FL, open, W, CONST, FL;
-, FL, closed, W, INC, NFL;
-, NFL, closed, W, CONST, NFL;
(t=<1), NFL, open, W, CONST, NFL;
(1<t=<3), NFL, open, W, DEC, FL;
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(t=<1), -, -, F, CONST, NFL;
(1<t=<3), -, -, F, DEC, NFL;
}
B.1.2.12 Component Timer Relay Decision Table
File Name: timerRelay.dt
DT timer_relay
{
time:time1, in:in1, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2;
(t<1), C, W, EN, C;
(t>=1), C, W, DE, NC;
-, -, F, DE, NC;
-, NC, -, DE, NC;
}
B.1.2.13 Component Valve Decision and Operational Mode Table
File Name: valve.dt
DT valve
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, closed, NFL;
NFL, open, NFL;
NFL, closed, NFL;
FL, open, FL;
}
File Name: valve.omt
OMT valve
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, F_closed, closed;
closed, CL, -, closed;
closed, OP, W, open;
closed, NA, -, closed;
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open, -, F_open, open;
open, OP, -, open;
open, NA, -, open;
open, CL, W, closed;
}
B.1.2.14 Component Junction Decision Tables
File Name: junctionTwoIn.dt
DT junction_two_in
{
in:in1, in:in2, out:out1;
C, -, C;
-, C, C;
NC, NC, NC;
}
File Name: junctionOneIn.dt
DT junction_one_in
{
in:in1, out:out1, out:out2;
C, C, C;
NC, NC, NC;
}
B.1.2.15 Component Boundary Decision Table
File Name: boundary.dt
DT boundary
{
in:in1;
FL;
NFL;
}
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B.1.3 System Structure File
File Name: ss_pts.ss
SS SS_Structure1
begin
S1 : push_switch
port map(
in1 => OP_S1;
in2 => J4_S1;
out1 => S1_J1;
)
J1 : junction_two_in
port map(
in1 => CT_J1;
in2 => S1_J1;
out1 => J1_PS1;
)
PS1 : power_supply
port map(
in1 => J1_PS1;
out1 => PS1_S2;
)
S2 : toggle_switch
port map(
in1 => OP_S2;
in2 => PS1_S2;
out1 => S2_J2;
)
J2 : junction_one_in
port map(
in1 => S2_J2;
out1 => J2_TIM;
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out2 => J2_R;
)
TIM : timer_relay
port map(
in1 => J2_TIM;
out1 => TIM_CT;
out2 => TIM_J3;
)
R : relay
port map(
in1 => J2_R;
out1 => R_CR;
out2 => R_J3;
)
J3 : junction_two_in
port map(
in1 => TIM_J3;
in2 => R_J3;
out1 => J3_J4;
)
J4 : junction_one_in
port map(
in1 => J3_J4;
out1 => J4_CT;
out2 => J4_S1;
)
CT : contact
port map(
in1 => TIM_CT;
in2 => J4_CT;
out1 => CT_J1;
)
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CR : contact
port map(
in1 => R_CR;
in2 => FS_CR;
out1 => CR_M;
)
M : motor
port map(
in1 => CR_M;
out1 => M_PS2;
out2 => M_P;
)
PS2 : power_supply
port map(
in1 => M_PS2;
out1 => PS2_FS;
)
FS : fuse
port map(
in1 => PS2_FS;
out1 => FS_CR;
)
P : pump
port map(
in1 => M_P;
out1 => P_T;
)
T : tank
port map(
in1 => P_T;
in2 => V_T;
out1 => T_PG;
out2 => T_V;
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)
V : valve
port map(
in1 => OP_V;
in2 => T_V;
out1 => V_B;
mode3 => V_T;
)
PG : pressure_gauge
port map(
in1 => T_PG;
out1 => PG_OP;
)
OP : operator
port map(
in1 => PG_OP;
out1 => OP_V;
out2 => OP_S2;
out3 => OP_S1;
)
B : boundary
port map(
in1 => V_B;
)
end
B.1.4 Phase Transition Table File
File Name: ptt_m4.ptt
ptt mission_1 {
time, from_phase, to_phase, condition;
0, 1, 2, CT.mode3=closed;
delta, 1, 8, CT.mode3=open;
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1, 2, 3, T.out1=CONST;
-, 2, 8, T.out1=CONST;
-, 3, 4, V.mode3=open;
delta, 3, 5, V.mode3=closed;
3, 4, 9, T.out1=DEC;
-, 4, 8, T.out1=CONST;
delta, 5, 6, CR.mode3=open;
delta, 5, 7, CR.mode3=closed;
}
B.1.5 Simulation File
File Name: simulation_2.sim
- - This is the simulation file for the pressure tank system
- - This file contains:
- - 1.) The modes of components with an operational mode table.
- - 2.) The failure and repair distributions/rate.
- - 3.) The initiating component
SIM
- - Component Modes:
- - List as component_identifier mode = mode_type; e.g. S1 mode = OP;
COMPONENT MODES
{
S1 mode = open;
S2 mode = closed;
CT mode = open;
CR mode = open;
V mode = closed;
}
- - Failure distributions/rates
- - List as component_identifier distribution_type(parameter_1, parameter_2);
- - for WEIBULL distribution: component_identifier weibull(characteristic_Life,
shape_parameter);
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- - for EXPONENTIAL distribution: component_identifier exponential(mean);
- - for NORMAL distribution: component_identifier normal(standard_deviation,
mean);
- - for time to failure: component_identifier ttf(rate);
FAILURE
{
S1 F_closed exponential(10);
S1 F_open exponential(10);
PS1 F exponential(1000.000);
S2 F_closed exponential(1000.000);
S2 F_open exponential(1.149689584);
TIM F exponential(1000.000);
R F exponential(10.000);
CT F_closed exponential(10.00);
CT F_open exponential(10.00);
CR F_closed exponential(4347.826087);
CR F_open exponential(4347.826087);
M F exponential(1000.000);
PS2 F exponential(1000.000);
FS F exponential(100.000);
P F exponential(10.000);
T F exponential(10000.000);
V F_closed exponential(33.333);
V F_open exponential(33.333);
PG F_LOW exponential(100.000);
PG F_HIGH exponential(100.000);
PG F_VHIGH exponential(100.000);
OP F exponential(10.000);
}
- - Initiating component
- - List as component_identifier port_name = value; e.g. OP out1 = CL;
INITIAL
{
OP out3 = CL;
}
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B.1.6 Setup File
File Name: setup.ini
– SETUP FILE –
INI
- - DEFAULT
- - Working state of components
working state :: W;
- - Wire link types current, no current used for the decision tables
- - List as Current, noCurrent
wire type :: C, NC;
B.2 Analytical Results
B.2.1 Single Mission
Table B.1 shows the phase reliability and unreliability values used within the analytical
calculations seen in Chapter 6.
B.3 Simulation Results
B.3.1 Single Mission
Tables B.2 - B.4 show the simulation results for the single mission condition for the Pressure
Tank System.
B.3.2 Multiple Missions
Table B.5 shows the simulation results for the testing of multiple consecutive missions
undertaken by the Pressure Tank System.
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Table B.2: Simulation Results for the single mission condition for the Pressure Tank System
(Simulations 0-4000)
Simulation Number of failures Phase Unreliability Mission
Number Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Unreliability
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 6 5 4 0 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.3
100 0 15 10 9 0 0.15 0.1 0.09 0.34
150 0 28 20 11 0 0.186666667 0.133333333 0.073333333 0.393333333
200 0 37 27 16 0 0.185 0.135 0.08 0.4
250 0 50 31 24 0 0.2 0.124 0.096 0.42
300 0 65 37 28 0 0.216666667 0.123333333 0.093333333 0.433333333
350 0 71 46 29 0 0.202857143 0.131428571 0.082857143 0.417142857
400 0 84 49 33 0 0.21 0.1225 0.0825 0.415
450 0 93 52 37 0 0.206666667 0.115555556 0.082222222 0.404444444
500 0 101 56 42 0 0.202 0.112 0.084 0.398
550 0 113 61 45 0 0.205454545 0.110909091 0.081818182 0.398181818
600 0 127 67 52 0 0.211666667 0.111666667 0.086666667 0.41
650 0 137 70 57 0 0.210769231 0.107692308 0.087692308 0.406153846
700 0 144 74 59 0 0.205714286 0.105714286 0.084285714 0.395714286
750 0 151 79 64 0 0.201333333 0.105333333 0.085333333 0.392
800 0 159 86 72 0 0.19875 0.1075 0.09 0.39625
850 0 175 88 76 0 0.205882353 0.103529412 0.089411765 0.398823529
900 0 183 94 79 0 0.203333333 0.104444444 0.087777778 0.395555556
950 0 191 99 82 0 0.201052632 0.104210526 0.086315789 0.391578947
1000 0 201 104 83 0 0.201 0.104 0.083 0.388
1050 0 212 111 84 0 0.201904762 0.105714286 0.08 0.387619048
1100 0 225 119 86 0 0.204545455 0.108181818 0.078181818 0.390909091
1150 0 233 125 90 0 0.202608696 0.108695652 0.07826087 0.389565217
1200 0 243 128 92 0 0.2025 0.106666667 0.076666667 0.385833333
1250 0 251 133 95 0 0.2008 0.1064 0.076 0.3832
1300 0 259 136 100 0 0.199230769 0.104615385 0.076923077 0.380769231
1350 0 270 141 101 0 0.2 0.104444444 0.074814815 0.379259259
1400 0 282 146 103 0 0.201428571 0.104285714 0.073571429 0.379285714
1450 0 295 148 106 0 0.203448276 0.102068966 0.073103448 0.37862069
1500 0 309 150 109 0 0.206 0.1 0.072666667 0.378666667
1550 0 316 155 112 0 0.203870968 0.1 0.072258065 0.376129032
1600 0 321 160 116 0 0.200625 0.1 0.0725 0.373125
1650 0 326 162 122 0 0.197575758 0.098181818 0.073939394 0.36969697
1700 0 335 168 125 0 0.197058824 0.098823529 0.073529412 0.369411765
1750 0 345 172 127 0 0.197142857 0.098285714 0.072571429 0.368
1800 0 356 178 130 0 0.197777778 0.098888889 0.072222222 0.368888889
1850 0 362 184 133 0 0.195675676 0.099459459 0.071891892 0.367027027
1900 0 371 187 135 0 0.195263158 0.098421053 0.071052632 0.364736842
1950 0 377 195 136 0 0.193333333 0.1 0.06974359 0.363076923
2000 0 382 198 140 0 0.191 0.099 0.07 0.36
2050 0 390 209 145 0 0.190243902 0.10195122 0.070731707 0.362926829
2100 0 398 212 147 0 0.18952381 0.100952381 0.07 0.36047619
2150 0 410 224 151 0 0.190697674 0.104186047 0.070232558 0.365116279
2200 0 421 230 154 0 0.191363636 0.104545455 0.07 0.365909091
2250 0 431 238 156 0 0.191555556 0.105777778 0.069333333 0.366666667
2300 0 442 240 160 0 0.192173913 0.104347826 0.069565217 0.366086957
2350 0 453 246 163 0 0.192765957 0.104680851 0.069361702 0.366808511
2400 0 463 248 165 0 0.192916667 0.103333333 0.06875 0.365
2450 0 472 256 169 0 0.192653061 0.104489796 0.068979592 0.366122449
2500 0 481 258 173 0 0.1924 0.1032 0.0692 0.3648
2550 0 490 263 176 0 0.192156863 0.103137255 0.069019608 0.364313725
2600 0 507 266 180 0 0.195 0.102307692 0.069230769 0.366538462
2650 0 517 272 181 0 0.19509434 0.102641509 0.068301887 0.366037736
2700 0 522 275 183 0 0.193333333 0.101851852 0.067777778 0.362962963
2750 0 535 279 184 0 0.194545455 0.101454545 0.066909091 0.362909091
2800 0 548 286 185 0 0.195714286 0.102142857 0.066071429 0.363928571
2850 0 563 290 187 0 0.19754386 0.101754386 0.065614035 0.364912281
2900 0 579 295 191 0 0.199655172 0.101724138 0.065862069 0.367241379
2950 0 584 298 197 0 0.197966102 0.101016949 0.066779661 0.365762712
3000 0 593 303 201 0 0.197666667 0.101 0.067 0.365666667
3050 0 599 311 206 0 0.196393443 0.101967213 0.067540984 0.365901639
3100 0 609 317 210 0 0.196451613 0.102258065 0.067741935 0.366451613
3150 0 622 320 213 0 0.197460317 0.101587302 0.067619048 0.366666667
3200 0 633 330 216 0 0.1978125 0.103125 0.0675 0.3684375
3250 0 643 336 220 0 0.197846154 0.103384615 0.067692308 0.368923077
3300 0 648 342 224 0 0.196363636 0.103636364 0.067878788 0.367878788
3350 0 657 344 226 0 0.196119403 0.102686567 0.067462687 0.366268657
3400 0 661 350 233 0 0.194411765 0.102941176 0.068529412 0.365882353
3450 0 672 357 234 0 0.194782609 0.103478261 0.067826087 0.366086957
3500 0 685 359 239 0 0.195714286 0.102571429 0.068285714 0.366571429
3550 0 690 371 242 0 0.194366197 0.104507042 0.068169014 0.367042254
3600 0 697 374 248 0 0.193611111 0.103888889 0.068888889 0.366388889
3650 0 706 379 249 0 0.193424658 0.103835616 0.068219178 0.365479452
3700 0 721 383 253 0 0.194864865 0.103513514 0.068378378 0.366756757
3750 0 728 389 259 0 0.194133333 0.103733333 0.069066667 0.366933333
3800 0 738 396 263 0 0.194210526 0.104210526 0.069210526 0.367631579
3850 0 747 399 270 0 0.194025974 0.103636364 0.07012987 0.367792208
3900 0 756 406 274 0 0.193846154 0.104102564 0.07025641 0.368205128
3950 0 764 411 279 0 0.193417722 0.104050633 0.070632911 0.368101266
4000 0 771 415 282 0 0.19275 0.10375 0.0705 0.367
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Table B.3: Simulation Results for the single mission condition for the Pressure Tank System
(Simulations 4050-8000)
Simulation Number of failures Phase Unreliability Mission
Number Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Unreliability
4050 0 781 422 285 0 0.192839506 0.104197531 0.07037037 0.367407407
4100 0 794 427 288 0 0.193658537 0.104146341 0.070243902 0.36804878
4150 0 804 430 291 0 0.19373494 0.103614458 0.070120482 0.36746988
4200 0 819 435 296 0 0.195 0.103571429 0.07047619 0.369047619
4250 0 828 444 298 0 0.194823529 0.104470588 0.070117647 0.369411765
4300 0 840 451 301 0 0.195348837 0.104883721 0.07 0.370232558
4350 0 851 456 302 0 0.195632184 0.104827586 0.069425287 0.369885057
4400 0 859 460 305 0 0.195227273 0.104545455 0.069318182 0.369090909
4450 0 867 465 309 0 0.194831461 0.104494382 0.069438202 0.368764045
4500 0 879 471 312 0 0.195333333 0.104666667 0.069333333 0.369333333
4550 0 887 480 313 0 0.194945055 0.105494505 0.068791209 0.369230769
4600 0 899 485 318 0 0.195434783 0.105434783 0.069130435 0.37
4650 0 903 497 320 0 0.194193548 0.10688172 0.068817204 0.369892473
4700 0 912 503 322 0 0.194042553 0.107021277 0.068510638 0.369574468
4750 0 923 507 325 0 0.194315789 0.106736842 0.068421053 0.369473684
4800 0 933 513 328 0 0.194375 0.106875 0.068333333 0.369583333
4850 0 942 519 331 0 0.194226804 0.107010309 0.068247423 0.369484536
4900 0 950 523 339 0 0.193877551 0.106734694 0.069183673 0.369795918
4950 0 960 528 340 0 0.193939394 0.106666667 0.068686869 0.369292929
5000 0 975 530 342 0 0.195 0.106 0.0684 0.3694
5050 0 987 534 344 0 0.195445545 0.105742574 0.068118812 0.369306931
5100 0 997 543 348 0 0.195490196 0.106470588 0.068235294 0.370196078
5150 0 1008 550 351 0 0.195728155 0.106796117 0.06815534 0.370679612
5200 0 1016 556 353 0 0.195384615 0.106923077 0.067884615 0.370192308
5250 0 1032 560 354 0 0.196571429 0.106666667 0.067428571 0.370666667
5300 0 1043 564 357 0 0.196792453 0.106415094 0.067358491 0.370566038
5350 0 1054 571 363 0 0.197009346 0.106728972 0.067850467 0.371588785
5400 0 1060 575 367 0 0.196296296 0.106481481 0.067962963 0.370740741
5450 0 1068 588 369 0 0.195963303 0.107889908 0.067706422 0.371559633
5500 0 1078 591 371 0 0.196 0.107454545 0.067454545 0.370909091
5550 0 1087 595 376 0 0.195855856 0.107207207 0.067747748 0.370810811
5600 0 1099 603 380 0 0.19625 0.107678571 0.067857143 0.371785714
5650 0 1108 610 380 0 0.196106195 0.107964602 0.067256637 0.371327434
5700 0 1120 614 382 0 0.196491228 0.107719298 0.067017544 0.37122807
5750 0 1134 617 387 0 0.197217391 0.107304348 0.067304348 0.371826087
5800 0 1147 622 392 0 0.197758621 0.107241379 0.067586207 0.372586207
5850 0 1154 630 395 0 0.197264957 0.107692308 0.067521368 0.372478632
5900 0 1163 637 400 0 0.197118644 0.107966102 0.06779661 0.372881356
5950 0 1172 644 403 0 0.19697479 0.108235294 0.067731092 0.372941176
6000 0 1180 649 405 0 0.196666667 0.108166667 0.0675 0.372333333
6050 0 1190 652 410 0 0.196694215 0.107768595 0.067768595 0.372231405
6100 0 1203 657 412 0 0.197213115 0.107704918 0.067540984 0.372459016
6150 0 1213 659 416 0 0.197235772 0.107154472 0.067642276 0.37203252
6200 0 1226 664 418 0 0.197741935 0.107096774 0.067419355 0.372258065
6250 0 1232 669 420 0 0.19712 0.10704 0.0672 0.37136
6300 0 1240 678 424 0 0.196825397 0.107619048 0.067301587 0.371746032
6350 0 1250 681 426 0 0.196850394 0.107244094 0.067086614 0.371181102
6400 0 1259 688 427 0 0.19671875 0.1075 0.06671875 0.3709375
6450 0 1267 696 429 0 0.196434109 0.107906977 0.066511628 0.370852713
6500 0 1277 702 429 0 0.196461538 0.108 0.066 0.370461538
6550 0 1286 708 431 0 0.196335878 0.108091603 0.065801527 0.370229008
6600 0 1295 714 438 0 0.196212121 0.108181818 0.066363636 0.370757576
6650 0 1306 726 439 0 0.196390977 0.109172932 0.066015038 0.371578947
6700 0 1316 731 441 0 0.19641791 0.109104478 0.065820896 0.371343284
6750 0 1323 736 442 0 0.196 0.109037037 0.065481481 0.370518519
6800 0 1335 740 446 0 0.196323529 0.108823529 0.065588235 0.370735294
6850 0 1346 748 450 0 0.19649635 0.10919708 0.065693431 0.371386861
6900 0 1359 753 452 0 0.196956522 0.109130435 0.065507246 0.371594203
6950 0 1371 757 455 0 0.197266187 0.108920863 0.065467626 0.371654676
7000 0 1381 762 457 0 0.197285714 0.108857143 0.065285714 0.371428571
7050 0 1390 764 460 0 0.197163121 0.108368794 0.065248227 0.370780142
7100 0 1401 765 466 0 0.197323944 0.107746479 0.065633803 0.370704225
7150 0 1411 768 470 0 0.197342657 0.107412587 0.065734266 0.37048951
7200 0 1421 772 473 0 0.197361111 0.107222222 0.065694444 0.370277778
7250 0 1426 783 475 0 0.196689655 0.108 0.065517241 0.370206897
7300 0 1438 785 477 0 0.196986301 0.107534247 0.065342466 0.369863014
7350 0 1451 792 480 0 0.197414966 0.107755102 0.065306122 0.37047619
7400 0 1462 797 481 0 0.197567568 0.107702703 0.065 0.37027027
7450 0 1474 800 486 0 0.197852349 0.10738255 0.065234899 0.370469799
7500 0 1481 807 491 0 0.197466667 0.1076 0.065466667 0.370533333
7550 0 1489 811 494 0 0.197218543 0.107417219 0.065430464 0.370066225
7600 0 1499 817 497 0 0.197236842 0.1075 0.065394737 0.370131579
7650 0 1511 821 501 0 0.19751634 0.107320261 0.065490196 0.370326797
7700 0 1528 826 503 0 0.198441558 0.107272727 0.065324675 0.371038961
7750 0 1535 832 506 0 0.198064516 0.107354839 0.065290323 0.370709677
7800 0 1547 838 507 0 0.198333333 0.107435897 0.065 0.370769231
7850 0 1559 844 511 0 0.198598726 0.107515924 0.065095541 0.371210191
7900 0 1567 853 516 0 0.19835443 0.107974684 0.065316456 0.37164557
7950 0 1579 856 519 0 0.198616352 0.107672956 0.065283019 0.371572327
8000 0 1588 860 524 0 0.1985 0.1075 0.0655 0.3715
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Table B.4: Simulation Results for the single mission condition for the Pressure Tank
System: (Simulations 8050-10000)
Simulation Number of failures Phase Unreliability Mission
Number Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Unreliability
8050 0 1599 865 530 0 0.19863354 0.107453416 0.065838509 0.371925466
8100 0 1613 870 534 0 0.199135802 0.107407407 0.065925926 0.372469136
8150 0 1622 876 537 0 0.199018405 0.107484663 0.065889571 0.372392638
8200 0 1628 884 540 0 0.198536585 0.107804878 0.065853659 0.372195122
8250 0 1637 887 542 0 0.198424242 0.107515152 0.06569697 0.371636364
8300 0 1649 896 543 0 0.198674699 0.107951807 0.065421687 0.372048193
8350 0 1658 901 547 0 0.198562874 0.107904192 0.065508982 0.371976048
8400 0 1668 906 549 0 0.198571429 0.107857143 0.065357143 0.371785714
8450 0 1685 909 551 0 0.199408284 0.107573964 0.065207101 0.372189349
8500 0 1697 913 555 0 0.199647059 0.107411765 0.065294118 0.372352941
8550 0 1705 917 557 0 0.199415205 0.107251462 0.065146199 0.371812865
8600 0 1709 924 562 0 0.19872093 0.10744186 0.065348837 0.371511628
8650 0 1722 930 564 0 0.199075145 0.107514451 0.065202312 0.371791908
8700 0 1732 934 565 0 0.19908046 0.107356322 0.064942529 0.37137931
8750 0 1744 940 569 0 0.199314286 0.107428571 0.065028571 0.371771429
8800 0 1752 948 571 0 0.199090909 0.107727273 0.064886364 0.371704545
8850 0 1760 957 574 0 0.198870056 0.108135593 0.064858757 0.371864407
8900 0 1768 963 576 0 0.198651685 0.108202247 0.064719101 0.371573034
8950 0 1780 968 578 0 0.198882682 0.108156425 0.064581006 0.371620112
9000 0 1789 977 581 0 0.198777778 0.108555556 0.064555556 0.371888889
9050 0 1798 979 586 0 0.198674033 0.108176796 0.064751381 0.37160221
9100 0 1805 983 587 0 0.198351648 0.108021978 0.064505495 0.370879121
9150 0 1811 991 590 0 0.197923497 0.108306011 0.064480874 0.370710383
9200 0 1819 994 594 0 0.197717391 0.108043478 0.064565217 0.370326087
9250 0 1829 999 597 0 0.19772973 0.108 0.064540541 0.37027027
9300 0 1841 1004 601 0 0.197956989 0.107956989 0.064623656 0.370537634
9350 0 1851 1012 603 0 0.197967914 0.108235294 0.064491979 0.370695187
9400 0 1861 1018 604 0 0.197978723 0.108297872 0.064255319 0.370531915
9450 0 1874 1018 610 0 0.198306878 0.107724868 0.064550265 0.370582011
9500 0 1884 1021 612 0 0.198315789 0.107473684 0.064421053 0.370210526
9550 0 1895 1027 613 0 0.198429319 0.107539267 0.064188482 0.370157068
9600 0 1907 1032 616 0 0.198645833 0.1075 0.064166667 0.3703125
9650 0 1914 1037 619 0 0.198341969 0.10746114 0.064145078 0.369948187
9700 0 1923 1043 623 0 0.198247423 0.107525773 0.064226804 0.37
9750 0 1933 1051 625 0 0.19825641 0.107794872 0.064102564 0.370153846
9800 0 1948 1059 630 0 0.19877551 0.108061224 0.064285714 0.371122449
9850 0 1956 1063 634 0 0.19857868 0.107918782 0.064365482 0.370862944
9900 0 1971 1067 637 0 0.199090909 0.107777778 0.064343434 0.371212121
9950 0 1985 1073 643 0 0.199497487 0.107839196 0.064623116 0.371959799
10000 0 1990 1080 645 0 0.199 0.108 0.0645 0.3715
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Appendix C
Bulb System
C.1 Input Files
This section includes the files used to generate the Petri net based on the repairable bulb
system.
C.1.1 Project File
- - PROJECT bulb_system
- - DT files:
toggleSwitch.dt;
powerSupply.dt;
b_operator.dt;
bulb.dt;
junctionOneIn.dt;
junctionTwoIn.dt;
- - OMT files:
toggleSwitch.omt;
- - SS file:
ss_b1.ss
- - PTT file:
ptt_b1.ptt;
- - SIM file:
simulation_b1.sim;
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C.1.2 Component Files
This section covers the decision and operational mode table files of each component type
within the bulb system.
C.1.2.1 Component Power Supply Decision Table
File Name: powerSupply.dt
DT power_supply
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
C, W, C;
-, F, NC;
NC, -, NC;
-, UR, NC;
}
C.1.2.2 Component Toggle Switch Decision and Operational Mode Table
File Name: toggleSwitch.dt
DT toggle_switch
{
in:in2, mode:mode3, out:out1;
-, open, NC;
NC, -, NC;
C, closed, C;
}
File Name: toggleSwitch.omt
OMT toggle_switch
{
mode:mode1, in:in1, state:state1, mode:mode2;
closed, -, F_closed, closed;
closed, CL, -, closed;
closed, OP, W, open;
closed, NA, -, closed;
closed, -, UR, open;
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open, -, F_open, open;
open, OP, -, open;
open, NA, -, open;
open, CL, W, closed;
open, -, UR, open;
}
C.1.2.3 Component Operator Decision Table
File Name: b_operator.dt
DT_operator
{
time:time1, in:in1, state:state1, out:out1;
0, OFF, W, CL;
(0<t<=20), OFF, W, NA;
(0<t<20), ON, W, NA;
20, ON, W, OP;
-, -, F, NA;
}
C.1.2.4 Component Bulb Decision Table
File Name: bulb.dt
DT bulb
{
in:in1, state:state1, out:out1, out:out2;
C, W, C, ON;
NC, -, NC, OFF;
-, F, NC, OFF;
-, UR, NC, OFF;
}
C.1.2.5 Component Junction Decision Tables
File Name: junctionTwoIn.dt
DT junction_two_in
{
in:in1, in:in2, out:out1;
C, -, C;
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-, C, C;
NC, NC, NC;
}
File Name: junctionOneIn.dt
DT junction_one_in
{
in:in1, out:out1, out:out2;
C, C, C;
NC, NC, NC;
}
C.1.3 System Structure File
File Name: ss_b1.ss
SS SS_Structure_bulb
begin
OP : b_operator
port map(
in1 => B_OP;
out1 => OP_S1;
)
S1 : toggle_switch
port map(
in1 => OP_S1;
in2 => J2_S1;
out1 => S1_B;
)
PS1 : power_supply
port map(
in1 => J1_PS1;
out1 => PS1_J2;
)
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PS2 : power_supply
port map(
in1 => J1_PS2;
out1 => PS2_J2;
)
J1 : junction_one_in
port map(
in1 => B_J1;
out1 => J1_PS1;
out2 => J1_PS2;
)
J2 : junction_two_in
port map(
in1 => PS1_J2;
in2 => PS2_J2;
out1 => J2_S1;
)
B : bulb
port map(
in1 => S1_B;
out1 => B_J1;
out2 => B_OP;
)
end
C.1.4 Phase Transition Table File
File Name: ppt_b1.ptt
ptt mission_b1
{
time, from_phase, to_phase, condition;
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0, 1, 2, B.out2=ON;
delta, 1, 4, B.out2=OFF;
20, 2, 3, B.out2=OFF;
-, 2, 5, B.out2=OFF;
delta, 2, 6, B.out2=ON;
}
C.1.5 Simulation File
File Name: simulation_b1.sim
SIM
COMPONENT MODES
{
S1 mode = open;
}
FAILURE
{
S1 F_closed exponential(1000);
S1 F_open exponential(1000);
PS1 F exponential(150.00);
B F exponential(200.00);
PS2 F exponential(150.00);
}
REPAIR
{
S1 exponential(10);
PS1 exponential(50.000);
PS2 exponential(50.000);
B exponential(10.000);
}
- - Maintenance Plan
MAINTENANCE
{ corrective PS1(eng1);
corrective PS2(eng2);
corrective S1(eng4);
corrective B(eng5);
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}
- -STANDBY
{
PS1 * COLD(PS2);
PS2 COLD(PS1);
}
INITIAL
{
OP out1 = CL;
}
C.1.6 Setup File
File Name: setup.ini
– SETUP FILE –
INI
- - DEFAULT
- - Working state of components
working state :: W;
- - Default under repair state
repair state :: UR;
- - Wire link types current, no current used for the decision tables
- - List as Current, noCurrent
wire type :: C, NC;
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